POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 


POETIC  JUSTICE    IN   THE 
DRAMA 


The  History  of  an  Ethical  Principle 
in  Literary  Criticism 


By  M.  A.  QUINLAN,  C.  S.  C,  PH.  D. 


UNIVERSITY  PRESS 

Notre  Dame,  Indiana 

1912 


Copyright,  1912 
By  M.  A.  QUINLAN    C.  S    C. 


1475 

QH4 


TO 

THE  MEMORY   OF 

MY  MOTHER 


PREFACE. 


The  book  which  is  here  presented  to  the  public 
constitutes  only  a  part  of  a  much  larger  work  in  which 
the  author  has  become  interested,  namely,  The 
History  of  Ethical  Principles  in  Literary  Criticism. 
In  the  present  case  no  attempt  has  been  made  to 
discuss  anything  but  the  historical  aspect  of  the 
matter.  Poetic  Justice  in  the  Drama  is  a  large  subject 
in  itself  and  admits  of  a  wider  range  of  treatment 
than  has  been  here  attempted.  As  a  problem  study 
it  presents  the  solution  of  two  difficulties,  one  con- 
cerning the  Greek  origin  of  the  doctrine  of  rewards 
and  punishments  in  dramatic  art,  the  other  con- 
cerning the  English  basis  of  the  same  doctrine.  In 
order  to  treat  these  two  problems  in  a  satisfactory 
manner,  it  was  necessary  to  examine  closely  the  lead- 
ing sources  of  literary  criticism  from  Plato  to  Addison, 
and  to  give  special  attention  to  certain  minor  literary 
critics  who  flourished  in  England  during  the  last 
quarter  of  the  seventeenth  century  and  the  first 
quarter  of  the  eighteenth.  To  the  solution  of  these 
two  problems  has  been  added  a  study  of  the  general 
attitude  of  literary  critics  towards  the  doctrine  of 
poetic  justice  during  the  two  centuries  that  have 
elapsed  since  Addison's  time. 

Historically,  the  drama  takes  precedence  over 
other  literary  types  that  might  be  studied  in  con- 
nection with  this  subject,  and  as  a  matter  of  fact 

[*] 


PREFACE 

the  controversy  that  first  arose  in  England  in  regard 
to  poetic  justice  was  concerned  specifically  with 
the  drama;  but  this  does  not  mean  that  other 
literary  types  are  to  be  ignored  in  making  a  complete 
study  of  this  principle  of  literary  art.  Criticism  of 
the  novel,  since  the  earliest  period  of  the  development 
of  the  novel,  has  taken  note  of  the  attention  which 
novelists  have  given  this  same  principle.  Narrative 
discourse  of  all  types,  including  the  epic,  affords 
suitable  material  for  the  literary  critic  who  has 
any  interest  in  advocating  the  doctrine  or  in  arguing 
against  it;  and  to  make  a  complete  study  of  poetic 
justice,  it  would  be  necessary  to  examine  literary 
criticism  in  its  bearing  upon  the  whole  field  of  nar- 
rative and  dramatic  literature. 

The  study  of  poetic  justice  necessarily  involves 
a  study  of  ethical  principles  in  literary  art;  for  the 
very  idea  of  poetic  justice  implies  a  judgment  regard- 
ing the  morality  of  action.  As  a  result,  then,  of 
studying  literary  criticism,  it  is  possible  to  come  to 
a  partial  knowledge  of  the  principles  of  morality  by 
which  a  given  race  of  people  was  governed  at  some 
given  time.  If,  for  instance,  the  advocates  of 
poetic  justice  of  one  century  require  that  punishment 
be  meted  out  in  atonement  for  an  act  which  the 
advocates  of  poetic  justice  in  another  century  might 
be  disposed  to  condone,  it  is  easy  to  conceive  that  the 
difference  between  critics  implies  a  sort  of  difference 
in  the  prevailing  principles  of  morality.  Just  what 
these  principles  have  been  in  any  particular  period 
of  the  literary  history  of  a  race,  can  be  somewhat 
determined  as  a  result  of  study  the  works  of  con- 
temporaneous literary  critics  and  of  such  contem- 


PREFACE 

poraneous   dramatists   as   recognized   in   a   practical 
way   the   principle   of   poetic   justice. 

Prominent  among  the  subjects  which  must  be 
thought  of  by  any  one  who  makes  a  study  of  the 
problem  of  poetic  justice,  is  that  which  takes  into 
consideration  the  aim  and  end  of  art.  In  order  to 
accept  or  reject  the  dogma  of  rewards  and  punish- 
ments in  literature,  one  must  Carefully  consider 
whether  or  not  it  is  the  aim  and  end  of  art  to  instruct. 
It  was  not  necessary,  however,  that  the  writer 
should  offer  any  very  specific  and  final  answer  to 
this  large  question.  The  doctrine  of  poetic  justice 
has  been  understood  in  different  ways  by  literary 
critics,  and  has  been  applied  so  rigorously  by  some 
writers,  that  the  rejection  of  the  doctrine  does  not 
necessarily  imply  a  denial  that  instruction  should 
be  the  chief  aim  of  literary  art.  This  much  may  be 
said  as  pointing  towards  an  answer:  on  the  one 
hand  the  gross  violation  of  the  principle  of  poetic 
justice,  as  ordinarily  understood,  is  highly  inartistic 
in  its  effect;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  absolute 
conformity  to  an  extreme  form  of  poetic  justice 
works  against  the  best  interests  of  art. 


[  iii  ] 


CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  I.     Greek  Origin  of  Poetic  Justice: 

Addison's  Revolt 1-7 

Aristotle's  Influence  in  Literary  Criticism. 7-21 

Mediaeval  Theories   of   Poetry 21-29 

Plato's  Doctrine  of  Poetic  Justice 29-48 

Aristotle's  Idea  of  Tragedy 48-63 

CHAPTER  II.     English  Basis  of  Poetic  Justice: 

An   Erroneous   Assertion   Concerning  Rymer 64-67 

Religious  and  Political  Restraint  of  the  Drama.  .  .67-81 

The  Early  Puritan  Attitude  Toward  Plays 81-88 

Sidney's  Ethical  Requirement  in  Poetry 88-95 

Puttenham's  Treatment   of   the   Problem 95-103 

Harington's    Discussion   of   Poetry 103-109 

Bacon  and  Some  of  his  Successors 109-1 14 

CHAPTER  III.     Two  Prominent  Advocates  of   Poetic 
Justice: 

Dryden's  Idea  of  Tragedy 11 5-1 1 9 

Early  Critical  Opinions  of  Dryden 120-123 

Dryden    Accepts    the    Doctrine    of    Rewards    and 

Punishments 1 23-131 

A  Summary  of  Dryden's  Views 1 31-1 34 

Rymer's     First     Contribution     to     Literary     Crit- 
icism  1 34-1 39 

Rapin's   Influence   on    Rymer 139-148 

"The  Tragedies  of  the  Last  Age" 148-164 

Rymer's  Criticism  of  Shakespeare 164-166 

A  General  View  of  Rymer's  Opinions 167-168 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER   IV.     Later  Development  in  the  Doctrine 
of  Poetic  Justice: 

John   Dennis  Defends  the   Doctrine 169-183 

Joseph   Addison   Institutes  a   Revolt 183-189 

Charles  Gildon  Accepts  the  Traditional  View.  .  .189-199 

Other   Eighteenth  Century   Critics 199-206 

Recent   Opinions  about   Poetic  Justice 207-216 

Conclusion 216-219 


[vi] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

CHAPTER   I 
Greek  Origin  of  Poetic   Justice 

addison's  revolt 

WRITING  in  the  Spectator  for  April  16,  1711, 
Joseph  Addison  took  the  English  writers  of 
tragedy  to  task  for  constructing  their  plays 
in  accordance  with  a  certain  principle  of  dramatic 
art  which  he  described  as  "  a  ridiculous  doctrine 
of  modern  criticism."*  For  more  than  a  quarter 
of  a  century  before  this  time,  literary  criticism  had 
been  making  a  vigorous  campaign  against  the  ethics 
of  the  English  drama.  Beaumont  and  Fletcher 
and  Jonson  and  Shakespeare  were  the  most  dis- 
tinguished of  the  playwrights  against  whom  the 
attack  had  been  made.  Fault  was  found  with  these 
in  particular  because  they  failed  to  observe  the 
law  of  poetic  justice  in  the  distribution  of  rewards 
and  punishments.  Other  writers  of  plays  were 
condemned  because,  of  the  gross  immoralities  which 
they  portrayed,  and  some  because  they  violated  the 
unities  of  time,  place,  and  action.  Addison  decided 
that  it  was  time  to  put  a  stop  to  the  excessively 
rigorous    tactics    of    the   critics.     He    felt   sure    that 

*  Xo.  40.  At  the  end  of  this  volume  will  be  found  a 
list  of  works  to  which  reference  is  made  in  these  pages. 
In  that  list  is  given  the  date  and  place  of  publication  of 
the  editions  from  which  citations  are  made. 

[1  ] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE   DRAMA 

English  tragedy  was  not  inferior  to  that  upon  which 
the  laws  of  tragedy  were  founded  by  Aristotle,  and 
he  judged  that  a  true  interpretation  of  those  laws 
would  serve  not  only  to  justify  the  practice  of 
artists  like  Shakespeare,  but  also  to  correct  the 
mistakes  which  later  dramatists  had  made.  He 
did  not  propose  that  the  dramatist  should  be  free 
from  all  moral  restraint,  but  he  did  object  to 
the  limitations  imposed  on  tragedy  by  such  a  law 
as  that  of  poetic  justice.  Addison's,  so  far  as  can 
be  ascertained,  was  the  first  formal  expression  of 
revolt  in   England  against  this  doctrine. 

In  order  that  there  may  be  a  clear  under- 
standing of  what  was  Addison's  conception  of  the 
doctrine  of  poetic  justice,  it  will  be  necessary  to 
quote  the  passage  in  which  the  expression  of  this 
revolt  occurs.  "  The  English  writers  of  tragedy," 
says  Addison,  "  are  possessed  with  a  notion,  that 
when  they  represent  a  virtuous  or  innocent  person 
in  distress,  they  ought  not  to  leave  him  till  they 
have  delivered  him  out  of  his  troubles,  or  made  him 
triumph  over  his  enemies.  This  error  they  have 
been  led  into  by  a  ridiculous  doctrine  in  modern 
criticism,  that  they  are  obliged  to  an  equal  dis- 
tribution of  rewards  and  punishments,  and  an 
impartial  execution  of  poetical  justice.  Who  were 
the  first  to  establish  this  rule  I  know  not;  but  I 
am  sure  it  has  no  foundation  in  nature,  in  reason, 
or  in  the  practice  of  the  ancients.  We  find  that 
good  and  evil  happen  alike  to  all  men  on  this  side 
of  the  grave;  and  as  the  principal  design  of  tragedy 
is  to  raise  commiseration  and  terror  in  the  minds 
of  the   audience,   we   shall   defeat   this   great  end  if 

[2] 


ADDISON'S  REVOLT 

we  always   make  virtue  and  innocence  happy   and 
successful."* 

Three  observations  are  to  be  made  in  regard 
to  the  foregoing  quotation.  In  the  first  place,  it 
is  evident  that  Addison  had  in  mind  Aristotle's 
definition  of  tragedy,  since  he  speaks  of  commisera- 
tion and  terror  as  being  the  emotions  which  it  is 
the  chief  design  of  tragedy  to  raise.  Aristotle's 
definition  is  this,  "  Tragedy  is  an  imitation  of  an 
action  that  is  serious,  complete,  and  of  a  certain 
magnitude;  in  language  embellished  with  each 
kind  of  artistic  ornament,  the  several  kinds  being 
found  in  separate  parts  of  the  play;  in  the  form 
of  action  not  of  narrative;  through  pity  and  fear 
effecting  the  proper  purgation  of  these  emotions. "f 
Addison's  words  refer  distinctly  to  the  last  of  the 
clauses  of  this  definition,  and  give  us  reason  there- 
fore to  conclude  that  the  study  of  the  development 
of  the  idea  of  poetic  justice  must  take  into  con- 
sideration the  views  of  commentators  on  that  part 
of  Aristotle's  definition  which  refers  to  the  emotions 
of  pity  and  fear.  Addison  thought  that  these 
emotions  could  not  be  aroused  if  the  dramatist  always 
rewarded  virtue  and  with  like  regularity  punished 
vice.  There  were  others  who  maintained  that  this 
same  emotional  effect  could  not  be  produced  unless 
the  dramatist  faithfully  observed  the  rule  for  rewards 
and  punishments  in  regard  to  all  the  characters  of 
the  play.  A  difference  of  opinions,  such  as  is  here 
indicated,  complicates  in  a  special  manner  the 
difficult    problem    of   interpreting    the    famous    'pity 

*  Ibid. 

f  'Poetics,  VI.;    in  Butcher's  text,  pp.  22—23. 

[3] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

and  fear'  clause  in  Aristotle's  definition  of  tragedy. 
No  passage  in  the  Poetics  has  created  more  dis- 
cussion than  this,  and  none  has  been  more  variously 
interpreted.  When  we  come  to  the  discussion  of 
Aristotle's  views  on  the  ethical  function  of  poetry, 
we  shall  explain  Aristotle's  reference  to  the  emotions 
of  pity  and  fear. 

The  second  observation  to  be  made  concerning 
the  quotation  from  Addison  is  to  the  effect,  that  he 
evidently  holds  that  Aristotle  neither  instituted  nor 
recommended  the  doctrine  of  poetic  justice.  The 
sweeping  charge  that  this  doctrine  has  no  founda- 
tion in  the  tragedies  of  the  Greeks,  is  followed  by 
an  argument  based  on  Aristotle's  idea  of  tragedy; 
for  he  says  that  if  we  adhere  to  this  rule  of  poetic 
justice,  we  shall  defeat  the  great  end  of  tragedy 
which  is  "  to  raise  commiseration  and  terror  in  the 
minds  of  the  audience."  Addison  understood  the 
Poetics  well  enough  to  realize  that  Aristotle  regarded 
the  spectacle  of  unrewarded  virtue  as  a  suitable 
means  of  arousing  the  emotion  of  pity. «. 

In  the  third  place,  it  is  to  be  noted  that 
Addison  does  not  know  who  it  was  that  first  estab- 
lished the  doctrine  of  poetic  justice.  That  he  pro- 
fessed his  ignorance  in  this  matter  is  in  itself 
sufficient  reason  to  speak  of  the  origin  of  poetic 
justice  as  one  of  the  problems  of  literary  criticism. 
Dennis,  who  wrote  a  reply  to  Addison,  did  not 
regard  the  problem  as  a  difficult  one.  He  quoted 
Addison's  remarks  in  part  and  then  made  his 
commentary  in  these  words:  "But  who  were  the 
first  who  established  this  rule  he  is  not  able  to  tell. 
I  take  it  for  granted,  that  a  man  who  is  ingenious 

[4] 


ADDISON'S  REVOLT 

enough  to  own  his  ignorance,  is  willing  to  be  in- 
structed. Let  me  tell  him  then,  that  the  first  who 
established  this  ridiculous  doctrine  of  modern  crit- 
icism, was  a  certain  modern  critic,  who  lived  above 
two  thousand  years  ago;  and  who  tells  us  expressly 
in  the  thirteenth  chapter  of  his  critical  Spectator, 
which  pedants  call  his  Poetic,  That  since  a  tragedy, 
to  have  all  the  beauty  of  which  it  is  capable,  ought 
to  be  implex  and  simple,  (by  the  way,  Mr.  Spectator, 
you  must  bear  with  this  critical  cant,  as  we  -  do 
with  your  speculations  and  lucubrations)  and  ought 
to  move  to  compassion  and  terror,  for  we  have  already 
shown  that  the  exciting  these  passions  is  the  proper 
effect  of  a  tragical  imitation,  it  follows  necessarily, 
that  we  must  not  choose  a  very  good  man,  to  plunge 
him  from  a  prosperous  condition  into  adversity, 
for  instead  of  moving  compassion  and  terror,  that 
on  the  contrary  would  create  horror  and  would 
be   detested   by   all   the  world. 

"  And  does  not  the  same  deluded  philosopher 
tell  us  in  the  very  same  chapter  that  the  fable  to 
which  he  gives  second  preference,  is  that  which  has 
a  double  constitution,  and  which  ends  by  a  double 
catastrophe;  a  catastrophe  favorable  to  the  good 
and  fatal  to  the  wicked.  Is  not  here,  Mr.  Spectator, 
a  very  formal  recommendation  of  the  impartial  and 
exact  execution  of  poetical  justice?  Thus  Aristotle 
was  the  first  who  established  this  ridiculous  doctrine 
of  modern  criticism."* 

The  language  of  Addison's  opponent  might 
seem    to   afford   a   final   answer   to   the   question   at 

*  An  Essay  on  the  Genius  and  Writings  of  Shakespeare 
with    some    Letters    of    Criticism    to    the    Spectator,  pp.  40  ff. 

[5] 


POETIC  JUSTICE   IN  THE   DRAMA 

issue,  especially  since  it  does  not  appear  that 
Addison  made  any  formal  objection  to  the  proposi- 
tion that  Aristotle  was  the  originator  of  the  doctrine 
of  poetic  justice.  That  Addison  was  somewhat 
impressed  by  the  weight  of  the  arguments  advanced 
by  various  critics  in  favor  of  the  theory,  is  evident 
from  the  fact  that  when  he  next  ventured  to  discuss 
the  subject,*  he  treated  his  opponents  with  more 
consideration  and  respect  than  the  tone  of  his 
attack  would  lead  one  to  expect;  certain  it  is  that 
his  reply  exhibited  little  of  the  dogmatism  and 
none  of  the  sarcasmf  that  characterized  the  utter- 
ances of  Dennis.  It  does  not  seem  that  he  studied 
the  Poetics  closely  enough  to  be  quite  sure  that 
Aristotle  was  neither  the  author  nor  the  defender 
of  poetic  justice  as  applied  to  tragedy. 

*  Spectator,    No.   .548,   Nov.    2«s,    1712. 

t  The  reply  of  Dennis,  in  which  Aristotle  was  mentioned 
as  the  author  of  poetic  justice,  was  practically  ignored  by 
Addison.  He  recognized  his  opponent  only  indirectly. 
Referring  to  this  matter  in  his  Shakespeare  as  a  Dramatic 
Artist,  p.  408,  Professor  I.ounsbury  says:  "To  this  outburst 
Addison,  as  usual,  made  no  reply.  It  was  one  of  his  most 
irritating  characteristics.  He  amused  himself,  indeed,  in 
an  essay,  printed  about  a  week  later  than  his  previous 
one,  by  citing  a  couple  of  lines  which  he  called  humorous, 
from  a  translation  of  Boileau  made  by  Dennis.  The  refer- 
ence suggested  the  impression  that  he  considered  the  critic 
a  dunce;  but  it  could  as  legitimately  be  construed  into  a 
compliment.  Dennis  was  puzzled  by  it;  and  though  he 
could  not  refrain  from  indulging  in  further  comment,  it  is 
clear  he  did  not  know  how  to  take  what  was  said.  Towards 
the  close  of  the  following  year,  when  the  'Spectator'  was 
nearing  its  end,  Addison  returned  to  the  subject.  He  de- 
fended his  former  position,  though  without  mentioning  his 
critic." 

16] 


ARISTOTLE'S  INFLUENCE 

Two  questions  have  their  origin  in  this  eighteenth 
centurv  controversy  about  the  doctrine  of  rewards 
and  punishments  in  poetry;  one  of  these  questions 
concerns  the  beginnings  of  the  doctrine  in  the 
critical  literature  of  Greece,  the  other  concerns  the 
introduction  of  the  doctrine  into  England.  The 
first  of  these  questions  is  to  receive  our  immediate 
attention. 

ARISTOTLE'S   INFLUENCE    IN    LITERARY    CRITICISM. 

It  can  hardly  be  denied  that  Aristotle  recog" 
nized  a  form  of  dramatic  art  which  exhibited  the 
reward  of  virtue  and  the  punishment  of  vice;  but 
that  he  was  the  author  of  the  doctrine  or  that 
he  recommended  it  in  any  form,  is  not  admitted  by 
the  majority  of  present-day  critics.  Many  go  so 
far  as  to  contend  that  Aristotle  ascribes  to  poetry 
no  ethical  function  whatsoever.  Professor  Butcher, 
of  the  University  of  Edinburgh,  is  one  of  those 
who  hold  that  Aristotle's  definition  of  tragedy  does 
not  involve  an  ethical  consideration  such  as  that 
wrhich  is  implied  in  the  idea  of  poetic  justice. 
"The  character  of  the  ideal  tragic  hero,"  he  says, 
commenting  on  chapter  xiii.  of  the  Poetics,  "  is 
deduced  not  from  any  ethical  ideal  of  conduct, 
but  from  the  need  of  calling  forth  the  blended 
emotions  of  pity  and  fear,  wherein  the  proper  tragic 
pleasure  resides.  The  catastrophe  by  which  virtue 
is  defeated  and  villainy  in  the  end  comes  out  tri- 
umphant is  condemned  by  the  same  criterion;  and 
on  a  similar  principle  the  prosaic  justice,  misnamed 
poetical,  which  rewards  the  good  man  and  punishes 

[7] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

the   wicked,   is  pronounced   to   be   appropriate  only 
to  comedy."* 

Another  writer  of  our  own  times,  Professor 
Saintsbury,  likewise  of  the  University  of  Edinburgh, 
has  expressed  his  opinion  in  regard  to  this  much- 
debated  question.  "  Volumes  have  been  written  on 
these  few  words,"  he  says,  referring  to  the  last 
clause  of  Aristotle's  definition  of  tragedy,  "  the 
chief  crux  being,  of  course,  the  word  katharsis.~\ 
It  cannot  be  said  that  any  of  the  numerous  solutions 
is  in  itself  and  to  demonstration  correct,  but  it  is 
clear  that  the  addition  is  out  of  keeping  with  the 
rest  of  the  definition.  Hitherto  Aristotle,  whether 
we  agree  with  him  or  not,  has  been  purely  literary, 
but  now  he  shifts  to  ethics.  You  might  almost  as 
well  define  fire  in  terms  strictly  appropriate  to 
physics,  and  then  add,  'effecting  the  cooking  of 
sirloins  in  a  manner  suitable  to  such  objects.'" X 
In  comparing  the  remarks  of  Professor  Saintsbury 
with  those  of  Professor  Butcher,  it  is  well  to  consider 
the  force  of  the  former's  assertion  that  Aristotle 
"shifts  to  ethics."  This  indicates  it  to  be  Professor 
Saintsbury's  opinion  that  in  spite  of  an  evident 
incongruity  Aristotle  ascribed  to  tragedy  a  certain 
moral    purpose.     That    this    opinion    implies    a    dis- 

*   Aristotle's  Theory  of  Poetry  and  Fine  Art,  pp.  208-209. 

t  The  word  katharsis  is  the  Greek  equivalent  of  the 
English  word  purgation  in  the  clause,  "through  pity  and 
fear  effecting  the  proper  purgation  of  these  emotions." 
Some  translators  use  the  word  purification  in  place  of 
purgation,  but  they  are  in  the  minority.  The  interpretation 
which  this  essay  supports  calls  for  the  use  of  the  latter 
word. 

X   A    History  0}  Literary  Criticism,   I.,  p.  38. 

[8] 


ARISTOTLE'S  INFLUENCE 

agreement  with  the  scholarly  editor  of  the  Poetics 
is  not  over-looked  by  Professor  Saintsbury  himself, 
and  he  makes  no  "  apologies  for  occasionally 
differing  with  him,  on  the  purely  critical  side,"*  and 
accounts  for  this  by  saying  that  Aristotle's  work 
is  "  a  document  which  is  admittedly  very  obscure 
in  parts,"  and  that  "opinion,  not  demonstration, 
must  decide  in  very  many  cases  what  is  the  correct 
interpretation.  Concerning  the  particular  point  of 
interpretation  here  involved,  Professor  Saintsbury 
says,  "Although  we  have  no  full  treatment  of  comedy, 
his  distaste — almost  his  contempt — for  it  is  clear; 
and  debatable  as  the  famous  'pity  and  terror' 
clause  of  the  definition  of  tragedy  may  be,  its 
ethical  drift  is  unmistakeable."f 

Professor  Butcher,  on  the  other  hand,  has 
gone  into  the  study  of  this  clause  in  considerable 
detail,  and  has  reached  the  conclusion  that  "Aris- 
totle would  probably  admit  that  indirectly  the 
drama  has  a  moral  influence,  in  enabling  the  emo- 
tional system  to  throw  off  some  perilous  stuff, 
certain  elements  of  feeling,  which  if  left  to  them- 
selves, might  develop  dangerous  energy,  and  impede 
the  free  play  of  those  vital  functions  on  which  the 
exercise  of  virtue  depends.  The  excitation  of  noble 
emotions  will  probably  in  time  exert  an  influence 
on  the  will.  But  whatever  may  be  the  direct  effect 
of  the  repeated  operation  of  the  katharsis,  we  may 
confidently  say  that  Aristotle  in  his  definition  of 
tragedy  is  thinking,  not  of  any  such  remote  result, 


*  History  of  Literary  Criticism,  I.  p.,  31,  note. 
t   Ibid.,  p.  37. 

[9] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

but  of  the  immediate  end  of  the  art,  of  the   aesthetic 
function  it  fulfills."* 

On  one  more  point  the  two  eminent  professors 
disagree  in  regard  to  Aristotle's  definition  of  tragedy. 
Professor  Saintsbury  translates  the  final  clause  of 
the  definition  as  follows,  "  accomplishing  the  purga- 
tion of  such  emotions. "f  Instead  of  such,  Professor 
Butcher  uses  the  word  these. X  Attention  is  here 
called  to  this  variation  in  opinions,  to  emphasize 
the  fact,  that  some  of  the  leading  controversies  in 
in  English  criticism  of  the  sixteenth  and  seven- 
teenth centuries  are  possessed  of  wonderful  vitality. 
So  insignificant  a  detail  of  criticism  as  that  just 
mentioned  takes  us  back  to  the  time  when  men 
like  Sir  Philip  Sidney  spoke  of  "  the  high  and  ex- 
cellent tragedy.  .  .  that  with  stirring  the  effects  of 
admiration  and  commiseration,  teacheth  the  un- 
certainty of  the  world. "§  About  a  century  later 
Dryden  thought  it  possible  for  tragedy  to  arouse  all 
the  emotions  in  turn,  ||  and  Gildon  after  him  touched 
upon  the  same  matter  in  his  query,  "Why  must 
the  tragic  poet  be  confined  to  move  terror  and 
compassion?  Why  not  admiration  or  even  love'■'", 
He  himself  answers  the  question,  saying,  "Admira- 
tion is  too  calm  a  passion  for  tragedy,"  and  love  is 
"directly    opposite    to    that    majesty"    which    this 


*  Aristotle's  Theory  of  Poetry,  p.   249. 

f  Hist.  Lit.  Crit.,  I.,  p.  33. 

X  Aristotle's  Theory  0}  Poetry,  p.   23. 

§  An   Apology  for  Poetry,   Arber   Reprint,    p.    45. 

||  Heads  of  an  Answer  to  Rymer,  in  Works,  XV.,  p.  383. 

If  The  Complete  Art  of  Poetry,  I.,  p.   119. 

[IOJ 


ARISTOTLE'S  INFLUENCE 

kind  of  poetry  requires.*  Curiously  enough,  he 
offers  as  his  own  a  definition  of  tragedy  which  admits 
of  the  agitation  of  other  emotions  than  terror  and 
compassion,  for  he  says,  "A  tragedy  is,  therefore, 
an  imitation  of  some  one  serious,  grave  and  entire 
action,  of  a  just  length,  and  contained  within  the 
unities  of  time  and  place;  and  which  without  narra- 
tion, by  means  of  terror  and  compassion,  purges 
those  passions,  and  all  others  which  are  like  them, 
that  is,  whose  prevalence  can  throw  us  into  the 
same,  or  like  misfortunes,  "f 

The  fact  that  the  history  of  literary  criticism 
presents  so  many  conflicting  opinions  in  regard  to 
the  meaning  of  Aristotle's  definition  of  tragedy, 
makes  it  worth  while  to  classify  these  opinions 
and  to  attempt  to  solve  the  problem  along  new  lines. 
Those  critics  who  see  an  ethical  consideration  in 
the  definition  are  disposed  to  argue  that  Aristotle 
favored  the  doctrine  of  poetic  justice;  those  who 
go  to  the  other  extreme,  and  deny  the  existence 
of  any  ethical  consideration  in  the  definition,  must 
necessarily  reject  the  proposition  that  Aristotle 
would  have  tragedy  exhibit  the  workings  of  divine 
providence  in  regard  to  the  good  and  the  bad.  To 
determine,  then,  the  merits  of  this  controversy  in 
literary  criticism  is  to  settle  in  some  measure  the 
question  as  to  Aristotle's  position  in  regard  to  the 
doctrine  of  poetic  justice.  The  earliest  efforts  made 
by  English  critics  to  make  Aristotle  sponsor  of  a 
law  of  ethics  for  tragedy,  are  not  so  much  to  be 
wondered  at,  when  we  consider  that  some  of  the 

*  Ibid. 

f   Ibid.,  p.   222. 

["] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

best  scholars  of  our  own  time  understand  Aristotle 
in  almost  the  same  sense  as  they  did;  nor  is  it 
surprising  that  those  efforts  should  meet  with  persis- 
tent opposition,  since  the  foremost  of  the  present- 
day  commentators  on  the  Poetics  rejects  the  theory 
that  Aristotle  intended  to  ascribe  an  ethical  function 
to  tragedy. 

From  what  has  been  said  it  might  be  inferred 
that  the  early  literary  critics  of  England  were  quite 
familiar  with  the  Poetics.  Such,  however,  was  the 
case  only  in  a  limited  degree.  It  must  be  remembered 
that  the  works  of  Aristotle  had  been  for  a  long  time 
wholly  lost  so  far  as  European  culture  was  con- 
cerned. Spingarn  says  that  the  Poetics  "  was  entirely 
lost  sight  of  during  the  middle  ages,"*  and  accepts 
the  opinion  of  Egger  that  the  works  of  Horace, 
Cicero,  or  Quintilian  contain  no  apparent  reference 
to  this  important  document  of  Greek  literature. 
For  centuries,  therefore,  literary  criticism  got  along 
without  the  authority  of  Aristotle.  The  first  indica- 
tion of  a  return  to  Aristotle  occurred  about  the 
year  935  when  the  Poetics  was  translated  from  the 
Syriac  into  Arabic.  In  the  thirteenth  century  a 
German  named  Herman  translated  into  Latin  the 
abridged  version  of  Averroes  which  had  been  pro- 
duced a  century  earlier.  Other  Latin  editions  followed 
this,  but  it  cannot  be  shown  that  the  Poetics  exerted 
much  influence  on  literary  criticism  prior  to  the 
beginning  of  the  sixteenth  century.  For  a  period 
of  about  fifty  years,  following  the  appearance  of 
Valla's    Latin   translation   in    1498,    the   scholarship 

*  .4  History  of  Literary  Criticism  in  the  Renaissance, 
p.    16. 

[12] 


ARISTOTLE'S  INFLUENCE 

of  Italy  gave  the  Poetics  such  attention  and  study 
that  Aristotle's  position  as  a  leading  factor  in 
literary  criticism  was  assured.  The  first  critical 
edition  of  the  Poetics  was  produced  at  the  end  of 
this  period  bv  Robortelli;  and  in  the  following 
year,  1549,  Segni  published  the  first  translation  into 
Italian. 

Readers  of  French,  it  would  seem,  became 
acquainted  with  Aristotle's  Poetics  in  the  same  year 
that  marked  its  introduction  into  Italian.  Before 
the  time  of  the  publication  of  Du  Bellay's  Defense 
et  Illustration  de  la  Langue  Francaise,  1549,  the 
Poetics  was  apparently  unknown.  At  least,  it  would 
seem,  according  to  Spingarn,  that  Du  Bellay's 
predecessors  were  as  little  acquainted  with  the 
Greek  philosopher  as  if  his  name  were  erased  from 
the  list  of  literary  critics.*  Earlier  than  this,  however, 
there  was  a  Latin  edition  of  the  Poetics  published 
at  Paris  in  1541;  but  the  literary  critics  of  the 
time  were  entirely  indifferent  to  the  fact.  France, 
then,  was  fully  half  century  behind  Italy  in  its 
critical  appreciation  of  Aristotle's  Poetics;  and  what 
is  true  in  this  respect  with  regard  to  the  general 
field  of  literary  criticism,  is  likewise  true  in  regard 
to  the  special  topic  concerned  in  this  discussion. 
It  was  only  in  the  seventeenth  century  that  the 
Aristotelian  katharsis  became  a  subject  of  controversy 
in  France,  whereas  the  critics  of  Italy  had  busied 
themselves  about  it  a  hundred  years  earlier. 

England  was  still  more  backward  than  France 
in  coming  to  a  knowledge  of  the  Poetics.  It  was 
shortly    before    the    year    1570   that   Roger   Ascham 

*   Ibid.,    p.    1S4. 

[13] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

wrote  as  follows :  "  When  M.  Watson  in  St.  Johns 
College  at  Cambridge  wrote  his  excellent  tragedy 
of  Absalon,  M.  Cheke,  he  and  I,  for  that  part  of  true 
imitation,  had  many  pleasant  talks  together,  in 
comparing  the  precepts  of  Aristotle  and  Horace 
de  Arte  Poeiica,  with  the  examples  of  Euripides, 
Sophocles,  and  Seneca.  Few  men,  in  writing  of 
tragedies  in  our  days,  have  shot  at  this  mark.  Some 
in  England,  more  in  France,  Germany,  and  Italy, 
also  have  written  tragedies  in  our  time :  of  the  which 
not  one  I  am  sure  is  able  to  abide  the  true  touch 
of  Aristotle's  precepts  and  Euripides'  examples,  save 
only  two  that  I  ever  saw,  M.  Watson's  Absalon, 
and  Georgius  Buchananus'  Jephthe."*  This,  says 
Spingarn,  is  "  the  first  reference  to  the  Poetics  in 
England."!  It  was  nearly  a  century  and  a  half 
later  that  Dennis  declared  Aristotle  to  be  the  author 
of  the  doctrine  of  poetic  justice,  and  offered  in 
support  of  his  opinion  a  citation  from  the  Poetics 
that  had  already  become  the  basis  of  controversy 
in  Italy  and  France.  J  Addison's  failure  to  deny  that 
Aristotle  was  the  author  of  the  doctrine  has  already 
been  referred  to§  as  an  indication  that  he  had  not 
made  a  thorough-going  study  of  the  famous  definition 
of  tragedy. 

From  the  time  of  Roger  Ascham's  remark  on 
the  excellence  of  Aristotle's  precepts,  down  to  the 
time  of  the  Dennis-Addison  controversy,  there  was 
a  gradual  but  very  slow  development  of  respect  for 

*  The  Schoolmaster,  in  Ascham's  English  Works,  pp.  2X4. 

t  Hist.  Lit.  Crit.,  p.  308. 

%  Loc.   cit.   p.   5. 

§  Loc.  cit.   p.  6. 

[14] 


ARISTOTLE'S  INFLUENCE 

the  author  of  the  Poetics.  After  Ascham's  School- 
master, came  Lodge's  Defence  of  Poetry  in  1579,  a 
work  which  was  written  in  reply  to  Gosson's  School 
of  Abuse.  The  Defence  contains  more  than  one 
reference  to  Aristotle,  but  none  seems  to  show 
that  Lodge  had  given  much  time  to  the  study  of 
the  Poetics.  In  one  case  he  appears  to  find  fault 
with  Aristotle,  ascribing  to  him  a  complaint  against 
poets;  but,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  Aristotle  mentioned 
the  objection  only  to  explain  it  away.  Lodge  says, 
"  I  with  thee  will  seek  out  some  abuse  in  poetry, 
which  I  will  seek  for  to  disprove  by  reason,  first 
pronounced  by  no  small  bird,  even  Aristotle  himself. 
Poetae  (saith  he)  multa  mentiuntur."*  Aristotle 
was  not,  of  course,  the  author  of  the  objection. 
It  was  Plato  who  complained  that  the  poets 
narrate  falsehoods;  Aristotle  was  the  defender 
of  the  poets.  Four  years  later,  f  when  Sidney 
wrote  his  Apology  for  Poetry,  Aristotle  seemed  to 
be  better  understood.  Sidney  uses  the  definition 
of  tragedy  as  found  in  the  Poetics,  %  cites  Aristotle's 
opinion  on  the  value  of  history  as  compared  with 
poetry, §  quotes  from  his  ethics  to  show  that  the 
poet  performs   the   office   of  a   teacher,  ||   and  places 

*   In  Smith's  Elizabethan   Critical  Essays,  I.,   p.   73. 

f  Sidney's  Apology  was  written  in  1583,  or  earlier,  and 
was  first  published  in  1595.  In  the  meantime,  the  manu- 
script was  in  circulation  to  such  an  extent  that  its  influence 
in  literary  criticism  was  felt  long  before  the  date  of  its  pub- 
lication. Sir  John  Harington  makes  reference  to  Sidney's 
work  in  his  own  Apology  which  wras  published  in   1  591. 

X   In  the  Arber  Reprint,  p.  26. 

§   Ibid.,   p.   35. 

li   Ibid.,    p.    39. 

[i5l 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

his  precepts  on  an  equal  basis  with  "common 
reason"  in  making  an  argument  for  unity  of  time.* 
In  1586  William  Webbe  published  a  Discourse 
of  English  Poetry  in  which  appear  certain  references 
to  Aristotle.  These  are  numerous  enough  but  do 
not  represent  any  increase  in  his  popularity.  The 
Art  of  English  Poetry,  published  in  1589  and  ascribed 
to  Richard  Puttenham,f  mentions  the  name  of 
Aristotle  only  twice,  a  fact  worthy  of  more 
than  passing  notice,  since  the  subject  was  treated 
in  a  manner  that  might  call  for  citations  from  the 
Poetics,  and  since  also  the  treatise  was  greater  in 
length  than  any  similar  study  in  literary  criticism 
that  had  been  published  prior  to  that  time  in  England. 
Next  in  chronological  order  comes  Sir  John  Haring- 
ton  who  in  1591  published  his  translation  of  Orlando 
Furioso  and  with  it  a  preface  that  was  sub-titled 
A  Brief  Apology  of  Poetry.  He  seems  to  be  familiar 
with  Aristotle's  definition  of  tragedy; J  he  mentions 
him  with  Plato  as  opposed  to  the  allegorical  use  of 
poetry, §  couples  his  name  with  "the  best  censurers 
of  poesie,"  ||  and  regards  it  as  a  meritorious  thing 
in  Ariosto  that  he  followed  the  rules  of  Aristotle 
"very  strictly."^  Francis  Meres  has  this  paragraph 
in  his  Wits  Treasury,  published  in  1598:  "As  Georgius 
Buchananus'  Jepthae  amongst  all  modern  tragedies 

*   Ibid.,  p.  63. 

t  This  work  is  sometimes  ascribed  to  George  Putten- 
ham,  but  the  more  reliable  opinion  favors  Richard  as  the 
author. 

%   In  Smith's  Eliz.  Crit.  Essays,  II.,  p.  200. 

§   Ibid.,   p.   203. 

||   Ibid.,   p.   216. 

U   Ibid. 

I  16] 


ARISTOTLE'S  INFLUENCE 

is  able  to  abide  the  touch  of  Aristotle's  precepts 
and  Euripides's  examples:  so  is  Bishop  Watson's 
Absalon."*  This  is  at  once  a  reminder  of  what 
Roger  Ascham  said  in  regard  to  the  same  matter, 
and  an  indication  of  the  growing  popularity  of 
Aristotle. 

The  illustrations  that  have  been  drawn  from 
the  writings  of  Ascham,  Lodge,  Sidney,  Webbe, 
Puttenham,  Harington,  and  Meres,  to  show  the 
development  of  respect  for  Aristotle  in  English 
literary  criticism  during  the  last  half  of  the  sixteenth 
century,  must  not  be  regarded  as  an  evidence  of 
any  unusual  dependence  upon  the  author  of  the 
Poetics.  Ben  Jonson,  also,  was  an  admirer  of  Aris- 
totle, and  so  was  Milton.  "But  despite  all  this," 
says  Spingarn,  "the  English  independence  of  spirit 
never  failed;  and  before  the  French  influence  we 
can  find  no  such  thing  in  English  criticism  as  the 
literary  dictatorship  of  Aristotle. "f  Nevertheless, 
this  same  writer  observes  that  before  the  close  of 
the  seventeenth  century  Renaissance  Aristotelianism 
achieved  a  certain  degree  of  supremacy  in  England 
where,  in  the  form  of  French  classicism,  it  charac- 
terized the  work  of  Dry  den.  $  It  was  at  this  time  that 
Rymer  endeavored  to  widen  the  influence  of  Aristotle 
in  England  not  only  by  using  his  name  and  author- 
ity to  support  his  own  critical  opinions,  but  also 
by  translating  from  the  French,  Rene  Rapin's  Reflec- 
tions on  Aristotle's  Poetics. 

It  must  not  be  supposed,  however,  that  French 

*   Ibid.,   p.   322. 

t   Hist.  Lit.  Crit.,  p.  309. 

t   Ibid-,  P-   3io. 

[17] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

classicism  represented  fully  the  French  attitude 
toward  Aristotle.  There  were  in  France  two  schools 
of  literary  criticism,  one  of  which  derived  its  prin- 
ciples from  the  theory  and  practice  of  the  ancients, 
while  the  other  derived  its  principles  from  the  theory 
and  practice  of  the  moderns.  Each  was  well  enough 
able  to  expound  the  principles  to  which  it  adhered; 
but  the  argument  which  resulted  cannot  be  said  to 
have  accomplished  much  for  literary  criticism.  The 
reason  for  this  is,  that  they  did  not  understand  each 
other.  On  both  sides  there  was  a  tendency  towards 
exaggeration  and  excessive  insistence  that  there  was 
but  one  rule  of  literary  faith.  Aristotle  was,  of  course, 
the  great  authority  upon  whom  the  ancients,  as  they 
were  called,  depended,  and  consequently  his  works 
became  a  sort  of  battle-ground  upon  which  the 
rival  schools  contended.  It  was  necessary  not  only 
to  translate  Aristotle  into  French  but  also  to  interpret 
his  meaning  after  the  translation  had  been  made. 
Owing  to  the  fact  that  Aristotle  had  been  lost  sight 
of  during  the  middle  ages,  Horace  became  the  chief 
authority  of  classical  antiquity;  upon  his  Ars 
Poetica  was  based  the  traditional  theory  of  poetry. 
When  Aristotle  came  into  vogue,  it  was  presumed 
that  Horace  was  merely  his  interpreter,  in  many 
things,  and  that  the  doctrines  for  which  Horace 
had  been  cited  as  an  authority  must  be  found  in  the 
Poetics  of  Aristotle.  They  did  not  stop  to  think 
that  Greek  literature  might  be  the  basis  of  critical 
opinions  of  which  Aristotle  was  not  the  author, 
nor  did  they  advert  to  the  fact  that  a  portion  of 
that  literature  was  produced  after  the  time  that 
the  Poetics  was  written.    That  tragedy  should  concern 

[18] 


ARISTOTLE'S  INFLUENCE 

itself  with  the  deeds  of  princes,  and  comedy  with  the 
deeds  of  common  people,  was  a  rule  of  dramatic 
art  that  came  into  vogue  after  the  time  of  Aristotle; 
but  it  seems  that  this  fact  was  unknown  to  the 
French  disciples  of  Aristotle.  They  discovered  in 
his  Poetics  a  phrase  that  suited  their  purpose,  and 
with  this  as  a  basis  of  argument  they  confirmed  the 
traditional  distinction  between  tragedy  and  comedy. 
The  error  into  which  they  fell  in  this  respect  is 
pointed  out  by  Professor  Butcher  in  his  excellent 
work  on  Aristotle's  Poetics.  "  In  all  this  misappre- 
hension," he  says,  "there  is  just  one  grain  of  solid 
fact.  Aristotle  does  undoubtedly  hold  that  actors  in 
tragedy  ought  to  be  illustrious  by  birth  and  position. 
The  narrow  and  trivial  life  of  obscure  persons  cannot 
give  scope  for  a  great  and  significant  action,  one 
of  tragic  consequences.  But  nowhere  does  he  make 
outward  rank  the  distinguishing  feature  of  tragic 
as  opposed  to  comic  representation.  Moral  nobility 
is  what  he  demands;  and  this  on  the  French  stage, 
or  at  least  with  French  critics — is  transformed  into 
an  inflated  dignity,  a  courtly  etiquette  and  decorum, 
which  seemed  proper  to  high  rank.  The  instance 
is  one  of  many  in  which  literary  critics  have  wholly 
confounded    the    teaching   of   Aristotle."*     The   two 

*  Aristotle's  Theory,  pp.  220-221.  This  idea  of  tragedy 
continued  to  be  common  in  Italy  after  the  ciitics  had  become 
acquainted  with  Aristotle.  Daniello,  in  his  La  Poetica,  1536, 
says  that  the  comic  poets  "deal  with  the  most  familiar  and 
domestic,  not  to  say  base  and  vile  operations;  the  tragic 
poets,  with  the  deaths  of  high  kings  and  the  ruins  of  great 
empires."  According  to  Giraldi  Cintio,  in  his  Discorso  Sulle 
Comedie  e  Sulle  Tragedie,  1543,  tragedy  and  comedy  "differ 
in    that    the   former   imitates   the   illustrious   and   royal,    the 

[i9l 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

French  critics  upon  whose  judgment  Professor 
Butcher  offers  this  commentary,  were  the  Abbe 
D'Aubignac  and  Dacier.  To  these  he  adds  the 
name  of  Corneille*  whose  interpretation  of  Aristotle 
was  in  some  instances  quite  erroneous  as  such,  but 
very  defensible  as  a  dramatic  theory.  Corneille 
attempted  to  use  the  authority  of  Aristotle  in 
defence  of  certain  features  in  his  own  dramatic 
writings. 

Such  were  some  of  the  peculiarities  that  charac- 
terized the  return  of  classic  models  in  France,  and 
chief  among  these  peculiarities  was  a  disposition  to 
make  Aristotle  responsible  for  certain  doctrines  which 
he  had  not  taken  into  consideration.  Dacier's 
tribute  to  him  is  forceful,  to  say  the  least.  In  his 
discussion  of  the  Poetics  he  takes  occasion  to  repri- 
mand an  Italian  commentator  for  pretending  to 
discover  an  inconsistency  between  Holy  Scriptures 
and  the  Poetics,  and  considers  it  out  of  the  question 
that  "  Divinity  and  Holy  Scriptures  could  ever  be 
contrary  to  the  sentiments  of  nature  on  which 
Aristotle  found  his  judgments."!  In  a  similar 
manner  the  same  kind  of  reverence  was  expressed 
by  Roger  Bacon  when  he  declared  that  "Aristotle 


*   Aristotle's   Theory,   p.    304. 

f   Note     I.,     chap.     III.,     Dacier's    French     translation, 
quoted   by   Butcher,    p.   325. 

latter  the  popular  and  civil."  Robortelli  held  substantially 
the  same  view  in  his  commentaries  on  Aristotle  in  1548. 
For  these  citations  and  for  further  development  of  the 
subject,  see  Spingarn's  History  of  Literary  Criticism  in 
the   Renaissance,   pp.   61    ff. 

[20] 


MEDIEVAL  THEORIES  OF  POETRY 

hath    the   same    authority    in    philosophy    that    the 
Apostle  Paul  hath  in  divinity."* 

To  Aristotle  has  been  ascribed,  as  we  have 
already  shown,  the  authorship  of  the  doctrine  of 
poetic  justice.  Before  questioning  the  truth  of  this 
assertion,  it  was  advisable  to  indicate  what  was  the 
position  which  Aristotle  held  in  the  field  of  literary 
criticism  during  the  sixteenth  and  seventeenth 
centuries.  Having  completed  this  preliminary  task, 
sufficiently  to  serve  our  purpose,  and  having  shown 
that  there  was  a  disposition  to  ascribe  to  his  authority 
the  rules  of  literary  art  which  had  been  held  in 
traditional  reverence  as  a  heritage  from  classical 
antiquity,  it  remains  to  show  that  the  doctrine  of 
poetic  justice  was  very  generally  recognized  in 
European  criticism  as  soon  as  the  Poetics  of  Aristotle 
began  to  have  an  influence  on  the  critics. 

MEDIEVAL    THEORIES    OF    POETRY. 

More  than  a  century  and  a  half  before  the  time 
of  the  Dennis-Addison  controversy  the  literary 
critics  of  Italy  had  referred  to  the  doctrine  of  poetic 
justice  as  one  of  the  requirements  of  the  drama. 
Giraldi  Cintio,  in  his  discussion  of  the  rules  of  poetry 
in  1543,  modifies  the  classic  law  of  tragedy,  that 
there  should  be  no  deaths  represented  on  the  stage, 
and  favors  the  representation  of  such  deaths  as 
are  not  exceedingly  painful,  if  they  may  serve  the 
ends  of  justice.  He  regards  it  the  end  of  tragedy, 
and  of  comedy  also,  to  conduce  to  virtue.  Vicious 
actions  must  be  so  portrayed,  through  the  medium 

*  Quoted  by  Butcher,  p.   325. 

[21] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE   DRAMA 

of  terror  and  misery  that  the  spectators  will  fear 
to  imitate  such  actions.* 

Minturno's  idea  of  tragedy,  set  forth  in  his 
treatise  De  Poetica  in  1559,  has  a  requirement  favor- 
ing poetic  justice  in  so  far  as  the  wicked  are  concerned, 
for  he  thinks  that  poetry  should  act  as  a  "  warning 
to  men  against  pride  of  rank,  insolence,  avarice,  lust, 
and  similar  passions,  "f  We  can  hardly  imagine 
that  he  is  thinking  of  producing  the  desired  effect 
unless  through  the  punishment  of  wrong-doing. 

Scaliger,  in  his  Poetics,  published  in  1561,  holds 
views  on  poetic  justice  that  are  essentially  the 
same  as  those  for  which  Rymer  and  Dennis  became 
famous  more  than  a  century  later.  Spingarn  has 
summarized  Scaliger's  opinions  on  tragedy  in  these 
words:  "the  aim  of  tragedy,  like  that  of  all  poetry, 
is  a  purely  ethical  one.  It  is  not  enough  to  move 
the  spectators  to  admiration  and  dismay,  as  some 
critics  say  Aeschylus  does;  it  is  also  the  poet's 
function  to  teach,  to  move,  and  to  delight.  The 
poet  teaches  character  through  actions,  in  order 
that  we  should  embrace  and  imitate  the  good,  and 
abstain  from  the  bad.  The  joy  of  evil  men  is  turned 
in  tragedy  to  bitterness,  and  the  sorrow  of  good  men 
to  joy. "J  Particular  attention  is  to  be  given  to  this 
quotation,  for  the  reason  that  Spingarn's  first  remark 
upon  his  own  summary  of  the  opinions  of  this  six- 

*  These  observations  and  others  of  the  same  kind, 
dealing  with  the  Italian  critics  of  the  sixteenth  century,  are 
based  on  Spingarn's  analysis  of  the  works  of  the  renaissance 
critics,  in  his  History  oj  Literary  Criticism,  pp.  68  ff. 

t   Ibid.,  p.   70. 

X  Ibid.,  pp.  78-79- 

[22] 


MEDIEVAL  THEORIES  OF   POETRY 

teenth  century  critic  bears  directly  on  the  subject 
we  are  investigating.  "Scaliger,"  he  says,  "is  here 
following  the  extreme  view  of  poetic  justice  which 
we  have  found  expressed  in  so  many  of  the  renais- 
sance writers.  .  .  .  For  Scaliger  the  moral  aim  of 
the  drama  is  attained  both  indirectly,  by  the  represen- 
tation of  wickedness  ultimately  punished  and  virtue 
ultimately  rewarded,  and  more  directly  by  the 
enunciation  of  moral  precepts  throughout  the  play." 
Commenting  elsewhere  on  the  same  subject,  Spingarn 
says  that  Scaliger  limits  tragedy  more  than  Aris- 
totle does,  for  Aristotle  admits  of  such  as  have  a 
happy  ending,  while  Scaliger  requires  that  all 
tragedies  shall  have  an  unhappy  ending.* 

It  is  hardly  fair  to  Scaliger  that  this  criticism 
of  Spingarn's  should  be  allowed  to  pass  without 
discussion.  -While  it  is  true  that  Aristotle,  speaking 
of  plays  that  have  a  happy  ending  puts  them  in 
the  same  class  with  those  that  have  an  unhappy 
ending,  calling  them  tragedies,  it  is  nevertheless  very 
evident  that  Aristotle  thinks  that  such  plays  partake 
of  the  nature  of  comedies  rather  than  tragedies, 
because  the  pleasure  which  is  derived  from  them 
"is  not  the  true  tragic  pleasure. "f  The  reason  that 
he  appears  to  call  them  by  the  name  of  tragedies  is, 
that  he  desires  to  treat  with  some  deference 
the  opinions  of  other  critics  who  think  that  the 
best  type  of  tragedy  is  that  which  has  a  happy  ending. 
But  this  is  not  the  only  reason.  He  was  deducing 
principles  from  the  actual  practice  of  the  art  as  it 
was    found    in    Greek    literature,    not    theorizing    on 

*   Ibid.,    p.    83. 

t  Poetics,   XIII.,  in  Butcher's  text,   p.   45. 

[23] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

plays  of  his  own  imagination,  and  he  discovered  that 
some  plays  showed  a  combination  of  the  effects  of 
pure  tragedy  and  pure  comedy.  These,  of  course,  had 
a  happy  ending;  they  also  had  an  unhappy  ending. 
Both  effects  were  presented  in  the  same  play,  one 
involving  the  punishment  of  the  wicked,  the  other 
involving  the  reward  of  the  good.  Plays  of  this  kind 
are  good  illustrations  of  the  doctrine  of  poetic  justice; 
Aristotle  says  that  they  please  the  people;  but  he 
holds  that  they  do  not  give  us  the  true  tragic  pleasure, 
and  for  this  reason  they  are  not  to  be  regarded  as 
tragedies  in  the  strict  sense  of  Aristotle's  definition. 

It  is  such  a  type  of  play  as  this  that  falls  within 
the  limits  of  tragedy  designated  by  Scaliger.  There 
must,  of  course,  be  an  unhappy  ending, — that  is 
always  necessary  in  tragedy;  there  must  also  be 
a  happy  ending  in  so  far  as  the  virtuous  persons 
of  the  play  are  concerned.  Such  a  combination  gives 
us  the  "  opposite  catastrophe  for  the  good  and  the 
bad,*  and  is  disapproved  of  by  Aristotle,  who  limits 
true  tragedy  to  the  representation  of  the  misfortunes 
and  unhappy  end  of  persons  who  are  not  without 
defects  and  human  weaknesses.  To  say,  then,  that 
Scaliger  limits  tragedy  more  than  Aristotle  does 
is  to  go  against  the  evidence  in  the  case.  The  reverse 
is  probably  true.  In  its  proper  place  we  shall  discuss 
at  greater  length  Aristotle's   definition   of  tragedy. 

When  Scaliger  published  his  Poetics,  English 
literary  criticism  had  not  yet  a  beginning,  and  before 
that  time  the  playwrights  of  England  had  not  pro- 
duced a  single  tragedy;   nevertheless,  we  have  reason 

*  Ibid. 

[24] 


MEDIAEVAL  THEORIES  OF  POETRY 

to  know  that  the  law  of  poetic  justice  was  one  of 
the  first  dramatic  requirements  recognized  by  those 
who  subjected  the  English  stage  to  censorship  and 
rules.*  In  France  the  same  thing  holds  true  to 
some  extent.  At  any  rate,  it  was  not  long  before  the 
writers  of  tragedy  made  a  very  formal  attempt  at 
constructing  plays  according  to  the  conditions  im- 
posed by  poetic  justice.  Racine,  whose  work  belongs 
to  the  last  half  of  the  seventeenth  century,  thought 
it  quite  proper  to  call  attention  to  this  feature  of 
his  art  when  he  wrote  the  preface  to  his  Phedre. 
He  prides  himself  upon  the  fact  that  he  treats  virtue 
and  vice  according  to  their  merits;  the  passions, 
he  says,  are  presented  to  the  eyes  only  to  show  the 
disorder  of  which  they  are  the  cause,  the  least  faults 
being  severely  punished.  It  is  his  contention  that 
poetry  should  serve  an  ethical  purpose,  and  he 
argues  that  the  ancient  tragic  poets  made  of  the 
theatre  a  school  wherein  virtue  was  taught  not 
Jess    effectively  than   in    the   school    of   philosophy.! 


*  An  argument  on  this  proposition  will  be  found  in  the 
next    chapter. 

f  Butcher's  work  on  Aristotle,  p.  226,  contains  the 
following  citation  from  Racine's  Preface:  "  Ce  que  je  puis 
assurer,  c'est  que  je  n'en  ai  point  fait  ou  la  vertu  soit  plus 
mise  en  jour  que  dans  celle-ci;  les  moindres  fautes  y  sont 
severement  punies:  la  seule  pensee  du  crime  y  est  regardee 
avec  autant  d'horreur  que  le  c  ime  meme;  les  faiblesses 
de  l'amour  y  passent  pour  de  vraies  faiblesses;  les  passions 
n'y  sont  presentees  aux  yeux  que  pour  montrer  tout  le 
desordre  dont  elles  sont  cause;  et  le  vice  y  est  peint  partout 
avec  des  couleurs  qui  en  font  connaitre  et  hair  la  difformite. 
C'est  la  proprement  le  but  que  tout  homme  qui  travaille 
pour  le  public  doit  se  proposer;    et  c'est  ce  que  les  premiers 

[25] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE   DRAMA 

In  the  long  period  of  time  that  intervened 
between  the  days  of  Aristotle  and  those  of  Cintio, 
Minturno,  and  Scaliger,  there  are  only  a  few  names 
that  need  be  mentioned  in  connection  with  the 
story  of  dramatic  criticism.  Eratosthenes,  who 
nourished  in  the  second  century  B.  C,  maintained 
that  "  the  aim  of  the  poet  always  is  to  charm  the 
mind  not  to  instruct."*  Plutarch  held  the  same 
opinion  about  two  centuries  later.  Horace,  of  course, 
favored  the  blending  of  the  two  effects,  as  is  manifest 
from  the  well-known  verse: 

Omne  tub't  punctum  qui  miscuit  utile  dulci. 

Cyril  and  Tertullian,  Fathers  of  the  Church  at  the 
beginning  of  the  third  century,  emphasized  the 
ethical  consideration  when  they  maintained  that 
stage-plays  were  injurious  to  religion.  Longinus, 
who  belongs  to  the  end  of  the  third  century  and  the 
beginning  of  the  fourth,  held  strongly  for  the  ethical 
requirement.  Saintsbury  points  out  the  influence 
which  this  writer  had, on  Dennis,  about  whom  he 
makes  the  following  remark :  "  In  his  three  chief 
books  of  abstract  criticism  he  endeavors  to  elaborate 
with   Longinus  in   part  for  code,   and   with   Milton 

*  Butcher,  p.   201. 

poetes  tragiques  avaient  en  vue  sur  toute  chose.  Leur 
theatre  etait  une  ecole  ou  la  vertu  n'etait  pas  moins  bien 
enseignee  que  dans  les  ecoles  des  philosophes.  Aussi  Aristote 
a  bien  voulu  donner  des  regies  du  poeme  dramatique;  et 
Socrate,  le  plus  sage  des  philosophes,  ne  dedaignait  pas  de 
mettre  la  main  aux  tragedies  d'fiuripide.  II  serait  a  sou- 
haiter  que  nos  ouvrages  fussent  aussi  solidcs  et  aussi  pleins 
d'utiles  instructions  que  ceux  de  ces  poetes." 

[26] 


MEDIEVAL  THEORIES  OF  POETRY 

for  example,  a  noble,  indeed,  and  creditable,  but 
utterly  arbitrary  and  hopelessly  narrow  theory  of 
poetry  as  necessarily  religious."*  After  Longinus, 
came  those  who  sought  to  find  in  pagan  poetry  such 
useful  lessons  as  might  be  discovered  by  means  of 
an  allegorical  interpretation;  this  method  was 
applied  to  Vergil's  Aeneid  by  Fulgentius,  who 
flourished  about  the  first  half  of  the  sixth  century. 
Here  again  was  an  attempt  to  give  prominence  to 
the  ethical  function  of  poetry.  A  practical  illustra- 
tion of  this  principle  is  found  in  the  writings  of 
Dante  and  Boccaccio,  for  with  these  authors  the 
allegorical  meaning  was  not  an  afterthought  or  a 
forced  interpretation   of  literary   criticism. 

Side  by  side,  however,  with  the  account  of  these 
efforts  to  ascribe  to  poetry  an  ethical  function,  is 
to  be  placed  the  record  of  views  to  the  contrary. 
It  will  not  be  necessary  to  do  this  in  detail,  but  only 
to  refer  to  the  fact  in  a  summary  of  the  situation. 
We  have  mentioned  Eratosthenes  as  one  who  held 
out  for  the  aesthetic  rather  than  ethical  in  poetry. 
Plutarch  was  referred  to  as  advocating  the  same 
doctrine.  Robortelli,  Magge,  Vettori,  Castlevetro, 
and  Varchi,  may  be  named  as  sixteenth  century 
critics  in  Italy  who  regarded  the  aesthetic  function 
of  poetry  as  more  important  than  the  ethical.  There 
was  a  blending  of  both  opinions  by  some  other 
writers,  as,  for  example,  by  Augustinus  Moravus 
Olmucensis  who  in  1493  defined  poetry  as  "  a  metrical 
structure  of  true  or  feigned  narration,  composed  in 
suitable    rhythm    or    feet,    and    adjusted    to    utility 


*  Hist.   Lit.   Crit.,   II.,   p. 

[27] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

and  pleasure."*  In  this,  we  have  nothing  of  Aris- 
totle, but  rather  a  deduction  from  Horace.  Daniello 
and  Minturno,  who  belong  to  the  middle  half  of 
the  sixteenth  century,  recognize  the  importance  of 
both  functions,  but  in  an  unequal  degree,  the  former 
emphasizing  pleasure,  the  latter  giving  first  place 
to  instruction.  Some,  as  for  instance  Guarino, 
who  flourished  about  the  same  time  as  Daniello 
and  Minturno,  went  to  the  extreme  of  denying  that 
poetry  should  have  any  moral  effect.  On  all  sides, 
of  course,  poetry  was  admitted  to  have  a  certain 
aesthetic  function.  Differences  of  opinion  arose 
only  in  regard  to  the  question  whether  or  not  poetry 
should  also  instruct.  The  consequence  was,  that 
critical  opinion  was  divided  on  the  subject  in  a 
manner  that  might  be  illustrated  by  a  series  of 
mathematical  ratios  representing  the  relative  impor- 
tance of  pleasure  and  instruction  as  ends  of  poetry. 
The  judgments  of  some  critics  might  be  reduced  to 
a  ratio  of  i  to  i ;  in  other  cases  the  ratio  would 
be  2  for  pleasure,  3  for  instruction;  1  for  pleasure 
3  for  instruction;  or  1  for  pleasure,  o  for  instruction. 
This  represents  in  a  general  way  the  attitude  of 
Italian  critics  of  the  sixteenth  century,  and  earlier, 
towards  a  problem  that  has  involved  an  endless 
amount  of  discussion  of  the  Poetics  of  Aristotle. 
And  the  discussion  is  not  yet  ended. 

In  order  that  we  may  the  better  understand 
what  was  Aristotle's  idea  regarding  the  moral 
function  of  poetry,  it  will  be  necessary  to  take 
note  of  what  had  been  said  on  the  subject  by  Plato 
who  proceeded  him  in  point  of  time  and  was  actually 

*  Ibid.,  p.  28. 

[28] 


PLATO'S  DOCTRINE 

his  teacher.  By  so  doing  we  shall  be  in  a  position 
to  defend  the  proposition  that  an  ethical  effect 
was  intended  by  Aristotle  in  the  famous  '  pity  and 
fear'  clause  of  his  definition  of  tragedy,  but  not — 
be  it  said — the  ethical  effect  usually  thought  of  in 
connection  with  the  idea  of  poetical  justice.  This 
means  that  we  shall  be  able  to  advance  a  plausible 
interpretation  based  upon  reasons  somewhat  different 
from  any  that  have  gained  prominence  in  literary 
criticism.  We  shall  also  be  able  to  show  that  Plato 
recommended  the  doctrine  of  poetic  justice,  thereby 
making  it  impossible  for  Aristotle  to  have  been  first 
to  establish  it. 

PLATA'S  DOCTRINE  OF  POETIC  JUSTICE. 

Plato  was  born  in  428  or  427  B.  C,  and  died 
in  347  B.  C.  He  flourished,  to  use  a  comprehensive 
expression,  about  40  years  before  Aristotle,  who 
was  his  pupil;  and  he  was  preceded  in  Greek  liter- 
ature by  that  group  of  distinguished  writers  who 
helped  to  add  lustre  to  the  age  of  Pericles.  ^Euripides 
and  Sophocles  died  when  he  was  about  twenty-two 
years  of  age,  and  Aeschylus  had  been  dead  nearly 
thirty  years  when  Plato  was  born.  The  glorious 
age  of  Greek  tragedy  was  just  passing  away  when 
he  was  beginning  to  formulate  his  views  about  law, 
philosophy,   and  literature. 

The  two  of  Plato's  books  which  will  be  of  most 
service  to  us  in  our  investigation  are  his  Republic 
and  his  Laws.  It  is  impossible  to  determine  the  exact 
chronology  of  all  his  works,  but  that  fact  makes  little 
difference  to  us,  since  sufficient  is  known  for  our 
purpose.     Wright  in  his  History  of  Greek  Literature 

[29] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

takes  it  for  granted,  on  the  authority  of  Aristotle, 
that  the  Laws  was  Plato's  latest  work.*  In  both 
the  Laws  and  the  Republic  there  are  passages  which 
have  a  direct  bearing  upon  the  problems  we  are 
trying  to  solve,  and  for  this  reason  these  two  books 
deserve  special  attention.  Whether  or  not  either 
of  these  treatises  represents  Plato's  critical  opinions 
rather  than  mere  hypothetical  considerations,  is  in 
itself  a  problem  with  which  we  are  not  now  concerned. 
They  stand  in  the  history  of  literature  as  documents 
with  which  literary  criticism  has  a  right  to  be  ac- 
quainted, and  they  have  a  special  value  since  they 
help  us  to  understand  Aristotle's  theory  of  poetry. 
In  both  works  there  are  evidences  that  Plato  not  only 
recognized  the  principle  of  poetic  justice  but  also 
applied  it  rigorously.  Inasmuch  as  his  Republic 
contains  the  earlier  expression  of  opinion  on  this 
subject,  we  shall  consider  it  first. 

"The  Republic  of  Plato,"  says  Professor  Jowett, 
"  is  the  longest  of  his  works  with  the  exception 
of  the  Laws,  and  it  is  certainly  the  greatest  of  them."t 
It  is  his  masterpiece,  the  model  upon  which  imitators 
have  worked  in  their  efforts  to  paint  a  picture  of 
the  ideal  state.  Plato  had  witnessed  the  failure 
of  democracy  in  Athens;  the  glorious  days  that  had 
made  this  splendid  city  in  Attica  the  centre  of  the 
world's  civilization,  were  passing  away,  never  to 
return.  Plato  observed  the  fact  and  endeavored  to 
find  out  the  cause.  The  Athenian  constitution  was 
defective  in  many  respects,  and  it  was  not  surprising 

*   A    Short    History    of    Greek    Literature,   p.   383. 
t   The  Dialogues  of  Plato.    See  Introduction  and  Analy- 
sis, III.,  p.  1. 

[30] 


PLATO'S  DOCTRINE 

to  him  that  the  consequences  should  be  disastrous. 
So  he  wrote  his  Republic,  and  afterwards  his  Laws, 
to  picture  the  ideal  state.  A  very  concise  summary 
of  what  Plato  considers  the  necessary  characteristics 
of  such  a  state  is  contained  in  the  following  passage 
taken  from  Wright's  account  of  Plato:  "Community 
of  property,  the  abolition  of  the  family,  universal 
brotherhood  based  on  the  possibility  that  any  man 
may  be  one's  brother,  state  regulation  of  the  breeding 
of  citizens,  provisions  against  race-suicide,  equality 
of  the  sexes  on  the  ground  that  there  is  no  intellectual 
difference  between  them,  compulsory  education,  the 
compulsory  vote — for  all  these,  though  they  were 
not  all  original  with  Plato,  one  may  turn  to  the 
Republic  or  the  Laws."*  It  may  be  surprising  that 
this  summary  contains  no  reference  to  poetry  or 
the  poets.  But  that  such  a  reference  is  omitted  is 
no  proof  that  poetry  and  the  poets  do  not  receive 
their  share  of  attention  from   Plato. 

The  Republic  is  divided  into  ten  books  and  is 
distributed  through  338  good  sized  pages  in  Pro- 
fessor Jowett's  translation.  The  first  half  of  Book 
III.,  which  is  about  forty  pages  in  length,  is  devoted 
to  a  discussion  of  the  ethics  of  poetry.  It  is  important 
that  this  discussion  be  reduced  to  a  summary  that 
will  show  in  what  way  Plato  treated  not  only  the 
doctrine  of  poetic  justice  itself,  but  also  those 
questions  which  are  closely  related  to  the  doctrine, 
such,  for  instance,  as  the  arousing  of  the  emotions. 
To  make  the  summary  more  complete  it  will  be 
necessary  to  add  the  last  eight  pages  of  Book  II., 
making  a  total  of  more  than  ioo">  lines  of  the  text. 

*   Short  History,   p.    386 

[3i] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

The  length  of  this  discussion  of  poetry  and  the 
poets  is  very  significant,  since  it  is  not  generally 
admitted  that  there  is  in  all  Aristotle's  Poetics 
a  single  sentence  that  deals  directly  with  the  ethical 
aspect  of  the  art;  it  is  significant  also  by  reason  of 
the  fact  that  the  literary  critics  of  the  sixteenth 
and  seventeenth  centuries  based  their  ethical  require- 
ment for  poetry  largely  upon  their  interpretation 
of  Aristotle,  little  thinking  that  a  better  basis  would 
be  found  in  Plato  who  was  popularly  known  to  them 
as  one  who  would  banish  poets  from  his  ideal  common- 
wealth. 

It  is  understood,  of  course,  that  the  Republic 
is  set  forth  in  the  form  of  a  dialogue  in  which 
Socrates  appears  as  the  chief  speaker;  but  it  will 
not  be  advisable  to  make  any  distinctions  based  on 
this  fact.  We  shall  ascribe  the  opinions  directly  to 
Plato,  and  thus  conform  to  the  generally  accepted 
theory  that  he  used  the  dialogue  as  a  literary  form 
for  the  expression  of  his  own  views. 

The  subject  of  poetry  is  introduced  under  the 
head  of  education.  The  ideal  republic  must  give 
proper  instruction  to  the  young.  This  subject  he 
treats  under  two  heads,  gymnastics  and  music, — 
the  former  for  the  body,  the  latter  for  the  soul. 
Under  the  head  of  music  he  introduces  literature, 
and  his  first  observation  is,  that  there  must  be 
"a  censorship  of  the  writers  of  fiction."*  He  objects 
to  Homer  and  Hesiod,  because  they  narrated  things 
which  were  not  true,  such  as  the  sufferings  of  Cronus 
which  were  inflicted  upon  him  by  his  son;  the 
reason  for  this  objection  is,  that  "  the  young  man 
*  Jowett,  III.,  p.  59. 

[32] 


PLATO'S  DOCTRINE 

should  not  be  told  that  in  committing  the  worst 
of  crimes  he  is  far  from  doing  anything  outrageous; 
and  that  even  if  he  chastises  his  father  when  he  does 
wrong,  in  whatever  manner,  he  will  only  be  following 
the  example  of  the  first  and  greatest  among  the 
gods."*  Even  if  the  incident  of  the  poet  has  an 
historical  basis,  Plato  objects  to  its  recital  if  it  may 
serve  as  a  bad  example,  f  Surely  this  kind  of  an 
opinion  should  be  approved  by  Rymer  and  by 
Dennis  after  him. 

Wrong-doing  and  the  consequences  thereof 
constitute  a  necessary  element  in  tragedy.  This 
being  true,  we  can  make  it  appear  that  Plato  was 
opposed  to  tragedy  because  of  this  fact.  "It  is  most 
important,"  he  says,  "that  the  tales  which  the 
young  first  hear  should  be  models  of  virtuous 
thoughts;"|  therefore,  he  would  try  to  keep  from 
the  minds  of  the  young  the  very  knowledge  of  such 
a  thing  as  wrong-doing,  quarreling  and  battles, 
his  advice  being,  that  "  we  shall  never  mention 
the  battle  of  the  giants,  or  let  them  be  embroidered 
on  garments;  and  we  shall  be  silent  about  the 
innumerable  other  quarrels  of  gods  and  heroes  with 
their  friends  and  relatives. "§  From  this  it  would 
seem  that  poetry  must  not  deal  with  evil  deeds; 
but  the  actual  conclusion  he  draws  is  not  so  restric- 
tive. He  makes  provision  for  the  use  of  tragic 
poetry,  and  discusses  the  manner  in  which  the 
poet  may  depict  suffering  and  wrong-doing.  I|  In 
making  this  exception  in  favor  of  the  writer  of 
tragedy,  he  first  determines  in  a  philosophical  fashion 


*  Ibid., 

|).  60. 

t  Ibid 

t   Ibid., 

p.   61 

§  Ibid. 
[33] 

||  Ibid 

POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

that  God  cannot  be  the  author  of  evil,  and  then 
places  upon  the  poet  the  obligation  of  conforming 
to  this  truth  in  his  writings.  The  passage  which 
gives  the  poet  his  license  to  write  tragedy  should 
be  quoted  in  full,  because  it  contains  a  very  impor- 
tant declaration  in  favor  of  poetic  justice.  The 
passage  is  as  follows :  "  Neither  will  we  allow  our 
young  men  to  hear  the  words  of  Aeschylus,  that 
'  God  plants  guilt  among  men  when  he  desires  utterly 
to  destroy  a  house.'  And  if  a  poet  writes  of  the  suffer- 
ings of  Niobe — the  subject  of  the  tragedy  in  which 
these  iambic  verses  occur — or  of  the  house  of  Pelops, 
or  of  the  Trojan  war,  or  on  any  similar  theme, 
either  we  must  not  permit  him  to  say  that  these 
are  the  works  of  God,  or  if  they  are  of  God,  he  must 
devise  some  explanation  of  them  such  as  we  are 
seeking;  he  must  say  that  God  did  what  was  just 
and  right  and  they  were  the  better  for  being  punished : 
but  that  those  who  are  punished  are  miserable,  and 
that  God  is  the  author  of  their  misery— the  poet  is 
not  permitted  to  say;  though  he  may  say  that 
the  wicked  are  miserable  because  they  require  to 
be  punished,*  and  are  benefitted  by  receiving  punish- 
ment from  God;  but  that  God  being  good  is  the 
author  of  evil  to  any  one  is  to  be  strenuously  denied, 
and  not  to  be  said  or  sung  or  heard  in  verse  or  prose 
by  any  one  whether  old  or  young  in  any  well 
ordered  commonwealth.  Such  a  fiction  is  suicidal, 
ruinous,  impious,  "f 

It  is  hard  to  discover  any  reason  for  supposing 

*  This  kind   of   theology   is  a   reminder  of   the   Roman 
Catholic  doctrine  that  fhe  souls  in  purgatory  suffer  willingly, 
t  Jowett,    III.,   p.   63. 

[34] 


PLATO'S  DOCTRINE 

that  Plato  was  not  a  rigorist  in  the  matter  of  poetic 
justice.  It  is  clear  that  he  could  not  tolerate  the 
idea  of  having  wickedness  triumph  in  poetical 
narrative,  because  it  was  contrary  to  his  idea  of 
eternal  justice,  and  also  because  it  would  serve  as 
an  incentive  to  evil  for  those  who  might  read  such 
a  narrative  or  see  it  represented  on  the  stage. 
How  important  was  the  thought  of  justice  itself  in 
helping  him  to  arrive  at  this  conclusion,  one  can 
best  indicate  by  calling  attention  to  the  fact  that 
the  whole  treatise  is  largely  an  application  of  Plato's 
theory  of  justice,  a  definition  of  which  is  given  in 
the  first  part  of  Book  I. 

The  next  notable  passage  in  the  portion  of  the 
work  which  we  are  considering  is  one  which  deals 
with  the  emotion  of  fear.  Tragedy,  according  to 
Aristotle,  should  arouse  the  emotions  of  pity  and 
fear,  an  opinion  which  has  been  accepted  by  nearly 
all  literary  critics  since  his  time.  Plato  thinks  differ- 
ently. At  any  rate,  he  disapproves  of  those  passages 
in  the  poets  that  are  likely  to  make  men  fear  death 
or  pity  any  man  who  is  to  die.  Aristotle  maintained 
that  tragedy  arouses  the  emotions  only  to  purge 
them;  and  Plato  should  have  held  to  the  same  kind 
of  opinion,  as  may  be  judged  from  the  following 
passage  in  the  Laws:  "when  mothers  want  their 
restless  children  to  go  to  sleep  they  do  not  employ 
rest,  but,  on  the  contrary,  motion — rocking  them 
in  their  arms:  nor  do  they  give  them  silence,  but 
they  sing  to  them  and  lap  them  in  sweet  strains."* 
The  implied  line  of  reasoning  is  this,  that  fear  may 
be  overcome  by  fear,  or  that  familiarity  with  fear 

*  Jowett,    V.,    p.    171. 

[35] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

makes  men  proof  against  fear.  Aristotle  would 
probably  agree  to  this,  but  Plato  does  not.  We  are 
to  draw  a  different  conclusion  from  his  reference 
to  the  rocking  of  restless  children.  He  himself  says 
that  "  there  is  a  good  deal  to  be  said  in  favor  of 
this  treatment;"*  but  he  qualifies  the  assertion  by 
adding  that  "  we  ought  to  infer  from  these  facts, 
that  every  soul  which  from  youth  upward  has  been 
familiar  with  fears,  will  be  more  liable  to  fear,  and 
every  one  will  allow  that  this  is  the  way  to  form  a 
habit  of  cowardice  and  not  of  courage,  "f  In  the 
Republic  he  makes  his  meaning  very  clear  on  this 
point.  After  quoting  on  objectionable  passage 
from  Homer,  he  boldly  declares:  "let  us  have  no 
more  lies  of  that  sort.  Neither  must  we  have  mothers 
under  the  influence  of  the  poets  scaring  their  children 
with  a  bad  version  of  these  myths — telling  how 
certain  gods,  as  they  say,  '  Go  about  by  night  in 
the  likeness  of  so  many  strangers  and  in  divers 
forms;'  but  let  them  take  heed  lest  they  make 
cowards  of  their  children,  and  at  the  same  time 
speak  blasphemy  against  the  gods."J 

It  seems  to  be  quite  clear  that  Plato  was  un- 
willing to  think  that  a  repeated  stimulation  of  the 
emotion  of  fear  would  make  men  courageous.  It  is 
true  that  the  citations  have  a  direct  bearing  upon 
the  education  of  children,  and  for  this  reason  one 
might  be  disposed  to  lessen  the  importance  of  the 
conclusion  to  be  drawn;  but  Plato's  view  was  not 
a  narrow  view.  His  theory  in  regard  to  the  emotion 
of  fear  referred  to  adults  as  well  as  to  children,  a 
fact   that   is   made   quite  apparent  in   the   opening 

*  Ibid.  f  Ibid.  %  Jowett,   III.,   p.   65. 

[36] 


PLATO'S  DOCTRINE 

sentences  of  Book  III.  of  the  Republic.  There  he 
takes  account  of  both  fear  and  pity,  and  he  reasons 
somewhat  in  this  order:  If  men  are  to  be  couragous, 
they  must  learn  lessons  that  "  will  take  away  the 
fear  of  death,"*  and  consequently  take  away  the 
thought  of  suffering  in  the  world  to  come.  "  Can 
he  be  fearless  of  death,"  Plato  asks,  "or  will  he 
choose  death  in  battle  rather  than  defeat  and 
slavery,  who  believes  the  world  below  to  be  real 
and  terrible?  "f  After  answering  this  question  in 
the  negative,  he  goes  on  to  say  that  "  we  must 
assume  control  over  the  narrators  of  this  class  of 
tales  as  well  as  over  the  others,  and  beg  them  not 
simply  to  revile,  but  rather  to  commend  the  world 
below,  intimating  to  them  that  their  descriptions 
are  untrue,  and  will  do  harm  to  our  future  war- 
riors.'J  Therefore  he  will  obliterate  from  the  Odyssey 
the  following  line,  "  I  would  rather  be  a  serf  on  the 
land  of  a  poor  and  portionless  man  than  rule  over 
all  the  dead  who  have  come  to  nought.  "§  Likewise 
would  he  expunge  many  another  passage  to  be  found 
in  the  works  of  Homer.  It  is  not  proper,  he  says, 
that  men  and  boys  "  should  fear  slavery  more  than 
death."  ||  Then  he  proceeds  "  to  get  rid  of  the  weepings 
and  wailings  of  famous  men,"*!  by  showing  that 
"  the  good  man  will  not  consider  death  terrible  to 
any  other  good  man  who  is  his  comrade.  .  .  and 
therefore  he  will  not  sorrow  for  his  departed  friend 
as  though  he  had  suffered  anything  terrible.  .  .  Then 
we  will  once  more  entreat  Homer  and  the  other  poets 

*  Ibid.,    p.    68.  f  Ibid.  }   Ibid. 

§  Od.  XI.,  489.  ||  Jowett,  III.,  p.  69. 

^  Ibid.,  p.  70. 

[37] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

not  to  depict  Achilles,  who  is  the  son  of  a  goddess, 
first  lying  on  his  side,  then-  on  his  back,  and  then  on 
his  face;  then  starting  up  and  sailing  in  a  frenzy 
along  the  shores  of  the  barren  sea;  now  taking  the 
sooty  ashes  in  both  his  hands  and  pouring  them 
over  his  head ;  or  weeping  and  wailing  in  the  various 
modes  which  Homer  has  delineated."*  In  this 
manner  he  proceeds  to  illustrate  what  should  be 
stricken  from  the  works  of  the  poets,  in  order  that 
men  may  not  be  induced  to  express  feelings  of 
commiseration.  He  thinks  that  the  setting  forth 
of  such  examples  of  weakness  in  the  actions  of  heroes 
and  divine  beings  would  give  men  a  means  of  justify- 
ing such  conduct  in  their  own  lives,  in  consequence 
of  which  they  would  lack  a  spirit  of  shame  and 
self-control,  and  would  "  be  always  whining  and 
lamenting  on  slight  occasions,  "f  In  like  manner  he 
develops  an  argument  against  poetry  that  excites 
laughter, J  or  describes  intemperance,  §  or  depicts 
immoral  conduct.  || 

But  all  this  theory,  it  may  be  said,  deals,  with 
the  poet's  treatment  of  the  deeds  of  "  gods  and 
demi-gods  and  heroes  and  the  world  below,  "^j  That 
is  quite  true,  and  Plato  himself  called  attention  to 
the  fact;  but  this  does  not  take  away  from  the 
importance  of  the  principle  laid  down,  nor  in  par- 
ticular should  it  be  an  affective  argument  against 
Plato's  position  in  regard  to  poetic  justice.  It  happens 
that  what  follows  gives  greater  force  to  what  has 
been  already- said  by  the  philosopher.     He  himself 


*  Ibid.  t  Ibid.,  p.   71.  J  Ibid. 

§  Ibid.,  p.  73-  II  Ibid.  H  ibid!,'  p.  76. 

[38] 


PLATO'S   DOCTRINE 

asks  the  question,  "what  shall  we  say  about  men?"* 
Poets  and  story  tellers,  he  says,  in  answer  to  this 
question,  "are  guilty  of  making  the  gravest  mis- 
statements when  they  tell  us  that  wicked  men  are 
often  happy,  and  the  good  miserable;  and  that 
injustice  is  profitable  when  undetected,  but  that 
justice  is  a  man's  own  loss  and  another's  gain — these 
things  we  shall  forbid  them  to  utter,  and  command 
them  to  sing  and  say  the  opposite. "f  Here  we  have  a 
most  explicit  statement  in  regard  to  poetic  justice. 
Plato  requires  that  poetry  shall  depict  the  reward 
of  virtue  and  the  punishment  of  vice,  and  will  allow 
no  exception  to  this  rule.  Were  a  tragedy  con- 
structed according  to  this  rule,  Aristotle  would 
find  fault  with  it,  saying  that  the  pleasure  to  be 
derived  from  it  would  be  proper  rather  to  comedy. 
Plato  would  not  only  praise  such  a  tragedy,  but 
he  would  reject  from  the  realm  of  poetry  any  play 
that  should  violate  the  rule  of  poetic  justice;  and 
the  author  of  the  play  would  be  banished  from 
the  ideal  commonwealth.  His  rule  applies  not  to 
tragedy  only,  but  to  all  kinds  of  poetry  that  repre- 
sent the  actions  of  men.  Of  course,  there  can  be 
no  strict  application  of  the  principle  to  the  repre- 
sentation of  the  actions  of  the  gods,  because  Plato 
maintains  that  they  should  not  be  portrayed  as 
doing  any  wrong. 

The  mere  fact  that  the  foregoing  enunciation 
of  the  doctrine  of  poetic  justice  is  stated  only  con- 
ditionally in  that  portion  of  the  Republic  from  which 
it  is  taken  should  detract  in  no  way  from  the  impor- 
tance which  is  here  given  to  it.  The  condition  referred 
*   Ibid;      •"•■*  t   Ibid. 

[39.] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

to  does  not  effect  the  principle  itself  but  rather  a 
question  of  relativity  in  regard  to  justice ;  and  because 
he  has  not  yet  determined  what  is  the  essence  of 
justice  or  what  advantage  a  man  possesses  in  seeming 
to  be  just,  he  fails  to  discuss  the  whole  question  in 
detail.  "Enough,"  he  says,  "of  the  subjects  of 
poetry:    let  us  now  speak  of  the  style."* 

Here  we  may  draw  to  a  close  our  citations  from 
Plato's  Republic.  The  fact  that  he  will  not  accept 
poets  into  his  ideal  commonwealth  is  not  an  argu- 
ment against  ideal  poetry,  but  only  an  argument 
against  poetry  as  he  found  it.  Euripides  had  praised 
tyrants,  saying  that  they  are  wise,  and  therefore 
he  should  be  banished;!  others  had  depicted  im- 
probabilities and  untruths,  and,  like  Homer,  had 
made  men  appear  pitiful  in  their  misfortunes  rather 
than  courageous, — therefore  they  must  be  banished; 
and  some  had  portrayed  the  triumph  of  villainy, 
a  disedifying  lesson  to  be  taught, — these,  likewise, 
are  to  be  banished  from  Plato's  Utopia.  It  is  not 
necessary  to  emphasize  further  the  "importance  of 
all  this  as  an  argument  against  the  assertion  of 
Dennis  that  Aristotle  was  the  first  to  establish  the 
doctrine  of  poetic  justice. 

That  Plato  adhered  to  his  opinion  on  the  ethical 
import  of  poetry  and  insisted  on  the  doctrine  of 
poetic  justice,  is  evident  from  what  he  says  on  the 
subject  in  his  Laws,  which,  as  we  said,  was  the  latest 
of  his  works.  No  attempt  will  be  made  to  make 
use  of  the  Laws  for  any  further  elucidation  of  the 
theory  of  poetry  beyond  calling  attention  to  those 

*  Ibid.  t  Ibid.,  p    278, 

[40] 


PLATO'S  DOCTRINE 

passages  which  deal  with  the  doctrine  of  rewards 
and   punishments. 

In  answer  to  the  inquiry,  "  Is  the  poet  to  train 
his  choruses  as  he  pleases,  without  reference  to 
virtue  or  vice?"  he  answers,  "That  is  surely  quite 
unreasonable,  and  is  not  to  be  thought  of,"*  and 
cites  the  example  of  Egypt  which  imposed  upon  its 
artists  in  antiquity  fixed  patterns  of  art.  He  accounts 
for  the  low  standards  of  poetry  prevalent  in  his 
day  by  the  fact  that  the  poets  sought  to  please  the 
people,  rather  than  attain  those  standards  of  excel- 
lence which  would  be  demanded  by  judges  of  better 
taste,  f  This  opinion  is  somewhat  interesting  in  the 
light  of  what  Aristotle  says  in  the  Poetics  where 
he  refers  to  the  poetic  justice  type  of  tragedy  as 
the  result  of  the  efforts  of  the  poets  to  please  the 
people.  | 

A  passage  of  very  considerable  importance  to 
us  in  this  investigation  occurs  towards  the  end 
of  the  first  half  of  Book  II.  in  Plato's  Laws.  The 
doctrine  of  poetic  justice  is  there  set  forth  in  terms 
of  such  unmistakable  meaning  that  commentary  is 
scarcely  needed.  The  following  is  the  passage: 
"Let  us  see  whether  we  understand  one  another: — 
Are  not  the  principles  of  education  and  music  which 
prevail  among  you  as  follows:  you  compel  your 
poets  to  say  that  the  good  man,  if  he  be  temperate 
and  just,  is  fortunate  and  happy;  and  this  whether 
he  be  great  and  strong  or  small  and  weak,  and 
whether  he  be  rich  or  poor;  and,  on  the  other  hand, 
if  he  have  a  wealth  passing  that  of  Cinyras  or  Midas, 

*  Ibid.,  V.,  p.  34-  t  Ibid.,  p.   37- 

I   Poetics,  chapter  XIII.,  in  Butcher's  text,  p.   47. 

]4i] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

and  be  unjust,  he  is  wretched  and  lives  in  misery? 
As  the  poet  says,  and  with  truth:  I  sing  not,  I 
care  not  about  him  who  accomplishes  all  noble 
things,  not  having  justice;  ....  if  I  were  a  lawgiver 
I  would  try  to  make  the  poets  and  all  citizens  speak 
in  this  strain;  and  I  would  inflict  the  heaviest  penal- 
ties on  any  one  in  all  the  land  who  should  dare  to 
say  that  there  are  bad  men  who  lead  pleasant  lives."* 
Here  we  have  the  indication  of  what  has  been 
regarded  as  a  somewhat  modern  idea  of  poetic  justice. 
In  the  time  of  Rymer  this  doctrine  called  for  the 
physical  punishment  of  the  wrong-doer;  in  later 
times  critics  have  been  sometimes  satisfied  if  the 
wrong-doer  suffer  mentally,  while  ostensibly  enjoying 
the  results  of  his  wickedness, — and  this  is  essentially 
the  kind  of  poetic  justice  that  Plato  had  in  mind 
when  he  insisted  that  the  unjust  must  be  depicted 
as  living  in  misery  But  it  is  hardly  likely  that 
Plato  favored  the  plan  of  having  the  wicked  escape 
without  punishment  in  the  legal  sense.  In  the  ideal 
commonwealth  provision  was  made  for  legal  punish- 
ment of  crime,  and  to  such  a  standard  of  conduct 
the  action  of  poetical  narrative  must  naturally 
conform.  Considered  from  all  points  of  view  the 
language  of  Plato  is  sufficiently  strong  in  favor  of 
poetic  justice.  He  will  admit  of  no  departure  from 
the  practice  of  rewarding  virtue  and  rendering  crime 
unprofitable.  This  is  a  purely  ethical  requirement, 
and  it  has  its  basis  in  the  idea  that  society 
may  be  harmed  or  helped  by  poetical  representations. 
Plato  does  not  deal  with  the  theory  of  poetic  justice 
considered  from  the  aesthetic  point  of  view.  "Such 
*  Jowett,  V.,  pp.  39-40. 

[42] 


PLATO'S  DOCTRINE 

a  view  is  possible,  and  such  a  view  was  taken  by 
Rymer  and  others.  According  to  their  idea  it  was 
necessary  not  only  that  the  given  punishment  of 
a  crime  be  fully  adequate  to  meet  the  demands 
of  justice  for  time  and  eternity,  thus  satisfying  the 
ethical  requirement,  but  also  that  the  mode  of 
punishment  be  in  itself  poetical,  thus  satisfying  the 
aesthetic  requirement  of  which  mention  was  made. 
Rymer  more  than  any  one  else  combined  these 
two  requirements  in  his  idea  of  poetic  justice. 
Plato  says  •  nothing  on  the  subject  directly  and 
very  little  indirectly.  There  is  no  evidence  that 
he  thought  of  combining  these  two  notions  in  his 
idea  of  poetic  justice.  He  is  altogether  concerned 
with  the  ethical  aspect  of  things. 

It  is  true,  of  course,  that  the  idea  of  poetic 
justice  which  is  discovered  in  the  writings  of  Plato 
differs  in  some  respects  from  that  which  prevailed 
in  the  time  of  Addison.  In  Plato  the  doctrine  is 
not  treated  in  the  expressly  formal  manner  that 
made  the  problem  one  of  peculiar  importance  at 
the  end  of  the  seventeenth  century.  It  is  a  fact, 
for  instance,  that  Plato  was  more  concerned  with 
a  discussion  of  the  faults  of  the  poets  than  with 
the  enunciation  of  positive  rules  by  which  they 
were  to  be  guided.  He  condemned  poets  because  of 
certain  errors  into  which  they  appeared  to  have 
fallen,  and  he  seemed  to  think  that  poetry  of  the 
ideal  type  was  not  to  be  found.  He  would  expel 
poets  from  his  ideal  commonwealth  because  he  did 
not  regard  them  as  a  practically  safe  guide  in  the 
development  of  the  noblest  types  of  citizen.  Poetry, 
as  he  found  it  in  Greek  literature,  failed  to  satisfy 

[43] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

him  from  the  point  of  view  of  ethics;  "poetry," 
he  declared,  "  feeds  and  waters  the  passions  instead 
of  drying  them  up;  she  lets  them  rule,  although 
they  ought  to  be  controlled,  if  mankind  are  ever 
to  increase  in  happiness;"*  and,  of  course,  poetry 
failed  to  indicate  what  should  be  the  proper  conse- 
quences of  the  actions  which  were  portrayed;  and 
since  the  poets  were  not  likely  to  put  in  practise 
the  ethical  requirement  he  had  in  mind,  he  decided 
to  restrict  the  field  of  their  activity,  saying,  "we 
must  remain  firm  in  our  conviction  that  hymns  to 
the  gods  and  praises  of  famous  men  are  the  only 
poetry  which  ought  to  be  admitted  into  our  state."* 
His  hostility  towards  the  poets  is  essentially  based 
on  an  ethical  ideal,  for  he  says,  "what  will  any  one 
be  profited  if  under  the  ....  excitement  of  poetry, 
he  neglect  justice  and  virtue?"! 

That  poetry  might  help  the  state  in  a  moral 
way  is,  nevertheless,  a  theoretical  possiblity,  pro- 
vided that  they  fulfil  certain  conditions  that  are 
described  in  Book  VIII.  of  his  Laws.  There  he 
requires  that  the  poet  should  be  "not  less  than 
fifty  years  of  age;  nor  should  he  be  one  who  ....  has 
never  in  his  life  done  any  noble  or  illustrious  action; 
but  those  who  are  themselves  good  and  also  honor- 
able in  the  state,  creators  of  noble  action — let  their 
poems  be  sung,  even  though  they  be  not  very 
musical.  .  .  .  Nor  shall  any  one  dare  to  sing  a  song 
which  has  not  been  approved  by  the  judgment  of 
the  guardian  of  the  laws  .  .  .  but  only  such  poems 

*  Rep.  X.  607,  in  Jowett,  III.,  p.  322. 

t  Ibid, 

t  Ibid  ,  p.  323. 

[44] 


PLATO'S  DOCTRINE 

as  .  .  .  are  the  works  of  good  men,  in  which  praise 
or  blame  has  been  awarded."* 

Here,  late  in  life,  Plato  indicates  an  acceptable 
treatment  of  the  deeds  of  men  in  poetry,  and  appar- 
ently calls  for  the  application  of  some  principle 
such  as  that  which  goes  by  the  name  of  poetic 
justice,  and  this  is  the  most  evident  conclusion  to 
be  drawn  from  the  reference  to  'praise  or  blame.' 

How,  it  may  be  asked,  would  Plato  illustrate 
the  idea  of  'praise  or  blame?'  To  answer  this 
question,  one  must  take  note  of  the  methods  em- 
ployed by  the  guardians  of  the  ideal  state  in  dealing 
with  actions  that  may  be  called  good  or  bad.  "If 
the  legislator,"  he  says  in  Book  IX.  of  his  Laws, 
sees  any  one  who  is  incurable,  for  him  he  will  appoint 
a  law  and  a  penalty.  He  knows  quite  well  that  to 
such  men  themselves  there  is  no  profit  in  the  con- 
tinuance of  their  lives,  and  that  they  would  do  a 
double  good  to  the  rest  of  mankind  if  they  would 
take  their  departure,  inasmuch  as  they  would  be 
an  example  to  other  men  not  to  offend,  and  they 
would  relieve  the  city  of  bad  citizens.  In  such  cases, 
and  in  such  cases  only,  the  legislator  ought  to 
inflict  death  as  the  punishment  of  offences."!  Here 
we  have  an  illustration  of  the  practical  relation 
between  crime  and  punishment;  and  may  we  not 
suppose  that  the  state  would  require  its  poets  to 
represent  this  same  relation  in  any  treatment  of 
such  a  situation?  To  do  so  would  be  to  satisfy  the 
ethical  purpose  of  the  law  of  retribution;  Plato 
himself  says  that   the  wrong-doer  is  punished,   not 

*   Laws  VIII.  829,  in  Jowett,  V.  p.   210-21 1. 
f  Jowett,  V.,   p.   246. 

[45] 


NOETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

"  because  he  did  wrong,  for  that  which  is  done 
can  never  be  undone,  but  in  order  that  in  future 
times,  he,  and  those  who  see  him  corrected,  may 
utterly  hate  injustice,  or  at  any  rate  abate  much 
of  their  evil  doing.  Having  an  eye  to  all  these  things, 
the  law,  like  a  good  archer,  should  aim  at  the  right 
measure  of  punishment,  and  in  all  cases  at  the  de- 
served punishment."*  By  portraying  human  conduct 
in  accordance  with  the  laws  of  the  state,  poets  would 
not  only  produce  the  proper  ethical  result,  but  also 
conform  with  the  real  standards  by  means  of  which 
they  might  be  allowed  to  practice  their  art  in  the 
ideal  commonwealth ;  so  far  as  any  special  restraint  is 
concerned,  it  is  merely  announced  "that  the  legislator 
ought  not  to  allow  the  poets  to  do  what  they  liked. 
For  that  they  would  not  know  in  which  of  their 
words  they  went  against  the  laws  to  the  hurt  of  the 

state,  "f 

It  seems  clear,  then,  that  Plato  would  require 
the  poet  to  represent  rewards  and  punishments  in 
absolute  accord  with  the  practise  of  the  legislators  of 
the  ideal  state,  or  not  at  all.  Moreover,  it  is  evident 
that  such  a  representation  would  be  calculated  to 
inspire  men  to  be  virtuous  and  deter  them  from 
evil.  Furthermore,  it  appears  that  the  given  punish- 
ment in  any  case  is  regarded  as  an  adequate  remedy 
to  prevent  men  from  falling  into  like  error. 

Against  all  this  an  objection  may  be  raised, 
based  on  the  fact  that  to  suffer  punishment  is  not 
a  real  source  of  misery  to  the  person  guilty  of  crime, 
but  rather  a  means  of  atonement.    Certain  it  is  that 

*  Laws,   XI.,  in  Jowett,   V.,   p.   323. 
f  Laws,  IV.,  in  Jowett,  V.,  p.   102. 

[46] 


PLATO'S  DOCTRINE 

Plato  regards  it  a  still  greater  punishment  to  let 
the  guilty  soul  carry  into  the  future  life  the  whole 
burden  of  its  sins  without  any  chance  of  retribution 
in  this  present  state  of  existence;  for  he  says,  "to 
do  wrong  is  the  second  only  in  the  scale  of  evils; 
but  to  do  wrong  and  not  to  be  punished,  is  first 
and  greatest  of  all;"*  and,  therefore,  it  may  be 
contended  that  if  the  poet  were  possessed  of  the 
seventeenth  century  idea  of  poetic  justice,  he  would 
employ  this  method  of  punishing  the  guilty.  Such 
a  contention  is  scarcely  practical,  for  the  seventeenth 
century  critics  were  not  satisfied  with  any  punish- 
ment such  as  may  be  supplied  by  religious  theories 
about  the  hereafter.  Rymer  wanted  "  no  hell  behind 
the  scenes;"  he  insisted  on  full  and  complete  punish- 
ment here  and  now  within  the  limits  of  the  tragic 
representation,  and  that  is  just  what  Plato  wanted 
in  the  ideal  state.  Even  though  Plato  admitted  such 
a  punishment  to  be  a  blessing  in  disguise,  he  never- 
theless regarded  it  as  an  effective  remedy,  by  example, 
for  the  prevention  of  such  disorders.  Life  for  life 
is  one  of  Plato's  doctrines  in  that  part  of  his  work 
in  which  he  discusses  methods  of  punishment. 
"These  are  the  retributions  of  Heaven,"  he  says, 
"  and  by  such  punishments  men  should  be  deterred,  "f 
It  is  clear,  therefore,  that  when  a  man  is  put 
to  death  for  taking  away  the  life  of  his  neighbor, 
he  satisfies  the  ends  of  justice  in  a  practical  way; 
and,  finally,  the  poetical  representation  of  such 
an  event  not  only  satisfies  the  popular  sense  of 
justice,   thereby  producing  its  proper  ethical  effect, 

*   Gorgias,  in  Jowett,   II.,   p.   336. 
f   Laws,  IX.,  in  Jowett,  V.,  p.  257. 

[47] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

but  also  fulfils  the  primary  condition  which  the 
legislator  in  the  ideal  state  should  impose  on  the 
writer  of  the  fiction. 

ARISTOTLE'S    IDEA    OF    TRAGEDY. 

Plato,  of  course,  was  not  the  first  to  consider 
instruction  as  the  chief  end  of  poetry.  There  was  a 
sort  of  traditional  notion  that  the  office  of  the  poet 
was  that  of  a  teacher.  Professor  Butcher  who  takes 
this  view  of  the  matter,  supports  his  opinion  by 
several  citations  from  the  plays  of  Aristophanes.* 
"The  other  theory,"  he  says,  "tacitly  no  doubt 
held  by  many,"  was  first  formulated  by  Aristotle, 
who  held  "that  poetry  is  an  emotional  delight. "f 
He  does  not  admit  that  Aristotle  recognized  any 
direct  moral  purpose  as  the  primary  function  of  a 
poet.  "  Neither  in  the  definition  of  tragedy  (ch. 
VI.  2),  if  properly  understood,"  he  says,  referring 
to  the  Poetics,  "  nor  in  the  subsequent  discussion 
of  it,  is  there  anything  to  lend  countenance  to  the 
view  that  the  office  of  tragedy  is  to  work  upon  men's 
lives,  and  to  make  them  better.  The  theatre  is  not 
the  school.  Aristotle's  critical  judgments  on  poetry 
rest  on  aesthetic  and  logical  grounds,  they  take  no 
account  of  ethical  aims  and  tendencies.  He  mentions 
Euripides  some  twenty  times  in  the  Poetics,  and  in 
the  great  majority  of  instances  with  censure.  He 
points  out  numerous  defects  such  as  inartistic 
structure,  bad  character-drawing,  a  wrong  part 
assigned  to  the  chorus;    but  not  a  word  is  there  of 

*   Frogs  1009-10;    Acharn.    500;    and  else  where. 
■{•  Butcher,  p.  201. 

[48] 


ARISTOTLE'S  IDEA  OF  TRAGEDY 

the  immoral  influence  of  which  we  hear  so  much  in 
Aristophanes."* 

Such  an  interpretation  as  this  would  not  suit 
Rymer  or  Dennis  or  others  who  argued  for  poetic 
justice,  and  based  their  theory  upon  Aristotle.  They 
held  that  the  spectator,  seeing  vice  punished,  would 
fear  to  commit  crime,  or,  seeing  virtue  rewarded, 
would  resolve  to  practice  virtue.  To  make  their 
position  strong,  they  held  that  fear  could  not  be 
aroused  unless  the  guilty  were  always  punished, 
and  that  pity  could  not  be  aroused  unless  this 
punishment  was  more  severe  than  legal  justice 
would  demand.  This  process  could  not  be  realized 
in  tragedy  without  of  necessity  producing  a  good 
moral  effect  in  the  subsequent  conduct  of  the  spec- 
tator. Then,  too,  there  was  another  moral  effect 
resulting  from  such  a  spectacle.  The  frequent  exercise 
of  the  emotions  of  pity  and  fear,  rendering  them  less 
and  less  responsive  to  the  stimulus  intended  to  stir 
them,  would  so  dispose  the  minds  of  men  that  they 
would  not  be  carried  away  by  pity  in  such  a  measure 
as  to  hinder  the  rigor  of  the  law  in  the  punishment 
of  crime.  It  was  along  these  lines  that  a  defence 
was  made  by  the  most  insistent  advocates  of  poetic 
justice  at  the  end  of  the  seventeenth  century  and 
the  beginning  of  the  eighteenth.  It  was  clear  to 
them  not  only  that  the  primary  purpose  of  tragedy 
is  to  produce  an  ethical  effect,  but  also  that  such  a 
doctrine  is  based  on  the  Poetics  of  Aristotle  and 
the  practice  of  the  ancient  writers  of  tragedy.  Point 
by  point  the  doctrine  was  attacked  by  Addison, — 
at  least  with  respect  to  the  arguments  based  upon 

*   Ibid.,   pp.    208—209. 

[49] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

reason  and  the  practice  of  the  ancients;  it  does  not 
appear,  however,  that  he  made  any  formal  denial 
that  Aristotle  proposed  the  doctrine. 

Aristotle,  as  we  have  seen,  was  not  the  first 
to  establish  the  doctrine  of  poetic  justice.  It  is 
not  to  be  asserted,  even,  that  he  recommended  the 
doctrine;  and  yet  we  must  admit  that  he  took  note 
of  the  idea  as  referring  to  a  special  type  of  dramatic 
representation.  Just  what  that  special  type  of 
dramatic  representation  is,  in  comparison  with 
comedy,  can  be  best  explained  only  after  quoting 
Aristotle's  own  words  on  the  subject;  and  an  ex- 
planation is  needed  to  determine,  for  instance,  if 
Aristotle  meant  to  say  that  poetic  justice  is  proper 
to  comedy,  when  as  a  matter  of  fact  he  merely 
says  that  a  certain  tragic  pleasure  is  proper  to 
comedy. 

The  passage  which  contains  Aristotle's  chief 
reference  to  the  idea  of  poetic  justice  and  its  imagin- 
ary relation  to  comedy  is  the  concluding  part  of 
chapter  XIII.  in  the  Poetics,  and  is  translated  as 
follows  by  Professor  Butcher:  "In  the  second  rank 
comes  the  kind  of  tragedy  which  some  place  first.* 
Like  the  Odyssey,  it  has  a  double  thread  of  plot, 
and  also  an  opposite  catastrophe  for  the  good  and 
for  the  bad.  It  is  generally  thought  to  be  the  best 
owing  to  the  weakness  of  the  spectators;  for  the 
poet  is  guided  in  what  he  writes  by  the  wishes  of 

*  As  a  result  of  the  comparative  study  of  the  works 
of  Plato  and  Aristotle,  the  writer  of  this  essay  is  disposed 
to  think  that  in  using  the  expression,  'which  some  place 
first,'  the  author  of  the  Poetics  had  chiefly  in  mind  the 
opinions  of  his  distinguished   preceptor. 

[5o] 


ARISTOTLE'S  IDEA  OF  TRAGEDY 

his  audience.  The  pleasure,  however,  thence  derived 
is  not  the  true  tragic  pleasure.  It  is  proper  rather 
to  comedy,  where  those  who,  in  the  piece,  are  the 
deadliest  enemies- -like  Orestes  and  Aegisthus — quit 
the  stage  as  friends  at  the  close,  and  no  one  slays 
or  is  slain." 

It  must  be  admitted  that  the  foregoing  passage 
contains  a  suggestion  of  what  is  meant  by  poetic 
justice,  the  suggestion  being  found  in  the  reference 
to  an  opposite  catastrophe  for  the  good  and  for 
the  bad.  The  meaning  of  this  is,  that  virtue  is 
rewarded  and  wickedness  is  punished.  Aristotle 
notes  that  such  a  thing  occurs  in  what  is  popularly 
regarded  as  the  best  kind  of  tragedy.  His  commentary 
on  this  species  of  drama  is  a  very  convincing  proof, 
not  that  the  '  opposite  catastrophe  for  the  good 
and  for  the  bad '  is  proper,  but  that  a  catastrophe 
of  this  kind  produces  the  same  sort  of  pleasure  as 
that  which  is  proper  to  comedy.  Professor  Butcher 
takes  a  different  view,  for  he  says  in  reference  to 
this  passage  that  "the  prosaic  justice,  misnamed 
poetical,  which  rewards  the  good  man  and  punishes 
the  wicked,  is  pronounced  to  be  appropriate  only 
to  comedy."*  Such  a  conclusion  seems  to  be  un- 
warranted. According  to  Aristotle,  the  catastrophes 
are  not  of  the  same  nature.  The  first  of  these 
catastrophes  calls  for  the  reward  of  the  good  and 
the  punishment  of  the  bad, — therefore,  it  calls  for 
poetic  justice;  the  termination  of  a  comedy  intro- 
duces a  general  reconciliation  in  which  '  no  one 
slays  or  is  slain,'  a  situation  in  which  there  is  no 
opportunity   of  punishing  wrong-doing  according   to 

*   Aristotle's  Theory,  p.   209. 
[5i] 


Noetic  justice  in  the  drama 

the  severe  requirements  of  tragedy.  Both  endings 
are  pleasing  to  the  spectators,  and  therefore  it  is 
that  Aristotle  draws  a  comparison  on  the  grounds 
of  emotional  effect. 

There  can  be  no  complete  poetic  justice  in  that 
sort  of  comedy  which  Aristotle  had  in  mind  when 
he  made  the  comparison  in  question.  The  idea  of 
poetic  justice  implies  not  merely  the  reward  of 
virtue;  it  implies  also  the  punishment  of  vice. 
Opposed  to  such  a  principle  of  dramatic  art  is  the 
disposition  of  plot  which  would  permit  the  guilty 
lo  scape  by  means  of  a  scheme  of  reconciliation. 
Such  a  thing  is  not  to  be  allowed.  Why?  For  the 
simple  reason  that  Mr.  Rymer  said  so,  in  substance, 
more  than  once,  as  we  shall  see, — and  we  are  bent 
on  tracing  Mr.  Rymer's  concept  of  poetic  justice 
to  its  source.  Other  critics  have  had  different  ideas 
regarding  the  nature  of  poetic  justice,  and  some  of 
them  have  so  defined  the  expression  as  to  make 
it  win  favor  with  critics  who  were  radically  opposed 
to  Rymer.  But  we  are  not  now  concerned  with  such 
modification  in  the  meaning  of  the  expression;  we 
are  concerned  only  with  what  Rymer  had  in  mind, 
and  we  have  started  with  the  explanation  of  the 
subject  that  was  given  in  the  Dennis-Addison 
controversy. 

Aristotle  has  been  misunderstood  in  this  regard. 
Let  us  look  more  closely  into  the  Poetics  and  try 
to  determine  whether  or  not  he  accepted  poetic 
justice  as  a  legitimate  principle  of  dramatic  art 
under  any  circumstances  whatsoever.  Such  an 
investigation  will  take  note  of  the  three  types  of 
plays  with  which  Aristotle  is  most  concerned  in  the 

[52] 


ARISTOTLE'S  IDEA  OF  TRAGEDY 

Poetics.  The  first  of  these  types  is  pure  tragedy, 
the  second  may  be  called  tragicomedy,  the  third 
is  pure  comedy.  We  have  already  given  some  con- 
sideration to  two  of  these  types.  It  remains  for  us 
to  institute  a  comparison  which  will  show  the  inter- 
relation of  the  three,  and  the  distinctive  character- 
istics of  each,  in  so  far  as  these  relations  and  charac- 
teristics will  help  us  to  understand  Aristotle's  theory 
about  poetic  justice. 

.  Pure  tragedy,  according  to  the  Poetics,  does  not 
involve  a  reward  of  virtue;  it  merely  involves  an 
unhappy  ending,  and  must  above  all  things  stir 
the  emotions  of  pity  and  fear.  If  it  were  necessary 
that  the  good  should  be  rewarded,  we  should  look 
for  mention  of  a  corresponding  emotion,  such  as 
joy,  and  we  should  expect  Aristotle  to  refer  to  the 
ending  as  both  happy  and  unhappy.  But  he  does 
not  mention  other  emotions  in  his  definition  of 
tragedy,  nor  does  he  make  any  references  to  the 
mingling  of  happy  and  unhappy  effects  in  the 
catastrophe.  This  means  that  he  did  not  apply  the 
rule  of  poetic  justice  to  pure  tragedy.  From  this 
assertion  might  be  drawn  the  unwarranted  conclusion 
that  Aristotle  would  permit  tragedy  to  violate  the 
principle  of  poetic  justice.  It  is  not  evident  that 
he  would  permit  such  a  thing  to  happen.  He  even 
goes  so  far  as  to  say  that  "  the  change  of  fortune 
presented  must  not  be  the  spectacle  of  a  perfectly 
good  man  brought  from  prosperity  to  adversity; 
for  this  moves  neither  pity  nor  fear;  it  simply  shocks 
us;"*  but  that  is  as  far  as  one  can  go  to  prove 
that  Aristotle  proposed  that  tragedy  should  depict 
*  Ibid.,  pp.  41  ff. 

[53] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE   DRAMA 

the  reward  of  virtue.  The  fact  of  the  matter  is  that 
he  is  not  in  favor  of  giving  any  prominence  to  the 
merits  of  virtue;  his  chief  concern  is  rather  in  the 
opposite  direction,  since  the  hero,  who  is  to  be  brought 
to  a  pitiable  end,  must  be  practically  a  good  man. 
On  this  subject  Aristotle  says  that  the  change  in 
fortune  "should  come  about  as  a  result  not  of  vice, 
but  of  some  great  error  or  frailty,  in  a  character 
either  such  as  we  have  described,  or  better  rather 
than  worse."*  The  description  to  which  he  refers 
requires  that  the  character  must  be  "  that  of  a  man 
who  is  not  eminently  good  and  just,  yet  whose 
misfortune  is  brought  about  not  by  vice  or  depravity, 
but  by  some  error  or  frailty.  He  must  be  one  who 
is  highly  renowned  and  prosperous, — a  personage 
like  Oedipus,  Thyestes,  or  other  illustrious  men  of 
such   families."! 

Again  let  it  be  affirmed  that  Aristotle  did  not 
concern  himself  with  the  application  of  any  theory 
of  poetic  justice.  He  was  not  concerned  with  the 
question  of  justice  at  all — a  leading  question  with 
Plato — he  was  concerned  only  with  the  means  by 
which  the  emotions  of  pity  and  fear  are  to  be  aroused. 
When  he  objects  to  "  the  spectacle  of  a  perfectly 
good  man  brought  from  prosperity  to  adversity, "t 
he  does  so,  not  because  it  would  offend  against 
justice,  but  because  it  shocks.  If  he  had  discussed 
the  reasons  why  we  are  likely  to  be  shocked,  he 
might  have  had  to  introduce  the  question  of  justice; 


*  Ibid.,  p.  43. 
t  Ibid.,  p.  43. 
%  Loc.  cit.  p.  53. 


[54] 


ARISTOTLE'S  IDEA  OF  TRAGEDY 

but  the  fact  is,  that  he  does  not  take  this  oppor- 
tunity of  referring  unequivocally  to  the  law  of 
poetry,  whose  history  we  are  tracing.  At  best,  he 
unconsciously  applies  the  principle  in  only  a  partial 
manner  to  the  protagonist  of  the  plays;  he  makes 
absolutely  no  attempt  to  discuss  the  treatment  of 
the  minor  characters  in  reference  to  the  relation 
existing  between  their  moral  qualities  and  their  fate. 
Rymer  and  Dennis  insisted  that  the  law  of  poetic 
justice  should  be  applied  to  all  the  characters  of  the 
play,  and  thereby  brought  their  beautiful  theory 
into  disrepute.  It  was  discovered  that  such  a  rigorous 
enforcement  of  the  principle  was  particularly  injurious 
to  the  reputation  which  Shakespeare  and  others 
had  earned,  and  for  this  reason  the  defence  attempted 
to  prove  that  there  was  no  foundation  for  the 
"ridiculous  doctrine." 

Tragi-comedy  exhibits,  according  to  Aristotle, 
a  conclusion  such  as  should  satisfy  the  pleader  for 
poetic  justice.  We  have  the  Greek  critic's  word 
for  it  that  this  sort  of  play  was  classed  by  some  as 
the  highest  form  of  tragedy.  What  he  himself  thinks 
about  it,  we  have  already  shown.  It  is  quite  certain 
that  he  does  not  care  to  approve  of  such  a  form  of 
the  drama,  for  the  reason  that  it  produces  an  emo- 
tional effect  proper  to  comedy  without  possessing 
the  structure  of  comedy.  It  is  quite  proper  to  repeat 
here  the  commentary  of  Dennis*  on  the  passage  of 
the  Poetics  which  is  now  under  consideration. 
Dennis  says:  "And  does  not  the  same  deluded 
philosopher  tell,  us  in   the  very  same  chapter  that 


*  Loc  cit.  p.  50. 

[55] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

the  fable  to  which  he  gives  second  preference,  is 
that  which  has  a  double  constitution,  and  which 
ends  by  a  double  catastrophe.  .  .  Is  not  here,  Mr. 
Spectator,  a  very  formal  recommendation  of  the 
impartial  and  exact  execution  of  poetical  justice?" 
One  is  tempted  to  be  somewhat  flippant  in  replying 
to  such  an  arrogantly-put  question  as  this  of  Mr. 
Dennis.  We  shall  dismiss  the  temptation  and  say 
simply  that  the  passage  to  which  Mr.  Dennis  refers 
contains  absolutely  no  evidence  that  Aristotle  recom- 
mended the  doctrine  of  poetic  justice.  The  only 
suggestion  of  a  recommendation  is  that  which  is 
based  upon  the  approval  of  the  people  who  encouraged 
such  a  feature  in  plays.  This  kind  of  recommerrdation 
Aristotle  mentions  as  an  historian  might,  but  not 
for  the  purpose  of  approving  it.  A  careful  examina- 
tion of  the  text  will  reveal  the  fact  that  what  Dennis 
regarded  as  a  recommendation  is  actually  a  censure: 
Aristotle  disapproved  of  those  plays  which  illustrated 
the  theory  of  poetic  justice. 

It  cannot,  then,  be  fairly  maintained  that 
"Aristotle  was  the  first  who  established  this  ridic- 
ulous doctrine  of  modern  criticism."  Such  a 
principle  could  not  be  applied  to  comedy  as  he 
understood  comedy,  nor  could  it  be  applied  to  more 
than  one  of  the  four  possible  variations  of  tragedy 
which  he  took  into  consideration.  The  four  possible 
variations  may  be  listed  as  follows: 

I.  A  protagonist — neither  eminently  good  nor 
notably   bad — passes   from   prosperity    to   adversity. 

II.  A  protagonist — eminently  good — passes  from 
prosperity  to  adversity. 


[56] 


ARISTOTLE'S  IDEA  OF  TRAGEDY 

III.  A  protagonist — notably  bad — passes  from 
adversity   to  prosperity.* 

IV.  An  exhibition  of  the  good  attaining  pros- 
perity   while    the   bad   are   afflicted    with    adversity. 

The  first  of  these  represents  the  only  legitimate 
type  of  tragedy.  The  fourth  is  tolerated,  not  for 
the  sake  of  art,  but  only  out  of  respect  for  the  taste 
of  the  people;  but  it  is  not  recommended.  The 
other  two  are  wholly  rejected. 

One  more  argument  is  to  be  advanced  to  show 
that  Aristotle  is  not  the  proper  basis  for  the  seven- 
teenth century  idea  of  poetic  justice.  In  deciding 
what  is  proper  for  tragedy  he  makes  this  assertion: 
"  Nor,  again,  should  the  downfall  of  the  utter  villain 
be  exhibited.  A  plot  of  this  kind  would,  doubtless, 
satisfy  the  moral  sense,  but  it  would  inspire  neither 
pity  nor  fear;  for  pity  is  aroused  by  unmerited  mis- 
fortune, fear  by  the  misfortune  of  a  man  like  our- 
selves, "t  Hence  it  was  not  a  question  of  justice;  the 
villain  might  be  punished  so  as  to  satisfy  the  moral 
sense,  says  Aristotle,  and  yet  he  would  not  do  for 
tragedy.    Rymer  would  insist  on  such  a  refinement  of 


*  Butcher  observes  that  whereas  Aristotle  is  to  be 
approved  for  rejecting  this  type  of  tragedy,  it  is  hardly 
so  certain  that  he  is  to  be  praised  for  rejecting  the  second 
in  the  list  here  given.  "The  unqualified  rejection  of  such  a 
theme  as  unsuited  to  tragedy  may  well  surprise  us.  Aris- 
totle had  not  to  go  heyond  the  Greek  stage  to  find  a  guilt- 
less heroine  whose  death  does  not  shock  the  moral  sense. 
Nothing  but  a  misplaced  ingenuity  or  a  resolve  at  all  costs 
to  impart  a  moral  lesson  into  the  drama,  can  discover  in 
Antigone  any  fault  or  failing  which  entailed  on  her  suffering 
as  its  due  penalty."^ — Aristotle's  Theory,  p.   287. 

f   Ibid.,  p.  43. 

[57] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

the  moral  sense  that  it  would  not  be  satisfied  by  any 
punishment  which,  for  instance,  Shakespeare  might 
inflict  upon  Richard  III.  Aristotle  did  not  think 
of  villainy  for  which  there  was  no  adequate  punish- 
ment, and  yet  he  would  refuse  to  accept  for  the 
office  of  protagonist  any  notably  bad  character. 
Rymer  would  admit  the  sinner  only  on  condition 
that  the  punishment  inflicted  should  satisfy  an  over- 
refined  moral  sense.  In  this  respect,  therefore, 
Aristotle  is  not  to  be  called  the  author  of  the  seven- 
teenth century  idea  of  poetic  justice. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  reference  was  made 
to  the  fact  that  Rymer  insisted  upon  certain  aestheti- 
cal  conditions  in  connnection  with  the  ethical  require- 
ment.* In  this  he  was  following  Aristotle,  who 
points  out  certain  circumstances  that  "  impress  us 
as  terrible  or  pitiful. "f  Here,  for  example,  is  a 
passage  of  which  Rymer  made  considerable  use  in 
The  Tragedies  of  the  Last  Age.  "  If  an  enemy  kills 
an  enemy,  there  is  nothing  to  excite  pity  either 
in  the  act  or  the  intention, — except  so  far  as  the 
suffering  in  itself  is  pitiful.  So  again  with  indifferent 
persons.  But  when  the  tragic  incident  occurs  between 
those  who  are  near  or  dear  to  one  another — if,  for 
example,  a  brother  kills,  or  intends  to  kill,  a  brother, 
a  son  his  father,  a  mother  her  son,  a  son  his  mother, 
or  any  other  deed  of  the  kind,  is  done — here  we  have 
the  situation  which  should  be  sought  for  by  the 
poet. "J  The  effect  which  such  circumstances  would 
produce    may    be    properly    described    as    aesthetic; 

-'-       *  Loc.  cit.  p.  43. 

t   Aristotle's  Theory,  p:   47. 
%  Ibid. 

[58] 


ARISTOTLE'S  IDEA  OF  TRAGEDY 

in  fact,  the  whole  burden  of  the  Poetics  is  largely 
one  of  aesthetics.  The  only  exception  to  this  rule 
is  found  in  the  clause  which  refers  to  the  kartharsis 
of  the  emotions  of  pity  and  fear.  In  this  particular 
passage  we  have  reason  to  think  that  Aristotle 
intended  an  ethical  effect;  and  such  a  conclusion 
must  be  maintained  if  we  are  to  admit,  with  Finsler, 
"  that  the  doctrine  of  the  karthasis  is  an  answer 
to  the  rejection  of  tragedy  by  Plato."* 

It  must  be  observed,  however,  that  the  ethical 
effect  intended  by  Aristotle  was  not  the  same  as 
that  which  was  thought  of  by  many  notable  literary 
critics  of  the  sixteenth,  seventeenth,  and  eighteenth 
centuries,  who  supposed  that  tragedy  should  have 
the  ethical  function  of  making  men  better  through 
the  effect  of  example.  Aristotle  did  not  intend  to 
show  how  men  might  become  better  by  witnessing 
the  portrayal  of  the  reward  of  virtue  and  the  punish- 
ment of  vice;  what  he  did  intend  to  show  was  that 
men  might  be  made  courageous  in  the  face  of  terrify- 
ing dangers  as  a  result  of  having  witnessed  terrifying 
spectacles  so  frequently  that  the  emotions  would 
not  be  aroused  by  means  of  the  ordinary  stimulus. 
This  interpretation  of  the  famous  '  pity  and  fear ' 
clause  of  the  Poetics  is  somewhat  radical,   but  not 


*  "  Dass  die  Lehre  von  der  Katharsis  eine  Antvvort 
auf  die  Yerwerfung  der  Tragoedie  durch  Platon  sei,  bezweifelt 
heute  im  Grunde  niemand  mehr.  Der  Streit  dreht  sich 
nur  darum,  ob  des  Aristoteles  Antwort  laute:  "Die  Tra- 
goedie ist  nicht  zu  verbannen,  denn  sie  darf  nur  nach  ihrer 
aesthetischen  Wirkung  betrachtet  werden."  oder:  "Der 
Tragoedie  ist  beizubehalten,  weil  sie  aueh  ethisch  berechtigt 
ist,"—  Platon  und  die  Aristotelische  Poetik  von  George  Finsler, 
p.    1 20.  ..... 

[59] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

without  the  implied  support  of  a  recent  writer  on 
the  subject.  Finsler  thinks  that  "  the  katharsis  is 
not  an  aesthetic  but  essentially  an  ethical  process" 
and  that  "it  has  to  serve  the  best  interests  of  the 
state  in  the  same  way  as  education  or  recreation."* 
But  the  position  taken  by  those  who  defended 
the  principle  of  poetic  justice,  and  ascribed  its  origin 
to  Aristotle,  made  it  necessary  for  them  to  search 
the  Poetics  for  every  passage  that  might  be  so  con- 
strued as  to  serve  their  purpose.  So  the  attempt 
was  made  to  show  that  Aristotle  intended  no  pleasur- 
able effect  as  the  chief  end  of  tragedy,  but  rather 
the  moral  effect  that  would  result  from  the  portrayal 
of  the  reward  of  virtue  and  the  punishment  of  vice. 
It  is  quite  certain  that  Aristotle  was  far  from  intend- 
ing any  effect  of  the  kind.  To  maintain  that  Aris- 
totle intended  this  moral  effect  would  be  the  same 
as  implying  that  he  was  guilty  of  an  inconsistency. 
How,  it  will  be  asked,  can  it  be  shown  that  Aris- 
totle did  not  intend  this  kind  of  ethical  effect  when 
he  speaks  of  the  purgation  of  the  emotions  of 
pity  and  fear?  The  answer  to  such  a  question  is  not 
difficult.  Certain  it  is  that  the  chief  end  of  tragedy 
*"\Venn  nun  Mitleid  und  Furcht  krankhafte  Affek- 
ionen  der  Seele  sind,  so  wird  durch  die  Katharsis  der  normale 
Zustand  der  Seele  wieder  hergestellt;  diese  gewinnt  dadurch 
ihr  Gleichgewicht,  oder,  vvie  Aristoteles  sagt,  ihre  Tugend 
wieder.  Es  ist  aber  der  Mensch  nur  durch  diese  im  Stande, 
das  Ziel  alles  Lebens,  die  Glueckseligkeit,  su  erreichen,  und 
nur  wer  das  fuer  sich  kann,  ist  auch  ein  nuetzliches  Glied 
des  Staates.  Also  ist  die  Katharsis  kein  a^sthetischer, 
sondern  ein  ganz  wesentlieher  ethischer  Prozess;  sie  hat 
dem  Ziel  des  besten  Staates  zu  dienen,  wie  die  Erziehung 
und  die  Erholung;  darurn  ist  sie  auch  in  der  Politik  und 
nicht  in  der  Poetik  ausfuehrlich  eroertert," — Ibid,   p.    122, 

[60] 


ARISTOTLE'S  IDEA  OF  TRAGEDY 

is  designated  by  that  part  of  Aristotle's  definition 
which  reads  as  follows :  "  through  pity  and  fear 
effecting  the  proper  purgation  of  these  emotions."* 
Now,  the  above-mentioned  moral  effect  will  be  accom- 
plished by  showing  that  virtue  is  rewarded  and  that 
vice  is  punished.  If  such  a  spectacle  be  the  means 
by  which  this  chief  end  of  tragedy  is  to  be  attained, 
how  does  it  happen  that  Aristotle  describes  such  a 
spectacle  as  characteristic  of  second-rate  tragedy, 
emphasizing  his  censure  by  saying  that  from  such  a 
spectacle  the  true  pleasure  can  not  be  derive  ,  and 
blaming  "the  weakness  of  the  spectators"  for  any 
popularity  which  such  shows  achieve ?f  I  can  see 
here  nothing  but  inconsistency.  Nor  can  I  overlook 
the  fact  that  Aristotle  h'mselt  rejects  the  poetic 
justice  type  of  tragedy  not  for  any  ethical  reasons, 
but  solely  for  the  reason  that  it  does  not  produce 
"the  true  tragic  pleasure. "J 

It  is  possible  to  arrive  at  the  same  general 
conclusion  by  means  of  an  entirely  different  kind 
of  argument.  Plato,  it  will  be  remembered,  was 
wholly  concerned  with  the  ethical  function  of  poetry; 
he  thought  not  only  that  poets  ought  to  represent 
the  reward  of  virtue  and  the  punishment  of  vice, 
but  that  they  should  have  no  alternative;  he  rejected 
entirely  the  type  of  tragedy  that  Aristotle  afterward 
favored,  and  proposed  the  type  which  Aristotle 
rejected  for  the  reason  that  it  did  not  produce  tragic 
pleasure;  moreover, — and  this  is  important — he 
objected  to  any  spectacle  that  should  arouse  in  men 

*   Aristotle' s  Theory,   p.    23. 

t    Ibid.,  p.  45.  „ 

t   Ibid. 

[61] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

the  emotions  of  pity  and  fear,  contrary  to  the 
proposal  of  his  pupil  who  held  that  they  should  be 
aroused.    Here  we  have  a  distinct  opposition  of  views. 

The  most  remarkable  point  of  difference  is  that 
which  concerns  the  emotions  of  pity  and  fear.  It 
seems  strange  that  the  parallel  of  difference  should 
exist  up  to  this  point  and  then  come  to  a  sudden 
stop  without  any  explanation.  Plato  objected  to  the 
agitation  of  the  emotions  of  pity  and  fear,  saying 
that  the  cultivation  and  intensifying  of  these  emo- 
tions will  make  men  cowards.  Aristotle  argued 
in  favor  of  the  agitation  of  these  same  emotions — for 
what  reason?  For  the  very  same  reason  that  Plato 
gave, — to  reduce  the  violence  of  these  emotions,  to 
bring  them  to  a  state  of  ideal  healthfulness,  that 
men  might  not  give  way  to  excessive  fear  in  the  face 
of  danger  or  to  undue  pity  when  witnessing  the 
misfortunes  of  other  men.  Since  Aristotle  had  the 
same  end  in  view  as  Plato,  he  regarded  the  parallel  of 
differences  brought  to  an  end  that  needed  no  apology. 
Plato  wanted  the  emotions  of  pity  and  fear  to 
be  kept  under  perfect  control  and  therefore  he 
would  expunge  entirely  from  the  works  of  poets  all 
passages  that  should  awaken  such  emotions.  Aris- 
totle seemed  to  hope  for  the  accomplishment  of  the 
same  ultimate  effect  by  the  purgation  method  of 
arousing  these  emotions  in  order  that  their  hurt- 
fulness  might  be  purged  from   the  system. 

We  are  not  arguing  here  for  a  right  conception 
of  the  true  end  of  poetry;  we  are  merely  attempting 
to  understand  what  was  Aristotle's  idea  of  poetry. 
It  is  entirely  beyond  the  bounds  of  reason  to  think 
that  he  entered   upon   the  discussion  of  the  effects 

[62] 


ARISTOTLE'S  IDEA  OF  TRAGEDY 

of  a  tragic  spectacle  upon  the  emotions  of  pity  and 
fear  without  intending  to  throw  new  light  upon  a 
problem  to  which  Plato  gave  such  serious  consider- 
ation in  his  Republic.  If  he  intended  to  agree  with 
Plato  that  these  emotions  should  be  rendered  less 
hurtful  in  their  effects  upon  the  soul,  he  could  have 
chosen  no  better  word  than  the  one  he  used,  for 
katharsis  means  purgation  in  the  medical  sense, 
metaphorically,  just  as  the  adjective  cathartic  is 
used  in  English  as  an  equivalent  of  the  word  purgative. 
If  Aristotle  did  not  intend  that  this  should  be  the 
meaning  of  the  word,  the  fact  itself  would  be  scarcely 
credible,  even  though  it  were  supported  by  evidence 
far  more  weighty  than  has  .been  yet  produced  by 
the  most  ardent  supporters  of  the  doctrine  of  poetic 
justice.  Here  ,then,  in  conclusion,  it  may  be  asserted 
in  a  positive  manner  that  Aristotle  did  not  recom- 
mend the  doctrine  of  poetic  justice,  and  that  the 
chief  end  of  poetry,  according  to  Aristotle,  was 
ethical,  not  in  the  sense  which  corresponds  to  the 
idea  of  poetic  justice,  but  rather  in  the  sense  which 
supposes  that  the  Aristotelian  purgation  of  the 
emotions  of  pity  and  fear  would  strengthen  in 
men  the  qualities  of  the  soldier,  and  not  make 
cowards  of  them,  as  Plato  thought. 


[63] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 


CHAPTER    II 
English  Basis  of  Poetic  Justice 

AN    ERRONEOUS    ASSERTION    CONCERNING    RYMER. 

THE  very  definite  form  which  was  taken  by 
the  Dennis-Addison  controversy  regarding 
poetic  justice  makes  it  clear  that  there  were 
two  questions  at  issue.  The  preceding  chapter  has 
disposed  of  one  of  these  questions  in  the  discussion 
of  the  statement  made  by  Dennis  when  he  said  that 
"Aristotle  was  the  first  who  established  this  ridic- 
ulous doctrine  of  modern  criticism."  The  second 
question  has  its  origin  in  the  remaining  part  of  the 
passage  just  quoted,  for  Dennis  goes  on  to  say,  "but 
Mr.  Rymer  was  the  first  who  introduced  it  into  our 
native  language;  who  notwithstanding  the  rage  of 
all  the  poetasters  of  the  times,  whom  he  has  exasper- 
ated by  opening  the  eyes  of  the  blind  that  they  may 
see  their  errors,  will  always  pass  with  impartial 
posterity  for  a  most  learned,  a  most  judicious,  and 
a  most  useful  critic."*  Here,  again,  it  is  to  be 
observed  that  Addison  offered  no  objection  to  the 
declaration  of  Dennis  in  regard  to  Rymer's  intro- 
duction of  the  doctrine  into  English  literary  criticism. 
Furthermore,  it  is  to  be  noted  that  the  truth  of  the 
proposition  has  been  accepted  by  all  those  who  have 
passed    judgment   upon    the   matter.     Even    so   dis- 

*   Dennis,    To  the  Spectator,    p.    42,    published    with   An 
Essay  on  the  Genius  and  Writings  oj  Shakespeare. 

[64] 


AN  ERRONEOUS  ASSERTION 

tinguished  a  writer  as  Professor  Lounsbury,  of 
Yale,  has  thought  fit  to  make  the  following  assertion 
in  his  work  entitled  Shakespeare  as  a  Dramatic 
Artist:  "So  far  as  I  know,  Rymer  was  the  one  who 
introduced  into  English  criticism  the  doctrine  of 
poetic  justice,  though  playwrights  had  previously 
not  neglected  to  conform  to  it  in  practice.  Certainly 
he  was  the  first  to  give  it  vogue."*  Professor  Louns- 
bury is  evidently  disposed  to  accept  what  Dennis 
said  in  regard  to  the  question,  in  the  same  sense 
and  almost  in  the  same  form  of  expression.  A  com- 
parison of  the  words  of  the  two  writers  will  show 
to  what  extent  the  opponent  of  Addison  is  less 
discerning  than  the  Yale  professor.  Both  seem  to 
regard  the  origin  of  the  doctrine  as  something 
distinct  from  its  position  in  English  literary  criticism : 
Dennis  is  positive  on  this  point;  Lounsbury  is  so 
by  inference,  since  he  refers  to  it  as  a  doctrine  that 
has  been  introduced.  Dennis  goes  no  farther,  except 
as  may  be  seen  elsewhere  in  his  writings,  to  show 
how  thoroughly  erroneous  were  the  current  theories 
of  tragic  poets  when  put  in  practice;  Lounsbury 
admits  that  playwrights  had  actually  conformed 
to  the  rule. 

Certain  it  is,  as  Lounsbury  asserted,  that  Rymer 
was  the  first  to  give  vogue  to  the  doctrine  of  poetic 
justice.  It  is  not  so  certain,  however,  that  Rymer 
was  the  first  to  introduce  the  idea  into  English  literary 
criticism.  To  be  the  author  of  the  English  expression, 
"poetical  justice,"!  and  to  apply  it  to  a  special 
principle  of  dramatic  art,  is  one  thing;    to  recognize 

*   Shakespeare  as  a   Dramatic   Artist,   pp.   401—402. 
t  This  is  the  phrase  as  first  used  by  Rymer. 

[65] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

that  principle  under  any  form  of  expression  what- 
soever, and  to  apply  it  to  the  drama  as  a  law  of 
criticism,  is  a  different  thing  altogether.  Rymer 
gave  the  principle  a  fixed  form  of  expression  and 
used  it  as  the  basis  of  a  large  portion  of  his  work 
in  literary  criticism,  but  he  was  not  the  first  English 
writer  to  apply  the  principle  to  the  discussion  of 
plays. 

As  early  as  the  year  1543  the  doctrine  of  poetic 
justice  was  recognized  by  an  act  of  parliament  in 
which  it  would  seem  that  only  those  plays  were  to 
be  approved  which  set  forth  the  punishment  of  the 
wicked  and  the  reward  of  the  good.  In  1575  this 
same  principle  of  dramatic  art  was  exhibited  design- 
edly in  George  Gascoigne's  play  called  The  Glass 
off  Government.  In  1578  the  same  thing  was  done 
in  the  case  of  George  Whetstone's  Promos  and 
Cassandra,  and  about  the  same  time  by  Stephen 
Gosson  in  his  unpublished  Catiline.  Sir  Philip  Sidney 
did  not  fail  to  make  note  of  the  principle  in  his 
Apologie  of  Poetry  which  was  written  as  early  as 
1583.  Less  explicit,  but  based  on  the  same  theory 
of  the  function  of  the  drama,  was  the  opinion  of 
Richard  Puttenham  as  set  forth  in  his  Arte  of  English 
Poesie  in  1589.  Francis  Bacon's  Essay  on  the  Advance- 
ment of  Learning,  published  in  1605,  contains  a 
passage  which  Worsfold  has  taken  to  be  an  enuncia- 
tion of  the  doctrine  of  poetic  justice;  and  Richard 
Fleckno's  Short  Discourse  of  the  English  Stage,  pub- 
lished in  1664,  seems  to  regard  it  the  chief  business 
of  a  play  to  be  a  practical  illustration  of  this 
dramatic  law. 

These  are  the  leading  authorities  that  may  be 
[66] 


RESTRAINT  OF  THE  DRAMA 

cited  in  support  of  the  proposition  that  Rymer 
was  not  the  first  to  introduce  the  "  ridiculous 
doctrine"  into  English  criticism.  The  references 
have  not  been  localized  in  the  foregoing  summary, 
for  the  reason  that  a  detailed  examination  is  to  be 
made  covering  the  whple  field  of  early  English 
literature  in  chronological  order.  The  sources  of 
argument  are  somewhat  diversified,  embracing  not 
only  a  particular  discussion  of  what  may  be  called 
pure  literary  criticism,  but  also  consideration  of 
certain  legal  enactments  that  dealt  with  plays  and 
players,  as  well  as  a  variety  of  popular  agitation 
concerning  the  same  subject. 

RELIGIOUS  AND  POLITICAL  RESTRAINT  OF  THE  DRAMA. 

The  earliest  limits  for  an  investigation  of  this 
kind  need  not  ante-date  the  twelfth  century.  Plays 
of  a  religious  kind  were  acted  in  England  as  early 
as  the  year  1119,  and  probably  before  that  time, 
but  the  language  used  was  French.  It  was  not  until 
the  year  1328  that  miracle  plays  were  first  performed 
in  English.*  It  is  not  to  be  expected,  therefore,  that 
pre-Chaucerian  English  will  present  much  commen- 
tary on  dramatic  art.  Nevertheless,  this  is  not  to 
be  regarded  as  a  special  characteristic  of  English 
literature.  Collier  remarks  that  in  this  respect  we 
are  ahead  of  the  other  countries  of  Europe.  His 
monumental  work  on  the  drama  contains  a  reference 
to  this  fact  in  the  following  words :  "  No  country 
of  Europe,  since  the  revival  of  letters,  has  been 
able  to  produce  any  notice  of  theatrical  performances 

*  Collier,  History  0}  English  Dramatic  Poetry,  I.,  p. 
12,  note. 

[67] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

of  so  early  a  date  as  England."*  The  notice  upon 
which  Collier  bases  his  assertion  is  taken  from  Stowe's 
Survey  of  London.  In  that  work  Stowe  quotes  from 
William  Fitzstephen's  Vita  Sancti  Thomce  Archi- 
episcopi  et  Martyris  a  passage  which  is  done  into 
English  as  follows :  "  London  for  the  shews  upon 
theatres,  and  comical  pastimes,  hath  holy  playes, 
representations  of  miracles,  which  holy  confessors 
have  wrought;  or  representations  of  tormentes, 
wherein  the  constancie  of  martirs  appeared."!  These 
holy  plays,  referred  to,  were  presented  in  London 
between  1170  and  1182,  a  conclusion  that  Collier 
draws  from  the  fact  that  it  was  about  that  time 
that  Fitzstephen  produced  his  life  of  St.  Thomas. 
It  is  proper,  therefore,  to  take  this  as  our  starting 
point  in  determining  how  it  was  that  the  doctrine 
of  poetic  justice  became  a  principle  of  dramatic 
art  in  English  literary  criticism. 

It  is  hardly  necessary  to  observe  that  the 
doctrine  of  poetic  justice  developed  through  a  con- 
sideration of  the  ethical  function  of  the  drama.  It 
is  true  that,  theoretically  speaking,  this  development 
could  take  place  in  another  way.  .  We  know  that 
critics  have  held  different  views  regarding  the  meaning 


*  Ibid.,  I.,  p.  1.  "It  is  known,"  says  Collier  (I.,  p.  3), 
"that  prior  to  11 19,  the  miracle-play  of  St.  Katherine  had 
been  represented  at  Dunstaple,"  but  elsewhere  he  says 
(I.,  5),.  referring  to  the  middle  of  the  thirteenth  century, 
that  "the  miracle-play  of  St.  Katherine  and  other  dramatic 
representations,  founded  upon  the  lives  of  the  saints,  and 
upon  the  events  of  the  old  and  new  testaments,  were  in 
French." 

t  Ibid.,  I.,  p.  2,  note. 

[68] 


RESTRAINT  OF  THE   DRAMA 

of  the  phrase  in  which  Aristotle  used  the  word 
katharsis.  According  to  one  interpretation  the 
emotions  of  pity  and  fear  must  be  produced  in  the 
mind  of  the  spectator  for  the  purpose  of  making 
him  avoid  in  his  own  conduct  the  errors  that  are 
exhibited  in  the  spectacle  before  him.  According 
to  another  interpretation  these  same  emotions  must 
be  produced  in  his  mind  in  order  that  he  may 
become  less  susceptible  to  their  harmful  effects. 
The  first  of  these  interpretations  implies  that  the 
drama  is  to  have  an  ethical  function,  inasmuch  as 
it  will  teach  men  to  be  better,  the  second  interpreta- 
tion implies  that  the  drama  is  to  have  an  aesthetical 
function,  inasmuch  as  it  creates  in  the  mind  of  the 
spectator  during  the  presentation  of  the  drama  a 
temporary  agitation  for  the  purpose  of  making  the 
mind  strong  to  withstand  the  worries  and  anxieties 
of  real  life.  According  to  one  theory,  the  drama 
teaches  men  to  be  good ;  according  to  the-  other,  it 
prepares  them  to  get  more  pleasure  out  of  life. 
In  one  case  the  drama  is  to  operate  chiefly  on  the 
will;  in  the  other  case  it  is  to  operate  chiefly  on  the 
emotions.  Teach,  says  one  school  of  interpreters; 
please,  says  the  other.* 

But  in  order  to  accomplish  the  end  proposed, 
whether  it  be  to  instruct  or  to  please,  both  schools 
of  interpreters  may  hold  that  the  emotions  of  pity 
and  fear  are  to  be  aroused;  and,  furthermore,  they 
may   hold   that   these   emotions   cannot   be   aroused 


*  The   second   of   these   theories   may   also   point   to   an 
ethical  effect,  as  we  have  already  observed.     See  pp.   59  ff. 

[69] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE   DRAMA 

when  the  dramatist  neglects  the  law  of  poetic  justice. 
It  may  be  argued,  for  example,  that  inasmuch  as  the 
protagonist  is  excessively  malicious  in  his  criminal 
acts,  he  can  not  be  punished  severely  enough  in  the 
play  to  make  us  pity  him  or  to  make  us  fear  the 
consequences  of  such  acts;  and  from  these  premises 
one  school  of  thought,  may  draw  the  conclusion  that 
the  spectacle  will  not  tend  to  make  man  morally 
better,  while  the  other  school  emphasizes  the  fact 
that  since  the  emotions  of  pity  and  fear  are  not 
exercised,  the  pleasurable  effect  will  not  be  produced. 
Now  it  happens  that  early  English  thought  on 
the  subject  was  more  concerned  with  the  question 
of  the  ethics  of  the  drama  than  with  any  other 
considerations.  The  reason  for  this  is  that  not  only 
in  England  but  also  in  all  European  countries  where 
the  drama  flourished,  there  was  from  the  beginning 
an  instinctive  opposition  to  any  dramatic  spectacle 
that  might  have  a  hurtful  effect  upon  the  morals 
of  men.  Plato  had  found  fault  with  poetry  for  the 
evils  which  it  might  produce;  the  Fathers  of  the 
Church  had  recognized  its  possibilities  for  evil; 
and  the  Church  of  the  middle  ages  had  discouraged 
very  effectively  the  writing  or  acting  of  objectionable 
plays.  In  consequence  of  this,  we  are  not  surprised 
to  observe  that  the  revival  of  the  drama,  wherever 
the  influence  of  the  Church  has  to  be  taken  into 
consideration,  showed  a  development  along  religious 
lines.  Moralities,  miracle-plays,  and  the  like,  were 
not  only  tolerated  but  also  encouraged  by  the  very 
spirit  which  had  done  so  much  to  retard  the  growth 
of  the  classical  drama.  Only  in  so  far  as  the  drama 
had  a  good  moral  effect,  was  it  at  all  tolerated  during 

[70] 


RESTRAINT  OF  THE   DRAMA 

the  middle  ages;  and  it  was  under  this  kind  of 
censorship  that  it  began  its  career  in  England. 
Whatever  might  have  been  the  effect  of  a  philosophical 
argument  in  favor  of  the  aesthetical  function  of  the 
drama,  it  was  of  such  little  importance  that  we  find 
scarcely  any  evidence  of  such  an  argument  in  early 
English  criticism. 

Let  us  turn  back  now  to  Collier's  quotation  from 
Fitzstephen.  There  is  little  to  be  gathered  from  the 
passage  except  an  inference  regarding  the  ethical 
character  of  the  drama  when  it  was  first  introduced 
into  England.  As  yet  there  was  no  development  such 
as  is  hinted  at  in  the  reference  to  "  shews  upon 
theatres  and  comical  pastimes."*  Fitzstephen  had 
described  the  condition  of  Rome  with  respect  to  the 
drama,  and  now  he  is  making  a  comparison,  in 
which,  of  course,  it  appears  that  the  business  of  the 
drama  in  England  was  to  instruct,  whereas  the 
tendency  in  Rome  was  probably  in  an  opposite 
direction. 

It  might  be  thought  that  such  theatrical  repre- 
sentations as  those  which  Fitzstephen  called  "  holy 
plays,"  would  be  received  with  universal  approval  so 
far  as  moral  considerations  were  involved;  but  such 
was  not  the  case.  Collier,  in  his  History  of  English 
Dramatic  Poetry,  says :  "  The  clergy  do  not  seem  to 
have  been  unanimous  as  to  the  propriety  and  policy 
of  public  dramatic  performances;  and  we  find  a 
violent  attack  npon  them  in  the  Manuel  de  Peche, 
an  Anglo-French  poem  written  about  the  middle  of 
the  thirteenth  century. "f  A  summary  of  the  attack 
would  show  that  while  it  was  proper  to  have  miracle 

*   Loc.  cit.  p.  68.  t   I-j   PP-    5  ff- 

[7i] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

plays  of  the  resurrection  or  birth  of  Christ  presented 
only  in  churches,  public  performances  on  highways 
or  greens  were  not  to  be  approved  of,  for  the  reason 
that  such  exhibitions  were  sinful.  In  the  year  1378 
King  Richard  II.  received  a  petition  from  the  choris- 
ters of  St.  Paul's  Cathedral,  asking  for  an  order 
restraining  certain  players  from  acting  "  the  History 
of  the  Old  Testament,"  their  reason  being  that  the 
clergy  of  St.  Paul's  had  gone  to  considerable  expense 
in  preparation  for  an  exhibition  of  the  kind  at 
Christmas  time.  This,  of  course,  was  a  mere  matter 
of  business,  but  it  is  mentioned  as  indicating  one 
step  in  the  development  of  government  censorship 
of  the  drama  in  England,  for  it  is  probable  that  the 
request  was  granted  by  Richard  II. 

.  One  of  the  earliest  suggestions  of  the  bad  moral 
effect  of  the  drama  in  England  is  to  be  found  in  a 
short  poem  that  appears  in  the  Harleian  Collection. 
In  form,  it  is  a  mixture  of  Latin  and  English;  in 
substance,  it  refers  to  the  dissolute  manners  of  the 
time  of  Henry  VI.,  and  may  therefore  be  assigned 
to  the  middle  of  the  fifteenth  century.  The  poem 
shows  that  the  performance  of  plays,  especially  on 
Sundays,  was  then  so  frequent  as  to  be  considered 
by  the  writer  a  crying  evil.    The  author  says: 

"Ingland   goeth   to   noughte,    plus  fecit   homo   viciosus, 
To   lust    man   is   brought,    nimis   est    homo   deliciosus; 
Goddis  halidays  non  observantur  honeste, 
For  unthrifty  pleyis  in  eis  regnant  manifeste."* 

More  than  a  hundred  years  elapsed,  however, 
before  there  was  any  very  formal  attack  made  on 
the  drama  in   England   because  of  its  immorality. 

*  Ibid.,  I.,  p.  25 

[>] 


RESTRAINT  OF  THE   DRAMA 

Such  an  attack  was  made  by  Roger  Ascham  about 
the  year  1570  in  a  book  called  The  Schoolmaster. 
He  complained  bitterly  against  the  influence  of 
certain  translations  from  the  Italian.  He  observed 
that  they  smacked  of  immorality,  and  he  declared 
that  they  had  been  introduced  by  "  the  subtle  and 
secrete  papistes  at  home."*  He  took  a  fling  at  the 
character  of  English  literature  as  it  was  before  the 
time  of  the  Reformation,  and  again  characterized 
it  as  offensive  in  the  same  way.  The  Arthurian 
legends  are  particularly  objectionable  on  the  score 
of  immorality,  he  says,  "  yet  ten  Morte  Arthures 
do  not  the  tenth  part  so  much  harme  as  one  of  these 
bookes  made  in  Italie  and  translated  in  England."! 
Ascham  was,  of  course,  a  Puritan;  but,  according 
to  Smith,  he  was  "the  least  bigoted  in  his  Puritan 
sympathies. "%  His  chief  distinction  is  this,  that  he 
was  one  of  the  very  first  to  enter  the  field  of  English 
literary  criticism. 

The  Puritan  spirit,  which  found  expression  in  the 
writings  of  Roger  Ascham,  was  largely  responsible 
for  the  subsequent  development  of  literary  criticism 
in  England.  Ascham  was  not  the  only  exponent  of 
that  spirit;  nevertheless,  he  was  in  some  respects 
the  most  distinguished.  Few  of  those  who  came 
after  him  achieved  any  noteworthy  success  in  giving 
literary  form  and  expression  to  the  doctrines  of 
Puritanism.  The  story  of  their  opposition  to  literary 
art  is  read  not  so  much  in  what  they  themselves 
wrote,  as  in  the  works  of  the  Defenders.  "They 
denounce    Poetry,"    says    Smith,    "because    it    is    a 

*  Smith,   Elizabethan  Critical  Essays,   I.,   p.   3. 

t   Ibid.,  I.,  p.  4.  J   Ibid.,   p.  xviii. 

[73^ 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

school  of  abuse — their  argument  is  social,  political, 
personal.  Their  importance — and  it  should  not  be 
under-estimated — lies  in  the  fact  that  they  called 
forth  a  reasoned  defense,  and  compelled  their 
opponents  to  examine  the  principles  of  Poetry."* 
Puritanism  was  only  one  of  the  influences 
against  which  literature,  and  the  drama  in  partic- 
ular, had  to  contend.  Two  other  religious  influences 
were  to  be  taken  into  consideration ;  namely :  Protes- 
tantism and  the  Church  of  Rome.  To  some  extent, 
these  three  influences  were  also  associated  with  a 
sort  of  political  influence.  There  was,  for  instance, 
a  certain  amount  of  Puritan  influence  brought  to 
bear  upon  the  government  for  the  purpose  of  estab- 
lishing a  strict  legal  censorship  of  the  drama;  in 
that  way  Puritanism  intensified  the  political  restric- 
tions to  which  plays  and  players  were  subjected. 
Then,  too,  Puritanism  stood  for  certain  religious 
principles,  the  conservation  of  which  was  imperilled 
by  such  theatrical  performances  as  satisfied  the 
taste  of  pleasure-seekers. 

Protestantism  also,  in  its  simplest  form,  con- 
tributed its  share  to  the  consorship  of  the  stage. 
After  the  Reformation  was  well  established  in 
England,  a  strict  watch  was  kept  on  the  drama 
in  order  to  take  note  of  any  representations  that 
might  be  helpful  to  the  cause  of  the  papacy  in  its 
struggle  to  regain  what  was  lost;  in  consequence 
of  this,  the  law  was  invoked  for  the  purpose  of 
prohibiting  such  performances.  But  Protestantism 
did  not  make  its  attack  quite  so  sweeping  as  Puritan- 
ism did.  The  latter  attacked  the  drama  on  both 
*   Ibid.,   I.,  p.  xiv. 

[74l 


RESTRAINT  OF  THE   DRAMA 

moral  and  historical  grounds,  as  well  as  on  grounds 
purely  sectarian;  the  former  based  its  attack  on 
sectarian  grounds  chiefly,  and  only  on  moral  grounds 
incidentally.  At  any  rate,  it  is  customary  to  attribute 
to  Puritanism  all  the  extreme  rigorism  of  the  attack 
in  so  far  as  it  looked  to  the  morality  of  the  stage, 
and  much  of  the  argument  which  was  derived  from 
the  anti-stage  spirit  of  the  middle  ages.  This  argu- 
ment from  history  was  acceptable  to  Puritans  even 
though  the  Fathers  of  the  Church  were  to  be  cited 
as  authorities.  "So,  too,"  says  Smith,  "it  turned  to 
classical  literature,  and  confounded  the  scholars  and 
lovers  of  vain  things  with  the  dicta  of  Aristotle,  or 
of  Plato  the  accredited  expeller  of  poets  from  the 
ideal  commonwealth."*  Smith  also  observes  that, 
"The  attack  was,  however,  keener  on  the  side  of 
morality,  and  it  was  led  in  two  directions — against 
the  playhouse  and  its  associations,  and  against  the 
foreign,  especially  the  Italian,  influences  in  society. "f 
Sectarian  opposition  in  the  form  of  Protestantism 
was  balanced  by  a  similar  activity  on  the  part  of 

those   who   adhered   to   the   Church   of   Rome,   each 

a. 

in  its  own  time  and  place.  No  sooner  had  the  Refor- 
mation started  in  Europe  than  the  stage  began  to 
be  used  as  a  means  of  popularizing  the  new  doctrine. 
Such  a  movement  was,  of  course,  checked  effectively 
wherever  the  Catholic  clergy  had  any  power  to  do 
so.  An  illustration  of  this  is  to  be  found  in  a  letter 
written  by  Thomas  Wylley  to  the  Lord  Privy  Seal 
of  England  about  a  year  after  Henry  VIII.  broke 
away  from  the  Church  of  Rome.  The  letter  complains, 
says  Collier,  "  that  the  priests  .  .  .  would  not  allow 
*  Ibid.,  I.,  p.  xvi.  f   Ibid. 

[  751 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

him  to  preach  in  their  churches  because  he  had 
made  a  play  against  the  Pope's  counsellors  ...  he 
also  mentions  in  it  several  other  dramatic  perfor- 
mances of  a  religious  character,  of  which  he  was  the 
author,  or  which  he  was  then  composing."*  About 
eight  years  after  this  an  act  of  Parliament,  dated 
1543,  put  an  effectual  stop  to  all  plays  that  might 
be  injurious  to  the  Church  of  Rome.  That  the  enact- 
ment should  be  favorable  to  the  Church  of  Rome 
is  very  strange  in  view  of  the  fact  that  it  was  pub- 
lished in  the  same  year  in  which  Henry  married 
his  last  wife,  Catherine  Parr.  It  shows  how  unsettled 
was  the  state  of  religion  at  the  time.  Six  years 
later,  by  an  act  of  Edward  VI.,  there  was  a  general 
prohibition  of  plays.  In  1553  there  was  another 
legal  enactment  which  held  the  drama  in  check. 
Queen  Mary,  a  Catholic,  was  on  the  throne.  In  "A 
Proclamation  for  reformation  of  busy  meddlers  in 
matters  of  Religion,  and  for  redresse  of  Prechars, 
Prynters,  and  players,"  she  took  means  to  prevent 
the  ridicule  of  Roman  Catholics  and  their  doctrines, 
by  forbidding  the  printing  or  enactment  of  plays 
without  license.!  This  enactment  brought  about 
such  a  severe  censorship  of  the  stage  that  there 
are  no  dramas  extant  "  which,  so  far  as  can  be 
ascertained,"  says  Collier,  "were  printed  during  the 
reign  of  Mary.  "J 

Such  was  the  religious  agitation  in  regard  to 
the  stage.  It  involved,  as  we  have  seen,  certain 
legal  enactments,  such  as  those  of  1543  and  1553, 
which  were  favorable  to  Roman  Catholics.     In  the 


*  Ibid.,  I.,  p.   130.  t  Ibid,  I.,  pp.   157-158. 

%  Ibid.,  I.,  p.   176. 

[76] 


RESTRAINT  OF  THE   DRAMA 

reign  of  Elizabeth  there  were  other  enactments, 
one  in  1559,  and  another  in  1574.  These,  however, 
were  not  all  concerned  with  the  religious  aspect  of 
the  drama.  They  were  rather  concerned  with  the 
very  life  of  dramatic  art  itself  and  took  into  consid- 
eration the  attitude  of  Puritans,  rather  than  that  of 
the  Roman  Catholics.  It  was  about  this  time,  as 
we  have  seen,  that  Puritanism  found  a  defender  in 
the  person  of  Roger  Ascham.  His  Schoolmaster  was 
published  four  years  before  any  actor  in  England 
had  received  a  national  permit  to  practice  his  pro- 
fession. This  brings  us  to  a  special  consideration  of 
early  English  law  in  so  far  as  it  had  a  bearing  upon 
the  acting  of  plays. 

It  is  worth  while  noting  what  was  the  standing 
which  the  actor  had  before  the  law,  and,  in  particu- 
lar, what  were  the  punishments  which  might  be 
inflicted  upon  him.  For  violating  the  act  of  Parlia- 
ment of  1543  the  player  was  to  be  fined  ten  pounds 
and  imprisoned  three  months  for  the  first  offence; 
for  the  second  offence  he  was  to  forfeit  all  his  goods 
and  be  subjected  to  perpetual  imprisonment.*  "A 
Proclamation  for  the  inhibition  of  Players,"  issued 
in  1549,  contained  a  provision  for  "imprisonment, 
and  further  punishment  at  the  pleasure  of  his 
Majestie."t  This  inhibition  becoming  ineffective 
by  the  beginning  of  the  year  1552,  as  appears  from 
the  fact  that  players  and  printers  took  excessive 
liberties  with  the  drama,  a  Proclamation  was  issued 
that  year  requiring  players  to  have  a  license  for 
theatrical  performances,  and  printers  a  license  for 
their  publications,  under  penalty  of  "  imprisonment, 

*   I.,  pp.  128  IT.  f  Ibid.,  I.,  p.  143. 

[77] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

without  bayle  or  mayneprice,  and  further  fine  at 
his  Majesties  pleasor."*  The  Proclamation  issued 
by  Queen  Mary  in  1553  was  the  same  in  effect, 
though  for  a  somewhat  different  purpose.  The 
punishment,  however,  was  less  specific;  it  was  only 
indicated  by  saying  that  the  offender  would  "  incurre 
her  highnesse  indignation,  and  displeasure. "f  In 
1559  Queen  Elizabeth  issued  a  proclamation  of 
dramatic  censorship  which  gave  "  all  manner  of 
officers"  authority  to  arrest  and  imprison  the 
offenders"  for  the  space  of  fourteene  dayes  or  more, 
as  cause  shall  nede. — And  further  also  untill  good 
assurance  may  be  founde  and  gyven,  that  they 
shalbe  of  good  behaviour,  and  no  more  offende  in 
the  like."| 

In  spite  of  the  fact  that  a  national  permit  was 
given  to  certain  players  in  1574,  the  city  of  London 
maintained  a  hostile  attitude  toward  the  drama,  as 
may  be  seen  from  the  following  passage  in  a  proclama- 
tion issued  by  the  city  council  in  1575:  "Be  yt 
enacted  by  the  Authoritie  of  this  Comen  Counsell, 
that  from  henceforth  no  play,  comodye,  tragedie, 
interlude,  nor  publycke  shewe  shalbe  openlye  played 
or  shewed  within  the  liberties  of  the  Cittie,  whearin 
shalbe  uttered  anie  wourdes,  examples,  or  doynges 
of  any  unchastitie,  sedicion,  nor  such  lyke  unfytt, 
and  uncomelye  matter,  uppon  paine  of  imprison- 
ment by  the  space  of  xmten  daies  of  all  psons 
offending  in  anie  such  open  playinge,  or  shewinges."  || 
The  enactment  from  which  this  passage  is  taken  was 
directly    the    cause    why    James    Burbage    built    his 

*  Ibid.,  I.,  p.  148.  t  Ibid.,  I.,  p.  150. 

%  Ibid.,  I.,  p.   169.  ||   Ibid.,   I.,   pp.   215-216. 

[78] 


kESTRAlNT  OF  THE   DRAMA 

Theatre,  just  outside  the  limits  of  the  city  adminis- 
tration. 

The  list  of  sixteenth  century  enactments  against 
the  drama  in  England  would  not  approach  complete- 
ness if  mention  were  not  made  of  one  which  was 
published  in  1572,  two  years  before  Elizabeth  issued 
the  royal  patent  already  referred  to.  This  royal 
enactment  of  1572  is  particularly  noteworthy  because 
it  shows  to  what  extremes  the  law  did  go  in  its  censor- 
ship of  the  stage.  I  do  not  find  that  this  law  is 
mentioned  by  Collier,  who  is  fairly  complete  in  his 
treatment  of  the  question.  The  passage  to  which 
I  wish  to  refer  is  summaried  in  the  Arber  Reprints, 
in  the  Editor's  Introduction  to  Gosson's  School  of 
Abuse.  Reference  is  there  made  to  an  Act  of  Parlia- 
ment of  1572,  "which  declared,  among  others  all 
Fencers,  Bearwardes,  Comon  Players  in  Enterludes 
and  Minstrels,  if  not  belonging  to  any  Baron  of 
this  Realme  or  towards  any  other  honorable  Person- 
age of  greater  Degree  to  be  Roges,  Vacabounds 
and  Sturdye  Beggers:  and,  as  such,  provided  for 
them,  whether  male  of  female,  as  follows: — On  first 
conviction  to  bee  grevouslye  whipped,  and  burnte 
through  the  gristle  of  the  right  eare  with  a  hot 
yron  of  the  compasse  of  an  ynche  about,  manifes- 
tinge  his  or  her  rogyshe  kinde  of  Lyef.  A  second 
offence  was  adjudged  felony.  A  third  offence  en- 
tayiled  death  without  benefit  of  clergy  or  sanctuary."* 
This  act  of  legislation  occurred  in  the  period  when 
Puritanism  was  most  active  in  its  attack  upon  the 
drama.    The  immediate   result  of  such  activity  was 

*  Arber  Reprints,  Introduction  to  Gosson's  School  oj 
Abuse,   p.    7—8. 

[79] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

to  bring  defenders  to  the  rescue.  A  less  immediate 
result  was  seen  more  than  half  a  century  later  in 
the  total  suppression  of  the  theatre  when  Puritanism 
gained  the  upper  hand  in  politics.  The  ultimate 
result  was,  however,  one  which  contributed  some- 
what to  the  development  of  the  idea  of  poetic 
justice,  for  the  reason  that  the  defenders  felt  they 
could  best  accomplish  their  purpose  by  proving  that 
poetry  has  an  ethical  value.  In  their  attempt  to 
prove  this  proposition  they  had  to  show  in  what 
way  the  ethical  element  operates  in  poetry ;  and  this, 
again,  meant  a  discussion  of  the  application  of  the 
law  of  morality  to  the  conduct  of  the  characters 
reproduced  on  the  stage. 

The  story  of  the  opposition  which  the  drama 
had  to  contend  with  in  England,  prior  to  the  time 
when  the  Burbage's  Theatre  was  established  outside 
of  the  city  limits  of  London,  has  been  told  in  a 
condensed  form  for  the  purpose  of  showing  that  it 
was  far  more  necessary  for  the  defenders  to  justify 
the  drama  on  the  grounds  of  morality  than  to  show 
that  its  chief  end  was  to  please.  The  opponents  of. 
the  drama  held  to  the  principle  that  the  drama 
must  have  a  good  moral  effect,  otherwise  it  is  to  be 
prohibited.  They  held,  also,  that  as  a  rule  the 
drama  produced  the  contrary  effect,  and  for  this 
reason  their  sympathies  were  entirely  against  the 
drama.  Some  of  the  defenders  of  poetry  accepted 
the  judgments  which  were  made  by  the  opposition, 
but  not  their  sympathies.  They  admitted  that  poetry 
should  not  run  riot,  they  said  that  it  should  conform 
to  certain  laws,  and  they  explained  the  operation 
of  the  laws  which  they  proposed.    Poetry  is  morally 

[80] 


PURITAN  ATTITUDE  TOWARDS  PLAYS 

bad,  said  the  extreme  Puritan;  therefore,  let  us  have 
no  more  of  it.  Poetry  is  sometimes  morally  bad, 
admitted  the  Defender;  let  us  instruct  the  poets 
how  to  produce  the  desired  moral  effect  without 
doing  away  entirely  with  the  aesthetic  qualities; 
let  us  have  poetry,  but  let  it  be  the  right  kind. 

THE  EAREY  PURITAN  ATTITUDE  TOWARDS  PLAYS. 

English  literary  criticism,  then,  was  concerned 
with  the  ethics  of  the  drama  as  soon  as  there  was 
anything  that  might  be  called  English  literary 
criticism.  The  first  English  writer  to  whom  we  can 
at  all  refer  for  a  critical  opinion  on  the  ethical  function 
of  the  drama  is  not  Roger  Ascham,  because  he  does 
not  deal  with  the  question  constructively,  nor  any 
one  before  him,  since  English  literary  criticism  begins 
with  him.  Ascham,  in  a  work  of  his  published  in 
1570*  touched  the  question  of  ethics  in  literature 
only  as  a  Puritan  would,  except  that  he  showed 
more  regard  for  the  classic  poets  than  would  be 
expected  from  a  rabid  Puritan;  Gascoigne  who 
followed  him  chronologically  was  chiefly  concerned 
with  questions  of  meter  and  rhythm  in  the  most 
important  of  his  critical  works,  "  Certayne  Notes 
of   Instruction." 

But  George  Gascoigne  is  to  be  mentioned  for 
something  more  than  his  critical  opinions  on  the 
making  of  verse.  He  was  the  first  English  critic 
to  apply  to  the  drama  in  a  formal  and  expressly 
intentional  way  the  idea  of  rewarding  virtue  and 
punishing  vice.     It  is  not  to  be  said,  however,  that 

*  This  was  two  years  after  his  death. 
[81] 


Poetic  justice  in  the  drama 

the  result  of  his  effort  was  so  remarkable  for  its 
success  as  to  encourage  others  to  follow  his  example. 
The  play  in  question  was  called  The  Glasse  off  Govern- 
ment, a  tragicall  comedie,  and  it  appears  that  his 
reason  for  calling  the  play  a  "tragicall  comedie" 
was,  as  he  himself  says,  "  because  therein  are  handled 
as  well  the  reward  for  virtues  as  also  the  punishment 
for  vices."*  Collier  gives  a  summary  of  the  argument 
of  the  play  in  his  History  of  Dramatic  Poetry.  He 
calls  it  a  most  tedious  puritanical  treatise  upon 
education,  illustrated  by  the  different  talents  and 
propensities  of  four  young  men  placed  under  the 
same  master:  the  two  cleverest  are  seduced  to  vice, 
whilst  the  two  dullest  perserve  in  a  course  of  virtue, 
and  one  of  them  becomes  secretary  to  the  Land- 
grave, and  the  other  a  famous  preacher,  "t  It  is 
not  necessary  to  analyse  the  play  to  show  that  virtue 
is  rewarded, — the  reason  why  Gascoigne  calls  the 
play  '  comedie ; '  nor  shall  we  try  to  show  that  vice 
is  punished, — the  reason  why  he  describes  the  play 
as  'tragicall.'  It  is  sufficient  that  he  regarded  such 
a  treatment  of  his  characters  as  worthy  of  being 
commented  upon.  He  did  not  make  it  a  rule  for 
himself  in  all  cases  nor  is  there  any  thing  to  indicate 
that  he  would  impose  the  rule  upon  others.  We 
are  probably  safe,  however,  in  taking  it  for  granted 
that  he  regarded  it  the  peculiar  function  of  'tragicall 
comedie'  to  reward  virtue  and  to  punish  vice.  If 
this  be  true,  he  regarded  the  doctrine  of  poetic 
justice  as  a  proper  characteristic  of '  tragicall  comedie.' 
Rymer  held  it  to  be  an  essential  characteristic  of 
tragedy,  properly  so  called,  and  erroneously  judged 

*  Collier,   III.,   p.   7,  note.  t  Ibid- 

[82] 


PURITAN  ATTITUDE  TOWARDS  PLAYS 

that  in  this  opinion  he  was  supported  by  Aristotle. 

The  third  notable  contributor  to  the  beginnings 
of  English  Criticism  was  George  Whetstone,  who 
published  in  1578  a  play  entitled  The  right  excellent 
and  famous  Historye  of  Promos  and  Cassandra 
devided  into  two  Comicall  discourses.  In  the  Dedica- 
tion of  these  two  comedies  he  says :  "  The  effects 
of  the  both  are  good  and  bad;  virtue  intermixed 
with  vice,  unlawful  desyres  (if  it  were  possible) 
quencht  with  chaste  denyals — all  needeful  actions 
(I  thinke)  for  public  vewe.  For  by  the  rewarde  of 
the  good  the  good  are  encouraged  in  wel  doinge — 
and  with  the  scourge  of  the  lewde  the  lewde  are 
feared  from  evill  attempts:  mainetayning  this  my 
opinion  with  Platoes  auctority.  Nawghtinesse  commes 
of  the  corruption  of  nature,  and  not  by  readinge  or 
hearinge  the  lives  of  good  or  lewde  (for  such  publica- 
tion is  necessary),  but  goodnesse  (sayth  he)  is 
beawtifyed  by  either  action."* 

Here  we  have  a  clear  indication  that  Whetstone 
has  a  fairly  good  knowledge  of  what  is  meant  by 
the  doctrine  of  poetic  justice.  He  has  constructed 
a  play  with  a  moral  lesson  based  upon  the  principle 
that  the  good  should  be  rewarded  and  the  wicked 
should  be  punished.  This,  of  course,  is  the  essence 
of  poetic  justice.  He  even  states  the  very  argument 
which  was  advanced  by  Rymer  a  century  later, 
for  he  points  to  the  fact  that  the  good  are  encouraged 
in  well  doing  when  they  see  that  the  virtuous  are 
rewarded,    and    the    wicked    are    made    to    fear    the 

*  Smith,  I.,  p.  59.  This  passage  should  have  been 
considered  by  Dennis  before  he  ascribed  to  Aristotle  the 
Greek   origin  of  poetic  justice- 

[83l 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

doing  of  evil  when  they  see  the  wicked  punished. 
Rymer,  it  is  true,  would  give  us  a  deeper  analysis 
of  the  question.  He  might  even  tell  us  that  Whet- 
stone did  not  observe  the  principle  of  poetic  justice 
in  the  play,  as  may  be  easily  proved.  Such  is,  in 
a  measure,  the  case, — a  fact  not  to  be  wondered  at, 
since  Promos  and  Cassandra  is  a  comedy.  In  so 
far,  however,  as  it  was  possible  in  that  part  of  the 
play  which  preceded  the  happy  ending,  the  action 
pointed  to  a  catastrophe  in  which  the  chief  offender 
was  to  suffer  death  for  his  crime,  for  having  put  the 
heroine's  brother  to  death.  The  happy  ending  is 
evolved  from  the  fact  that  the  crime  was  not  really 
committed,  and  the  chief  offender  is  saved  not  only 
on  this  account  but  because  mercy  is  asked  for  him 
by  those  whom  he  sought  to  injure.  The  intention 
of  the  poet  to  reward  virtue  is  made  clear  not  only 
in  the  Dedication,  but  also  in  the  text  of  the  play. 
In  the  closing  scene  the  King  says: 

"Cassandra,   I   have   noted   thy  distresse, 
Thy   vertues  eke,   from   first  unto  the  last; 
And  glad   I  am,   without  offence  it  lyes 
In   me   to  ease   thy  griefe  and   heavines. 
Andrugio  sav'd  the  juel  of  thy  joye, 
And  for  thy  sake  I  pardon  Promos  faulte: 
Yea  let  them  both  thy  virtues  rare  commende, 
In  that  their  woes  with  this  delight  doth  ende." 

(Part  II.,  Act  V.,  Scene  IV.)* 

The  story  used  in  this  play  is  the  same  as  that 
which  Shakespeare  used  as  a  basis  for  his  Measure 
for  Measure.  Shakespeare,  of  course,  improved  on 
the  work  of  Whetstone.  Rymer's  important  dis- 
quisition  on   poetic  justice   was   published   just  one 

*  Six  Old  Plays,  I.,   p.    107. 
[84] 


PURITAN  ATTITUDE  TOWARDS  PLAYS 

hundred  years  after  Whetstone  made  a  practical 
application  of  the  same  principle  in  the  comedy 
which  we  have  just  discussed.  It  can  be  reasonably 
supposed  that  if  he  had  given  the  play  a  tragic 
ending  he  would  have  still  adhered  to  the  same 
principle.  As  it  was,  he  observed  the  principle  as 
faithfully  as  possible  up  to  the  point  where  the 
happy  ending  was  introduced. 

No  argument  can  be  drawn  directly  from  the 
works  of  Gascoigne  or  Whetstone,  taken  separately, 
to  show  that  these  writers  thought  the  principle  of 
poetic  justice  should  be  applied  to  all  dramatic 
forms.  If,  however,  we  consider  one  in  the  light  of 
the  other,  we  shall  observe  that  both  seem  to  favor 
a  treatment  of  plot  which  will  illustrate  the  principle, 
whether  the  play  be  pure  comedy  or  tragi-comedy. 
Furthermore,  it  is  significant  that  both  call  attention 
to  the  fact  that  a  principle  of  this  kind  has  been 
applied.  But  we  are  not  to  consider  these  plays 
either  separately  or  merely  in  relation  to  each  other. 
We  must  take  account  of  the  external  influences 
which  were  then  at  work.  Puritanism  was  the 
most  prominent  of  these  influences,  and  just  at  this 
time  it  found  expression  in  a  sermon  delivered  at 
St.  Paul's  and  in  a  book  called  the  School  of  Abuse. 
On  the  third  Sunday  of  November,  1577,  the  preacher 
at  "  Pawles  Crosse"  delivered  a  bitter  harangue 
against  theatrical  spectacles,  in  which  it  was  argued 
that  "the  cause  of  sinne  are  playes."*  In  the  year 
1579  the  same  argument  was  advanced  by  Gosson 
in  his  School  of  Abuse.  He  charges  the  theatre  with 
being  a  meeting  place  for  persons  inclined  to  lewd 

*   Arber   Reprints,   Gosson,    p.    8. 
[85] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

conduct,*  and  attacks  also  the  character  of  the 
drama  itself,  saying  of  the  players,  "They  seek  not 
to  hurt,  but  desire  too  please — they  have  purged 
their  comedyes  of  wanton  speaches,  yet  the  Corne 
they  sell  is  full  of  Cockle,  "f  More  to  our  purpose, 
however,  was  his  apology  for  a  play  that  he  himself 
had  written:  "The  whole  mark  I  shot  at  in  the 
woorke,"  he  says,  "was  to  show  the  rewarde  of 
tray  tors  in  Catilin,  and  the  necessary  government 
of  learned  men  in  the  person  of  Cicero. "J  To  what 
extent  the  play  might  be  a  representation  not  only 
of  the  punishment  of  crime  but  also  of  the  reward 
of  virtue  we  are  unable  to  say,  since  the  play  to 
which  he  refers  was  never  printed. §  It  was  called 
Catiline's  Conspiracies.  It  seems  evident,  however, 
that  Catiline  was  punished  for  his  treason,  and  we 
can  imagine  that  the  virtuous  Cicero  was  rewarded 
for  his  patriotism.  Such  a  conclusion  can  easily 
be  drawn  from  Gosson's  own  words.  We  can  also 
draw  the  conclusion  that  the  play  was,  properly 
speaking,   a  tragedy. 

Combining  now  the  results  of  our  examination 
of  the  works  of  Gascoigne,  Whetstone,  and  Gosson, 
we  find  that  not  only  was  an  attempt  made  to  repre- 
sent the  reward  of  virtue  and  the  punishment  of 
crime  in  tragedy,  in  comedy  and  in  tragicomedy, 
but  that  attention  was  called  to  this  fact  by  the 
authors  of  the  plays;  and,  furthermore,  we  feel 
justified  in  saying  that  this  was  done  for  the  purpose 
of  making  the  plays  correspond  to  an  accepted  law 
of  the   drama.     We  find   no  evidence   of  any   one, 

*  Ibid.,   p.   35.        f  Ibid.,   p.    37.  J  Ibid.,   p.   40. 

§  Nat.  Diet.  Biog.,  Article  on  Gosson. 

[86] 


PURITAN  ATTITUDE  TOWARDS  PLAYS 

prior  to  the  year  171 1,  arguing  in  favor  of  the  non- 
observance  of  such  a  law,  though  it  was  ignored 
by  some  dramatic  writers.  The  Puritan  spirit  was 
so  strong  on  the  side  of  ethics  that  dramatic  writers 
had  to  make  the  best  of  the  situation.  They  were 
obliged  to  profit  by  the  suggestions  which  came 
from  Puritan  sources  and  make  the  drama  appear 
to  serve  the  cause  of  morality.  English  tragedy 
was  only  eighteen  years  old  when  Gosson  described 
the  theatre  as  The  School  of  Abuse,  and  the  players 
found  it  to  their  advantage  to  practice  their  pro- 
fession in  that  part  of  London  which  was  independent 
of  the  City  Fathers.  The  Puritan  attack  on  the 
drama  was  unmercifully  severe.  Gosson,  as  we 
have  indicated,  wrote  a  play,  but  in  spite  of  the 
fact  that  it  contained  a  moral  lesson  which  he  him- 
self pointed  out,  he  allowed  his  Puritan  prejudices 
to  take  possession  of  him  to  such  an  extent  that 
he  condemned  the  play,  saying,  "  I  have  sinned 
and  am  sorry  for  my  fault."* 

The  activity  of  this  Puritan  spirit  was  such  as 
to  provoke  sooner  or  later  a  very  formal  defence  of 
poetry.  Lodge  was  the  first  to  come  to  the  rescue, 
and  Gosson's  School  of  Abuse  was  the  immediate 
object  of  his  counter-attack.  Nevertheless,  his  work 
was  only  a  forerunner  of  Sidney's,  which  was  to  come 
soon  after.  In  the  Defence  of  Poetry  published  by 
Thomas  Lodge  in  1579  there  is  a  passage  which 
reduces  to  a  single  sentence  his  leading  observation 
on  the  subject.  "Poets,"  he  says,  "were  the  first 
raysors  of  cities,  prescribers  of  good  lawes,  mayn- 
tayners  of  religion,  disturbors  of  the  wicked,  advancers 

*   Arber  Reprints,   p.   41. 

[87] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

of  the  well  disposed,  inventors  of  laws,  and  lastly 
the  very  fot-paths  to  knowledge  and  understanding."* 
No  comment  is  necessary  here  unless  to  point  out 
that  the  principle  of  poetic  justice  is  hinted  at  in 
the  reference  to  the  "wicked"  and  the  "well  dis- 
posed." Neither  the  Puritans  on  the  one  side  nor 
the  Defenders  on  the  other  appear  willing  to  over- 
look this  principle.  We  shall  find,  also,  that  Sidney 
accepted  it. 

SIDNEY'S  ETHICAL  REQUIREMENT  IN   POETRY. 

Sir  Philip  Sidney  was  the  greatest  of  the 
Defenders.  Referring  to  his  most  important  work 
in  literary  criticism,  Ward  says,  in  his  English 
Poets,  "The  Apologie  for  Poetrie  was  written  in  or 
about  1 58 1  (the  first  known  edition  is  that  of  London 
I595)-"t  We  know  that  Sidney's  friends  were 
acquainted  with  the  work  long  before  the  time 
of  its  publication,  and  that  Sir  John  Harington 
referred  to  it  in  his  own  Apologie  which  was  published 
in  1 59 1.  It  is  clear,  therefore,  that  Sidney's  theory 
of  poetry  was  developed  shortly  after  the  time  when 
Gascoigne,  Whetstone  and  Gosson  wrote  their  plays. 
This  is  important,  because  Sidney  seems  to  regard 
the  principle  of  poetic  justice  as  one  that  should 
be  applied  to  poetry  in  general.  His  reference  to 
the  question  of  rewards  and  punishments  is  set 
forth  in  the  following  words :  "  Now,  to  that  which 
commonly  is  attributed  to  the  prayse  of  histories, 
in  respect  of  the  notable  learning  is  gotten  by  marking 
the  successe,  as  though  therein  a  man  should  see 
vertue  exalted  and  vice  punished.  Truely  that 
*  Smith,   I.,  p.   75.  f  Ward,   I.,   p.   340. 

[88] 


SIDNEY'S  ETHICAL  REQUIREMENT 

commendation  is  peculiar  to  Poetry,  and  farre  of 
from  History.  For  indeede  Poetry  ever  setteth 
vertue  so  out  in  her  best  cullours,  making  Fortune 
her  wel-wayting  hand-mayd,  that  one  must  needs 
be  enamoured  of  her.  Well  may  you  see  Ulisses 
in  a  storme  and  in  other  hard  plights;  but  they 
are  but  exercises  of  patience  and  magnanimitie, 
to  make  them  shine  the  more  in  the  neer-following 
prosperitie.  And  of  the  contrarie  part,  if  evill  men 
come  to  the  stage,  they  ever  go  out  (as  the  Tragedie 
Writer  answered  to  one  that  misliked  the  shew 
of  such  persons)  so  manacled  as  they  little  animate 
folkes  to  follow  them.  But  the  Historian,  being 
captived  to  the  trueth  of  a  foolish  world,  is  many 
times  a  terror  from  well  doing,  and  an  encourage- 
ment to  unbridled  wickedness."* 

Here  we  have  a  reference  to  the  doctrine  of 
poetic  justice  about  which  there  can  be  no  quibble. 
It  is  clear  beyond  question  that  Sidney  applies  the 
principle  to  that  kind  of  poetry  with  which  he  is 
concerned  in  his  defence.  If  we  want  to  know  what 
that  kind  of  poetry  is,  we  need  only  study  the  attack 
that  had  been  made  on  poetry.  It  is  hardly  neces- 
sary to  say  that  the  question  is  one  which  concerns 
dramatic  poetry  as  a  whole;  but  at  the  same  time  it 
is  proper  to  remark  that,  in  the  passage  which  we 
have  under  consideration,  Sidney  seems  to  have 
chiefly  in  mind  the  kind  of  poetry  which  involves 
a  tragic  ending. 

May  we  say  that  Sidney  introduced  the  doctrine 
of  poetic  justice?  To  answer  such  a  question  affirm- 
atively  would    be    to    make   a    double   mistake.     In 

*  Ibid.,  I.,  p.  169. 

[89] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

the  first  place,  it  would  mean  a  rejection  oi  the 
assumption  that  certain  dramatic  writers  of  the 
previous  decade  had  deliberately  applied  the  principle 
to  the  composition  of  their  plays.  In  the  second 
place,  it  would  mean  that  he  himself  felt  he  was 
introducing  into  English  criticism  a  new  test  by 
which  to  judge  of  poetry.  Sidney  was  not  the 
first  to  introduce  the  principle  into  literary  criticism 
in  England.  The  idea  seems  to  have  been  traditional 
with  the  critics,  and  in  no  case  is  this  more  apparent 
than  in  the  case  of  Sir  Philip  Sidney.  At  first  sight 
it  might  seem  that  this  assertion  is  difficult  of  proof. 
Let  us,  therefore,  make  a  close  examination  of  the 
passage  we  have  quoted.  First  of  all,  we  must  observe 
that  Sidney  is  attempting  to  show  that  poetry  is 
preferable  to  history, — and  here  we  must  stop  to 
explain  his  use  of  the  word  history.  The  question 
at  issue  is  as  ancient  as  any  question  with  which 
literary  criticism  is  concerned.  A  story  which 
presents  a  faithful  record  of  a  real  occurrence  is 
called  history.  A  story  which  presents  an  idealized 
record  of  a  possible  occurrence  is  called  poetry. 
Plato  made  the  distinction,  and  so  did  Aristotle. 
Plato  called  poets  liars  because  they  departed  from 
the  truth  in  their  idealizations,  even  in  so  small  a 
matter  as  ascribing  to  the  gods  some  of  the  emotions 
which  are  common  to  men.  Some  of  the  ecclesiastical 
writers  of  the  middle  ages  objected  to  poetry  for  a 
similar  reason.  As  time  went  on,  we  find  evidence 
that  critics  argued  pro  and  con  on  the  subject. 
It  is  a  common  thing  to  find  the  seventeenth  century 
critics  expending  considerable  energy  in  an  attempt 
to  prove  that  the  poet  should  use,  not  the  facts  of 

[9o] 


SIDNEY'S  ETHICAL  REQUIREMENT 

history,    but    rather   a   sort    of   fiction,    a   fable,    an 
idealized   version   of  some   possible   occurrence. 

The  first  thing  we  observe,  then,  in  Sidney's 
argument  is  the  emphasis  which  he  lays  on  the 
superiority  of  fiction  over  history  in  so  far  as  poetry 
is  concerned.  He  objects  to  history  on  the  ground 
that  it  has  a  morally  bad  effect.  The  historian,  he 
says,  makes  no  distinction  in  regard  to  the  reward 
of  \:rtue  and  the  punishment  of  vice;  he  frequently 
narrates  events  which  illustrate  the  violation  of 
this  ethical  principle,  and  as  a  result  he  instills  into 
the  minds  of  men  no  love  of  virtue  and  no  hatred 
of  vice, — many  times,  indeed,  he  creates  in  the 
minds  of  men  an  aversion  for  the  good  and  encourages 
them  to  plunge  into  a  career  of  unbridled  wickedness. 
Sidney  does  not  content  himself  with  the  mere  asser- 
tion that  this  is  the  case.  He  takes  up  the  actual 
facts  of  history  to  show  that  they  offer,  in  some 
instances,  absolutely  no  encouragement  to  the 
practice  of  virtue;  "For,"  says  he,  "see  we  not 
the  valiant  Milciades  rot  in  his  fetters?  The  just 
Phocion  and  the  accomplished  Socrates  put  to 
death  like  Tray  tors?  The  cruell  Severus  lives 
prosperously?  The  excellent  Severus  miserably  mur- 
thered?  Sylla  and  Marius  dying  in  thyr  beddes? 
Pompey  and  Cicero  slaine  then  when  they  would 
have  thought  exile  a  happiness?  See  we  not  virtuous 
Cato  driven  to  kyll  himself e?  And  rebel  Caesar  so 
advanced  that  his  name  yet,  after  1600  yeares,  lasteth 
in  the  highest  honor.  And  marke  but  even  Caesars 
own  words  of  the  forenamed  Sylla  (who  in  that  only 
did  honestly,  to  put  down  his  dishonest  tyrannie) 
Literas  nescivit,  as  if  want  of  learning  caused  him 

[91] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE   DRAMA 

to  doe  well.  He  meant  it  not  by  Poetrie,  which 
not  content  with  earthly  plagues,  devise th  new 
punishments  in  hel  for  Tyrants:  nor  yet  by  Philos- 
ophic, which  teacheth  Occidendos  esse;  but  no 
doubt  by  skiH  in  Historie,  for  that  indeede  can 
afford  your  Cipselus,  Periander,  Phalaris,  Dionisius, 
and  I  know  not  how  many  more  of  the  same  kennell, 
that  speede  well  enough  in  their  abhominable  in- 
justice or  usurpation."* 

The  real  facts  of  history  are  not,  according  to 
Sidney,  suitable  for  the  use  of  a  poet.  Why?  Because 
the  facts  of  history  too  often  represent  the  triumph 
of  wickedness  and  the  overthrow  of  virtue.  He 
might  have  gone  farther,  and  proved  the  proposition 
that  it  is  necessary  for  poetry  to  depict  the  prosperity 
of  the  good  and  the  downfall  of  the  bad,  but  he  does 
not  do  so.  He  seems  to  take  it  for  granted  that 
such  is  the  function  of  true  poetry;  he  actually 
declares  that  it  is  peculiar  to  poetry  to  portray  the 
exaltation  of  virtue  and  the  punishment  of  vice,  not 
occasionally  but  always. 

It  is  not  surprising  that  Sidney  should  accept 
the  doctrine  of  poetic  justice  in  such  a  simple  and 
direct  way.  He  was  merely  accepting  as  a  matter  of 
course  a  traditional  conception  of  the  function  of 
poetry.  Every  important  critical  writer  that  imme- 
diately preceded  him  had  not  only  referred  to  the 
principle,  but  had  made  no  attempt  to  reject  it 
or  to  limit  its  application  to  one  species  of  dramatic 
writing.  On  the  side  of  literary  criticism,  then, 
there  was  no  reason  why  he  should  think  that  the 
principle  needed  any  defence.    The  Puritans  had  not 

*  Ibid.,   I.,   p.   170. 

[92] 


SIDNEY'S  ETHICAL  REQUIREMENT 

objected  to  it,  nor  were  they  likely  to  object  to  it. 
They  were  not  interested  in  the  aesthetic  qualities 
of  poetry;  they  concerned  themselves  wholly  with 
the  ethical  consideration.  The  doctrine  of  universal 
poetic  justice  satisfied,  in  one  particular,  their  most 
extreme  ethical  requirement.  There  was,  therefore, 
no  cause  why  they  should  raise  any  objection  to  it, 
and  consequently  no  occasion  for  Sidney's  attempt- 
ing a  defence. 

The  fact  that  the  doctrine  of  poetic  justice 
had  been  received  without  question  whenever  and 
wherever  there  was  occasion  to  refer  to  it,  was  not 
the  only  reason  which  prompted  Sidney  to  accept 
it  as  a  standard  principle  of  poetry;  he  had  observed 
in  literature  itself  many  admirable  illustrations  of 
the  principle.  In  fact,  he  appears  to  have  come  across 
no  cause  in  which  the  rule  was  violated;  for  he  says 
that  "if  evill  men  come  to  the  stage,  they  ever  go 
out  ...  so  manacled  as  they  little  animate  folkes  to 
follow  them."* 

No,  Sidney  had  no  reason  to  think  that  the  idea 
of  a  just  distribution  of  rewards  and  punishments 
was  something  new  in  poetry;  and,  consequently, 
his  defence  was  only  indirectly  concerned  with  the 
question.  His  thesis  was  this:  Historical  narrative 
is  usually  unpoetical  in  its  essence  and  therefore 
unfit  for  poetry.  Why,  it  may  be  asked,  should  he 
lay  particular  stress  on  such  a  proposition,  if  his 
defence  were  occasioned  by  the  puritan  attack? 
There  is  no  reason  why  he  should  here  take  note  of 
a  difficulty  that  goes  back  to  the  time  of  Plato; 
he  discusses  it  because  it  is  a  question  of  the  hour 

*   Loc.  cit.  p.  89. 

[93] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

At  any  rate,  between  the  time  when  Sidney  began 
his  writing  of  the  Apologie  and  the  date  of  its 
publication,  Sir  E.  Hoby  made  an  English  translation 
of  Coignet's  Politique,  which  he  gave  to  the  public 
in  1586,  the  year  of  Sidney's  death.  Obviously  the 
English  translation  of  the  Politique  could  have  had 
very  little  influence  upon  Sidney;  nevertheless,  it 
affords  us  an  evidence  of  the  vigor  with  which  the 
enemies  of  poetry  were  urging  against  it  the  objection 
that  it  narrates  untruths,  and  with  such  kind  of 
objection  Sidney  was  familiar.  Chapter  xxxv.  of 
the  Politique  contains  a  strong  attack  on  poets  because 
they  modify  the  facts  of  history.  Plato  is  quoted 
as  writing  "  that  Poetrie  consisted  in  the  cunning 
invention  of  fables  which  are  false  narration  resem- 
bling the  true,"  and  to  Simonides  is  attributed  the 
opinion  that  the  end  of  both  poetry  and  painting 
"is  but  to  yield  pleasure  by  lying."*  It  was  proper, 
of  course,  for  Sidney  to  take  note  of  this  objection. 
That  he  did  so,  is  an  evidence  that  he  had  read  some 
such  discussion  of  the  question  as  was  found  in  the 
Politique,  or  that  among  those  with  whom  he  asso- 
ciated were  critics  who  declared  themselves  in  favor 
of  historical  plays.  Be  that  as  it  may,  we  feel  certain 
that  he  had  some  particular  reason  for  arguing  against 
the  use  of  history  in  poetry,  and  no  reason  whatever 
for  making  any  ex-professo  defence  of  the  principle 
of  poetic  justice;  nor  did  he  make  any  defence. 
He  accepted  the  traditional  view  that  the  principle 
was  fundamental  in  poetry,  and  clearly  incorporated 
the  idea  in  his  great  critical  essay. 

The  next  two  critics  to  be  named,  Webbe  and 

*  Smith,    I.,   p.    341. 

[94l 


PUTTENHAM'S  TREATMENT 

Nash,  may  be  assigned  a  place  of  minor  importance 
in  our  investigation.  Both  agree  that  even  out  of 
the  best  plays  some  good  may  be  derived,  but  at 
the  same  time  they  maintain  that  this  rule  applies 
only  to  persons  of  mature  years.  Webbe  in  his 
lengthy  Discourse  of  English  Poetrie,  which  was 
published  in  1586,  refers  to  the  ethical  function  of 
poetry  only  slightly,  giving  it  as  his  opinion  "  that 
the  wantonest  Poets  of  all,  in  their  most  lascivious 
workes  wherein  they  busied  themselves,  sought 
rather  by  that  means  to  withdraw  mens  mindes 
(especially  the  best  natures)  from  such  foul  vices 
then  to  allure  them  to  embrace  such  beastly  follies 
as  they  detected."*  In  a  like  manner  the  moral 
lessons  of  poetry  are  referred  to  by  Thomas  Nash 
in  The  Anatomie  of  Absurditie,  published  in  1589. 
"  Even  as  the  Bee  out  of  the  bitterest  flowers  and 
sharpest  thistles  gathers  honey,"  he  says,  "so  out 
of  the  filthiest  Fables  may  profitable  knowledge 
be  sucked  and  selected.  Neverthelesse,  tender  youth 
ought  to  be  restrained  for  a  time  from  the  reading 
of  such  ribauldrie."f 

puttenham's  treatment  of  the  problem. 

In  1589  there  was  published  by  Richard  Field 
a  work  entitled  The  Arte  of  English  Poesie.  Richard 
Field  was  not  the  author  of  the  work ;  the  manuscript 
came  into  his  hands  without  "  any  authours  name 
or  any  other  ordinarie  address.  "|  Subsequently  it 
was  attributed  to  George  Puttenham,  but  it  is  the 
opinion  of  G.  G.  Smith  "  that  the  traditional  ascrip- 

*    Ibid.,    I.,    p.    251.  f   Ibid.,  I.,  p.   332. 

%   Ibid.,   II.,   p.    1. 

[95] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

tion  to  George  must  be  abandoned,  and  that  a 
better  heading  would  have  been  '  Richard  Puttenham ' 
or  simply  Puttenham."*  Considered  as  a  whole, 
The  Arte  of  English  Poesie  is  similar  to  Sidney's 
Apologie.  We  may  even  go  so  far  as  to  say  that 
Puttenham  had  read  Sidney's  manuscript  and  drew 
much  of  his  inspiration  from  it.  Both  works  argue 
in  favor  of  the  ethical  function  of  poetry,  both 
observe  that  the  spectacle  of  rewarded  virtue  and 
punished  wickedness  has  a  good  effect  on  those  who 
witness  it,  both  find  it  worth  while  defending  poets 
against  the  accusation  that  they  are  falsifiers.  Sidney 
was,  of  course,  the  greater  literary  artist,  the  more 
original  thinker.  His  work  is  a  monument  to  his 
memory.  This  fact,  however,  should  not  lessen  the 
importance  which  is  here  to  be  given  to  Puttenham's 
treatise  on  The  Arte  of  English  Poesie.  No  matter 
how  obscure  the  writer  is,  the  fact  remains  that  he 
discussed  the  problem  with  which  we  are  concerned 
in  this  investigation. 

In  one  respect  in  particular,  Puttenham's  treatise 
is  more  valuable  than  that  of  Sidney,  for  he  points 
out  a  species  of  dramatic  composition  which  does 
not  seem  to  have  exemplified  the  workings  of  the 
principle  of  poetic  justice.  So  far  in  English  criticism 
it  was  apparently  taken  for  granted  that  the  principle 
applied  to  all  dramatic  forms — at  least,  we  can  dis- 
cover nothing  to  the  contrary.  It  is,  therefore,  of 
special  interest  to  us  to  find  Puttenham  saying  that 
the  '  new  comedy '  of  the  ancient  Greeks  shows  a 
breaking  away  from  the  general  rule.  Puttenham 
does  not  put  the  proposition  in  this  direct  form 
*  Ibid.,  II.,  p.  407,  note. 

[96] 


PUTTENHAM'S  TREATMENT 

but  in  substance  that  is  what  he  says.  To  make 
this  truth  apparent  it  will  be  necessary  to  consider 
in  its  entirety  his  treatment  of  the  subject  of  rewards 
and  punishments. 

The  passage  in  which  Puttenham  discusses  the 
moral  effects  produced  by  the  drama  contains  a 
quasi-historical  account  of  the  beginnings  of  theat- 
rical performances.  "Some  perchance,"  he  says, 
"would  thinke  that  next  after  the  praise  and  honor- 
ing of  their  gods  should  commence  the  worshippings 
and  praise  of  good  men,  and  specially  of  great  Princes 
and  governours  of  the  earth  in  soveraignety  and 
function  next  unto  the  gods.  But  it  is  not  so,  for 
before  that  came  to  passe  the  Poets  or  holy  Priests 
chiefly  studied  the  rebuke  of  vice,  and  to  carpe  at 
the  common  abuses,  such  as  were  most  offensive  to 
the  publique  and  private,  for  as  yet  for  lacke  of  good 
civility  and  wholesome  doctrines  there  was  greater 
store  of  lewde  lourdaines  then-  of  wise  and  learned 
Lords  or  of  noble  and  vertuous  Princes  and 
governours."* 

Here  we  observe  that  according  to  Puttenham 
the  drama  had  an  ethical  purpose  from  the  very 
beginning,  inasmuch  as  its  chief  aim  was  to  teach 
men  to  be  good  by  using  the  theatre  to  rebuke  those 
that  are  bad.  It  may  appear  that  he  overlooks  the 
question  of  praising  those  that  are  good,  but  such 
is  not  the  case,  for  he  says  in  the  next  sentence  that 
the  poets  found  "  much  to  reprove  and  little  to 
praise."  In  those  very  early  times,  he  says,  the 
temples  of  the  gods  were  used  for  the  purpose  of 
instructing  the  people  in  these  matters;    the  effect 

*  Ibid.,  II.,  p.  31. 

[97] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

was  similar  to  that  of  a  sermon;  and  the  form  was 
either  satire,  comedy,  or  tragedy.*  Each  of  these 
forms  is  discussed  at  some  length,  and  then  he 
introduces  his  reference  to  new  comedy,  of  which 
the  distinctive  feature  was  this,  that  it  eliminated 
the  fault-finding  element,  and  thus  became — to  use 
his  own  words — "more  civill  and  pleasant  a  great 
deale."t 

In  order  the  better  to  understand  what  Putten- 
ham  means  in  this  portion  of  his  treatise  we  must 
make  a  distinction  in  regard  to  his  use  of  the  words 
tragedy  and  comedy.  Both  terms  may  embrace  the 
modern  idea  of  tragedy,  for  the  reason  that  the 
chief  distinction  between  the  two  in  antiquity  J  was 
not  so  much  in  the  treatment  of  a  subject  as  in  the 
fact  that  the  former  dealt  with  the  actions  of  heroes, 
princes,  kings,  and  the  like,  while  the  latter  dealt 
with  the  actions  of  ordinary  men.  Both  kinds  of  plays 
should  end  tragically,  whereas  new  comedy  takes  a 
more  cheerful  view  of  life  and  aims  at  pleasing. 

Puttenham  gives  as  a  reason  for  the  back- 
wardness of  tragedy  in  the  beginning,  that  the  kings 
and  other  suitable  subjects  for  tragedy  were  not 
numerous  enough  to  give  the  necessary  cause  for 
the  writing  of  tragedies.  As  soon,  however,  as  it 
became  apparent  that  the  punishment  which  the 
gods  had  visited  upon  the  crimes  of  certain  kings 
and  heroes  of  the  past  might  serve  as  a  well-timed 

*  Ibid.,  II.,  p.  32.  t  Ibid.,  II.,  p.  34. 

%  The  use  of  the  word  antiquity  in  this  case  applies  to 
the  period  of  decline  in  Greek  literature.  Before  Aristotle's 
time  there  was  a  more  correct  idea  of  the  character  of  the 
tragic  hero. 

[98] 


PUTTENHAM'S  TREATMENT 

warning  for  the  living,  true  tragedy  was  given  its 
place  in  the  literature.  The  poets  waited  till  "  poster- 
ity stood  no  more  in  dread"  of  these  miserable 
sovereigns;  then,  says  Puttenham,  "their  infamous 
life  and  tyrannies  were  layd  open  to  all  the  world, 
their  wickednes  reproached,  their  follies  and  extreme 
insolencies  derided,  and  their  miserable  ends  pointed 
out  in  playes  and  pageants,  to  show  the  mutabilitie 
of  fortune,  and  the  just  punishment  of  God  in  revenge 
of  a  vicious  and  evill  life."* 

According  to  Puttenham,  then,  tragedy  did  not 
begin  to  exist  until  there  was  need  of  teaching  the 
great  and  powerful  of  the  earth  that  just  as  surely 
as  divine  vengeance  had  brought  misery  to  those 
of  their  rank  who  did  wicked  things  in  the  past,  so 
also  would  they  be  punished  if  they  did  not  live 
virtuous  lives.  It  is  not  necessary  to  prove  that  by 
this  he  meant  to  imply  not  only  that  the  idea  of 
poetic  justice  was  in  a  most  strict  sense  fundamental 
to  tragedy,  but  also  that  tragedy  had  in  the  beginning 
no  reason  to  exist  unless  it  was  to  portray  the  punish- 
ment of  vice  and,  by  inference,  the  reward  of  virtue. 
Such  are  the  simplest  conclusions  that  are  to  be 
drawn  from  his  treatment  of  the  subject. 

The  passages  of  The  Arte  of  English  Poesie,  to 
which  reference  has  already  been  made,  give,  as  has 
been  indicated,  a  somewhat  one-sided  conception  of 
the  idea  of  poetic  justice.  The  Dennis- Addison 
controversy  on  the  subject  made  it  clear  that  this 
peculiar  doctrine  called  for  a  perfect  distribution 
not  only  of  punishments  but  also  of  rewards.  We 
have   noted   that  while   Puttenham   regarded  it  the 

*   Ibid.,   p.   35. 

[99l 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE   DRAMA 

business  of  the  drama  to  portray  the  punishment 
of  the  wicked,  he  does  not  lay  much  emphasis  on 
the  reward  of  virtue.  That  is  true  only  so  far  as  our 
quotations  are  concerned.  Puttenham  returns  to 
the  subject  in  Chapter  xvi.  of  his  work  and  makes 
up  for  any  previous  neglect.  To  some  extent  he 
repeats  himself,  but  not  without  the  effect  of  making 
his  meaning  more  clear.  The  most  striking  passage 
in  that  chapter  is  as  follows:  "As  the  bad  and 
illawdable  parts  of  all  estates  and  degrees  were 
taxed  by  the  Poets  in  one  sort  or  another,  and  those 
of  great  Princes  by  Tragedie  in  especial,  and  not 
till  after  their  deaths,  as  hath  been  before  remembred, 
to  th'  extent  that  such  exemplifying  (as  it  were)  of 
their  blames  and  adversities,  being  now  dead,  might 
worke  for  secret  reprehension  to  others  that  were 
alive,  living  in  the  same  or  like  abuses:  so  was  it 
great  reason  that  all  good  and  vertuous  persons 
should  for  their  well  doings  be  rewarded  with  com- 
mendation, and  the  great  Princes  above  all  others 
with  honors  and  praises,  being  for  many  respects 
of  greater  moment  to  have  them  good  and  vertuous 
then  any  inferior  sort  of  men."*  Here  we  have  the 
required  balancing  of  rewards  and  punishments.  A 
close  inspection  of  Puttenham's  language,  however, 
makes  it  appear  that  our  use  of  the  term  'rewards' 
gives  us  a  slightly  forced  interpretation.  It  is  quite 
possible  for  the  virtuous  to  come  to  an  unhappy 
end,  such  as  that  of  Desdemona  in  Othello,  and.  yet 
have  their  praises  sung  at  the  very  end  of  the  play; 
but  it  is  not  likely  that  Puttenham  was  describing 
any  reward  of  this  kind.   The  commendation  of  which 

*   Ibid.,  pp.  36-37. 

[  100] 


PUTTE N HAM'S  TR EATMENT 

he  speaks,  is  put  in  direct  contrast  with  the  punish- 
ments of  God,'  mentioned  above:  it  is  only  proper 
to  suppose  that  since  Puttenham  has  already  pointed 
to  the  miserable  end  of  the  wicked,  he  now  intends 
to  refer  to  the  happy  end  of  the  good. 

We  have  noted  that  Sidney  found  it  advisable 
to  discuss  the  relative  merits  of  fact  and  fiction  and 
that  he  argued  for  the  superiority  of  fiction.  The 
same  thing  occurs  in  The  Arte  of  English  Poesie. 
Puttenham  says  on  the  subject  "  that  the  historical 
poets  used  not  the  matter  so  precisely  to  wish  that 
all  they  wrote  should  be  accounted  true,  for  that  was 
not  needeful  nor  expedient  to  the  purpose,  namely 
to  be  used  either  for  example  or  for  pleasure:  con- 
sidering that  many  times  it  is  seene  a  fained  matter 
or  altogether  fabulous,  besides  it  maketh  more  mirth 
than  any  other,  works  no  lesse  good  conclusions  for 
example  than  the  most  true  and  veritable,  but  often 
times  more,  because  the  Poet  hath  the  handling  of 
them  to  fashion  at  his  pleasure,  but  not  so  of  the 
other,  which  must  go  according  to  their  veritie, 
and  none  otherwise  without  the  writers  great  blame."* 
Pursuing  this  subject  still  further,  he  maintains  that 
in  a  single  day  a  good  wit  may  produce  more  "  fained  " 
examples  of  virtuous  conduct  than  "  many  ages 
through  mans  frailtie  are  able  to  put  in  ure;f  which 
made  the  learned  and  wittie  men  of  those  times 
to  devise  many  historical  matters  of  no  veritie  at 
all,  but  with  purpose  to  do  good  and  no  hurt,  as 
using  them  for  a  manner  of  discipline  and  president 
of   commendable   life. "J     Puttenham    observes    that 

*   Ibid.,   p.   42.  f   Old   English  form  for  use. 

t  Smith,   II.,   p.   42. 
[101I 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

not  only  did  the  poets  exercise  their  talents  in  this 
way,  but  that  they  also  made  it  their  business  to 
select  from  actual  history  only  those  events  that 
might  teach  men  good  moral  lessons.  The  point 
which  is  here  made  by  the  author  of  The  Arte  of 
English  Poesie  illustrates  how  closely  related  to  the 
discussion  of  poetic  justice  is  that  concerning  the 
use  of  fact  and  fiction.  One  class  of  critics  objected 
to  the  use  of  some  of  the  facts  of  history  because 
they  failed  to  show  how  virtue  was  to  be  rewarded 
and  vice  punished,  the  other  class  of  critics  objected 
to  fiction  because  it  represented  something  that  was 
untrue  and  made  it  the  business  of  poets  to  be  liars. 
The  opinion  that  made  the  poets  out  to  be  liars 
was  analyzed  by  several  of  the  defenders,  the  result 
being  that  the  argument  was  reversed.  Fiction, 
said  the  defenders,  represents  the  ideal  truth,  there- 
fore the  universal  truth;  history  represents  the 
contrary.  Fiction  illustrates  the  workings  of  ideal 
and  eternal  justice;  history  outrages  our  sense  of 
justice.  Fiction  rewards  the  good  and  punishes  the 
bad  always;  history  more  frequently  permits  the 
good  to  suffer  and  the  wicked  to  prosper.  Such  was 
the  form  that  the  defense  finally  took.  In  the  time 
of  Sidney  and  Puttenham  we  find  the  beginning 
of  such  a  defence.  The  argument  was  not,  of  course, 
so  thoroughly  worked  out  as  we  have  here  indicated; 
but  substantially  it  was  the  same. 

The  first  purpose  of  the  drama,  then,  was  to 
teach  men  a  moral  lesson,  a  lesson  that  was  not  to 
be  taught  unless  through  the  application  of  poetic 
justice.  This  was  the  conclusion  which  Puttenham 
drew  from  his  study  of  Greek  literature.  Plato, 
[  102] 


HARINGTON'S  DISCUSSION 

it  is  well  known,  objected  to  poets  on  the  supposition 
that  they  were  liars.  We  may  regard  this  as  the  first 
objection  that  was  raised  against  them;  for  this 
reason,  and  also  because  the  objection  was  taken 
seriously  in  the  sixteenth  and  seventeenth  centuries, 
it  is  interesting  to  remark  that  the  most  effective 
of  the  arguments  made  against  it  by  the  early  critics 
was  founded  on  the  theory  that  poetic  justice,  which 
was  characteristic  of  fiction,  represented  the  highest 
possible  kind  of  truth.  Such  being  the  case,  we 
have  good  reason  to  be  on  the  look-out  for  those 
passages  in  literary  criticism  which  call  attention  to 
the  objection  for  the  purpose  of  refuting  it.  Sidney 
and  Puttenham,  as  we  have  seen,  took  the  objection 
very  seriously,  a  lead  that  was  followed  by  almost 
every  English  literary  critic  for  more  than  a  century 
afterwards.  Harington  treated  the  problem  in 
1 59 1,  Bacon  in  1605,  Hobbes  in  1650,  Philips  in 
1675,  Rymer  in  1678,  Dryden  on  various  occasions, 
and  others  in  the  eighteenth  century,  like  Addison 
and  Dennis. 

harington's-  discussion  of  poetry. 

Sir  John  Harington,  the  first  among  those  whom 
we  have  just  mentioned,  published,  in  1591,  A 
Brief  Apologie  of  Poetrie  in  the  form  of  a  preface 
to  a  translation  of  Orlando  Furioso.  Here  again 
the  critic  takes  it  for  granted  that  poetry  had  in 
the  beginning  an  ethical  function;  for  Harington 
says  of  the  "first  writers  and  devisers"  of  poetry, 
that  they  intended  that  it  should  be  employed  "  to 
soften  and  polish  the  hard  and  rough  dispositions 
of  men,  and  make  them  capable  of  virtue  and  good 

[  i°3] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

discipline."*  The  form  which  the  Apologie  takes 
is  suggested  by  the  list  of  objections  which  he  enu- 
merates, and  first  among  these  is  the  calumny  that 
poets  are  liars.  Cornelius  Agrippa,  he  says,  made  a 
bitter  attack  on  poetry  saying  "  that  it  is  a  nurse 
of  lies,  a  pleaser  of  fooles,  a  breeder  of  dangerous 
errors,  and  an  inticer  of  wantonnes."f  Point  by 
point  he  takes  up  these  objections  and  refutes  them. 
He  does  not,  however,  give  them  equal  importance. 
Nearly  all  his  defence  is  concerned  with  the  first. 
Harington's  argument  in  favor  of  fiction  as 
opposed  to  historical  truth  in  poetry  makes  it  still 
more  certain  that  the  early  English  critics  thought 
that  the  chief  aim  of  the  poet  was  to  base  his  moral 
lessons  upon  a  representation  of  the  reward  of  virtue 
and  the  punishment  of  vice.  We  have  maintained 
that  this  view  was  traditional  among  the  critics, 
for  the  reason  that  all  semed  to  have  accepted  the 
doctrine  as  a  matter  of  course,  only  calling  attention 
to  the  fact,  when  poetry  was  objected  to  on  the 
ground  of  ethics.  Harington  goes  a  step  farther  and 
shows  by  a  concrete  example  how  the  principle 
worked.  It  is  important  that  the  critic's  own  words 
should  be  quoted  in  order  to  show  how  evident 
it  is  that  he  is  dealing  with  the  principle  of  poetical 
justice.  The  passage  to  be  quoted  is  as  follows: 
"  Perseus  sonne  of  Jupiter  is  fained  by  the  Poets 
to  have  slaine  Gorgon,  and,  after  that  conquest 
atchieved,  to  have  flown  up  to  heaven.  The  Histor- 
icall  sence  is  this,  Perseus  the  sonne  of  Iupiter,  by 
participation  of  Jupiters  vertues  which  were  in  him 
or  rather  comming  of  the  stock  of  one  of  the  Kings 

*  Ibid.,  p.    197.  t  Ibid.,  p.  99. 

[  104  ] 


HARINGTON'S  DISCUSSION 

of  Greet,  or  Athens  so  called,  slew  Gorgon,  a  tryant 
in  that  countrey  (Gorgon  in  Greeke  signifieth  earth), 
and  was  for  his  vertuous  parts  exalted  by  men  up 
unto  heaven.  Morally  it  signifieth  this  much: 
Perseus  a  wise  man,  sonne  of  Jupiter,  endewed  with 
virtue  from  above,  slayeth  sinne  and  vice,  a  thing 
base  &  earthly  signified  by  Gorgon,  and  so  mounteth 
up  to  the  sky  of  virtue.  It  signifies  in  one  kind  of 
Allegorie  this  much:  the  mind  of  man  being  gotten 
by  God,  and  so  the  childe  of  God  killing  and  van- 
quishing the  earthlinesse  of  this  Gorgonicall  nature, 
ascendeth  up  to  the  understanding  of  heavenly 
things,  of  high  things,  of  eternal  things,  in  which 
contemplacion  consisteth  the  perfection  of  man: 
this  is  the  natural  allegory,  because  man  (is)  one  of 
the  chiefe  works  of  nature.  It  hath  also  a  more 
high  and  heavenly  allegorie,  that  the  heavenly  nature, 
daughter  of  Iupiter,  procuring  with  her  continuall 
motion  corruption  and  mortality  in  the  inferiour 
bodies,  and  flew  up  on  high,  and  there  remaineth 
for  ever.  It  hath  also  another  Theological  Allegorie: 
that  the  angelicall  nature,  daughter  of  the  most 
high  God  the  creator  of  all  things,  killing  and  over- 
comming  all  bodily  substance  signified  by  Gorgon, 
ascended  into  heaven.  The  like  infinite  Allegories 
I  could  pike  out  of  other  Poeticall  fictions,  save  that 
I  would  avoid  tediousness."* 

Referring  now  to  this  passage  from  Harington, 
we  note  that  he  calls  attention  to  the  reward  of 
virtue. as  well  as  to  the  punishment  of  vice.  He 
even  takes  a  situation  in  which  it  is  necessary  to 
prove   that   a   given  action   is  virtuous  in   order   to 

*   Ibid.,   pp.   202—203. 

[105] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE   DRAMA 

account  for  the  reward  which  follows.  The  killing  of 
Gorgon  is  not  a  crime  but  rather  a  praise-worthy 
act,  and  consequently  the  poet  must  reward  Perseus 
who  has  done  the  deed.  On  the  other  hand,  Gorgon 
is  a  tyrant,  and  should  be  punished  for  the  wrong 
he  had  done.  Harington  satisfies  the  requirement 
of  justice  by  bringing  him  to  an  unhappy  end, — he 
is  slain  by  the  hand  of  Perseus.  Harington's  illustra- 
tion is  not  worked  out  in  all  its  details  and  therefore 
we  are  unable  to  discover  wherein  his  notion  of 
poetic  justice  would  be  out  of  harmony  with  that 
of  Rymer.  But  there  it  is,  essentially  the  same  as 
that  to  which  Addison  objected  in  171 1.  We  should 
not  say  it  was  essentially  the  same  unless  we  felt 
reasonably  sure  that  Harington  applied  the  principle 
to  tragedy  in  such  a  way  as  to  admit  of  no  exception. 
It  seems  certain  that  the  only  exception  recognized 
by  any  of  these  early  critics  was  in  favor  of  the  form 
of  play  called  the  'new  comedy.'  Addison  made  a 
more  sweepting  exception.  He  was  first  disposed 
to  reject  the  principle  altogether,  but  afterwards 
contented  himself  with  saying  that  tragedy  was  as 
successful  in  the  violation  as  in  the  observance 
of  the  law.  Dennis,  held,  with  Rymer,  that  the 
doctrine  of  poetic  justice  must  be  applied  unfailingly 
to  tragedy,  and  in  this  he  seems  to  be  supported  by 
the  leading  critics  of  the  sixteenth  century  and  partic- 
ularly by  those  who  argued  against  the  use  of  un- 
idealized  history.  In  arguing  for  an  idealization  of 
events,  the  critics  merely  argue  that  wickedness 
should  never  be  portrayed  in  attractive  colors  and 
that  virtue  should  never  be  so  depicted  as  to  dis- 
courage   men    from    being   good.     If   this   is   a   fair 

[106] 


HARINGTON'S  DISCUSSION 

estimate  of  the  opinions  of  the  English  critics  of 
the  sixteenth  century,  and  I  think  it  is,  there  is 
nothing  unwarranted  in  the  assertion  that  the 
doctrine  of  poetic  justice  was  traditional  in  English 
literary  criticism  more  than  a  century  in  advance 
of  the  time  when  Addison  rebelled  against  it.  It 
is  quite  certain,  on  the  one  hand,  that  Addison  and 
Johnson  and  other  writers  of  the  eighteenth  century 
favored  the  dramatic  theory  that  tragedy  should 
take  life  as  it  is,  and  hold  the  mirror  up  to  nature. 
They  regarded  it  proper  that  virtue  be  represented 
as  suffering,  simply  for  the  reason  that  such  a 
representation  is  true  to  life.  But  Dennis  did  not 
think  such  a  representation  proper;  Rymer  was 
most  decidedly  opposed  to  any  spectacle  of  suffering 
innocence;  and  may  we  not  say  that  the  same 
rigorous  doctrine  was  maintained  by  every  sixteenth 
century  critic  who  declared  himself  against  the 
use  of  unidealized  history?  To  prove  that  such  a 
doctrine  was  not  maintained  by  these  critics  is 
to  prove  the  impossible. 

Before  concluding  the  discussion  of  Harington's 
defense  of  poetical  fiction,  it  will  be  well  to  quote 
an  illustration  which  he  uses  to  show  how  a  fable 
may  serve  to  express  the  truth:  "Bishop  Fisher, 
a  stout  prelate  (though  I  do  not  praise  his  Religion), 
when  he  was  assaied  by  king  Henrie  the  eight  for 
his  good  will  and  assent  for  the  suppression  of  Abbeys, 
the  King  alledging  that  he  would  but  take  away 
their  superfluities  and  let  the  substance  stand  still, 
or  at  least  see  it  be  converted  to  better  and  more 
goodly  uses,  the  grave  Bishop  answered  it  in  this 
kind    of    Poeticall    parable.     He   said    there   was    an 

[  107] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE   DRAMA 

axe  that,  wanting  a  helve,  came  to  a  thicke  and 
huge  overgrowne  wood,  &  besought  some  of  the  great 
okes  in  that  wood  to  spare  him  so  much  timber  as 
to  make  him  a  handle  or  helve,  promising  that  if 
he  might  finde  that  favour  he  would  in  recompence 
thereof  have  great  regard  in  preserving  that  wood, 
in  pruning  the  branches,  in  cutting  away  the  un- 
profitable and  superfluous  boughs,  in  paring  away 
the  bryers  and  thornes  that  were  combersome  to 
the  fayre  trees,  and  make  it  in  fine  a  grove  of  great 
delight  and  pleasure:  but  when  this  same  axe  had 
obtained  his  suit,  he  so  laid  about  him,  so  pared 
away  both  timber  and  top  and  lop,  that  in  short 
space  of  a  woodland  he  made  it  a  champion,  and 
made  her  liberalise  the  instrument  of  her  over- 
throw. 

"  Now  though  this  Bishop  had  no  very  good 
successe  with  his  parable,  yet  it  was  so  farre  from 
being  counted  a  lye,  that  it  was  plainly  seen  soone 
after  that  the  same  axe  did  both  hew  down  those 
woods  by  the  roots  &  spared  off  him  by  the  head, 
and  was  a  peece  of  Prophecie  as  well  as  a  peece 
of   Poetrie."* 

The  unusual  prominence  given  to  the  question 
whether  or  not  fiction  is  to  be  preferred  to  fact  is 
only  one  of  the  features  in  that  sixteenth  century 
controversy  which  meant  life  or  death  to  the  drama. 
When  Harington  wrote  his  treatise  on  Poetry,  the 
Blackfriars  Theatre,  which  was  established  in  defiance 
of  Puritanism,  was  only  fifteen  years  in  existence 
and  still  had  to  contend  against  its  original  enemy. 
A  few  years  later  when  this  theatre  was  destroyed 

*   Ibid.,   pp.   204-205. 

[108] 


BACON   AND  HIS  SUCCESSORS 

by  fire,  the  same  enemy  tried  to  prevent  its  rebuilding. 
Blackfriars  was  rebuilt,  but  the  fact  remains  that 
the  opposition  against  which  it  had  to  contend  helps 
us  to  understand  why  literary  criticism  was  still 
endeavoring  to  show  that  poetry  was  essentially 
ethical  inasmuch  as  it  depicted  the  highest  form  of 
truth  and  made  men  virtuous  by  teaching  them 
practical   lessons  of  morality. 

BACON   AND   SOME)   OF   HIS   SUCCESSORS. 

The  first  half  of  the  seventeenth  century  produced 
only  one  critical  work  that  we  can  use  to  any  special 
advantage  for  the  purpose  of  this  investigation. 
That  work  was  written  by  Francis  Bacon  and  was 
published  by  him  in  /605  under  the  title  Of  the 
Advancement  of  Learning.  The  work  is  divided  into 
two  books,  and  each  book  is  subdivided  into  chapters. 
The  fourth  chapter  of  the  second  book  deals  with 
the  subject  of  poetry  and  contains  a  passage  which 
Worsfold  refers  to  as  an  enunciation  of  what  is 
essentially  the  modern  conception  of  poetic  justice.* 
Worsfold,  while  he  does  not  attempt  to  search 
English  Criticism  for  the  earliest  references  to  this 
doctrine,  goes  far  enough  to  refer  the  question  back 
to  a  critic  who  wrote  on  the  subject  about  three 
fourths  of  a  century  before  the  time  of  Rymer. 
Curiously  enough  the  discussion  of  poetic  justice  to 
which  Worsfold  calls  attention  in  Bacon's  essay  is 
chiefly  concerned  with  the  question  of  fiction  as 
opposed  to   fact. 

Treating  of  the  matter  of  poetry,  Bacon  says 
that  it  "  is  nothing  else  but  feigned  history,  which 

*   The  Principles  of  Criticism,   p.   81. 
[  109] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

may  be  styled  as  well  in  prose  as  in  verse."*  It  is 
in  this  fashion  that  he  closes  his  first  paragraph 
on  poetry.  The  old-time  question,  then,  is  upper- 
most in  his  mind,  and  he  at  once  proceeds  to  discuss 
it.  We  shall  quote  in  full  the  paragraph  that  contains, 
according  to  Worsfold,  the  enunciation  of  the 
modern  conception  of  poetic  justice: 

"  The  use  of  this  feigned  history  hath  been  to 
give  some  shadow  of  satisfaction  to  the  mind  of  man 
in  those  points  wherein  the  nature  of  things  doth  deny 
it,  the  world  being  in  proportion  inferior  to  the  soul; 
by  reason  whereof  there  is,  agreeable  to  the  spirit 
of  man,  a  more  ample  greatness,  a  more  exact  good- 
ness, and  a  more  absolute  variety,  than  can  be  found 
in  the  nature  of  things.  Therefore,  because  the  acts 
or  events  of  true  history  have  not  that  magnitude 
which  satisfieth  the  mind  of  man,  poesy  feigneth 
acts  and  events  greater  and  more  heroical.  Because 
true  history  propoundeth  the  successes  and  issues 
of  actions  not  so  agreeable  to  the  merits  of  virtue 
and  vice,  therefore  poesy  feigns  them  more  just  in 
retribution,  and  more  according  to  revealed  prov- 
idence. Because  true  history  representeth  actions 
and  events  more  ordinary  and  less  interchanged, 
therefore  poesy  endueth  them  with  more  rareness, 
and  more  unexpected  and  alternative  variations. 
So  as  it  appeareth  that  poesy  serveth  and  conferreth 
to  magnanimity  morality,  and  to  delectation.  And 
therefore  it  was  ever  thought  to  have  some  partici- 
pation of  divineness,  because  it  doth  raise  and  erect 
the  mind,  by  submitting  the  shows  of  things  to  the 
desires    of   the   mind;     whereas    reason   doth   buckle 

*  Of   the    Advancement   oj    Learning,    p.   101. 
[no] 


BACON  AND  HIS  SUCCESSORS 

and  bow  the  mind  unto  the  nature  of  things.  And 
we  see  that  by  these  insinuations  and  congruities 
with  man's  nature  and  pleasure,  joined  also  with 
the  agreement  and  consort  it  hath  with  music,  it 
hast  had  access  and  estimation  in  rude  times  and 
barbarous  regions,  where  other  learning  stood 
excluded."* 

Of  course,  the  important  sentence  in  the  fore- 
going quotation  is  that  which  notes  the  fact  that 
true  history  does  not  properly  distribute  the  rewards 
and  the  punishment  of  action,  giving  this  as  a  reason 
why  poetry  introduces  the  fable,  in  which  actions 
and  their  consequences  are  more  in  harmony  with 
the  idea  of  justice  and  the  providence  of  God.  There 
is  no  doubt  whatsoever  that  Bacon  is  here  discussing 
the  principle  of  poetic  justice.  Did  he  regard  it  as 
a  law  of  poetry?  It  seems  so;  for  he  makes  no 
argument  to  the  contrary  and  he  makes  no  distinction 
as  regards  the  particular  forms  of  poetical  composition. 
His  argument  follows  the  general  line  of  some  of 
those  who  preceded  him,  but  is  not  so  lengthy. 
Bacon  follows  Puttenham  to  the  extent  of  giving 
prominence  to  the  same  problem  in  literary  crit- 
icism that  he  laid  emphasis  upon.  He  also  follows 
Puttenham  in  the  matter  of  discussing  the  allegorical 
interpretation  of  poetry,  thereby  making  it  still 
more  evident  that  poetry  is  strong  in  its  ethical 
effects.  But  Bacon  departs  from  critical  tradition 
somewhat  when  he  says,  near  the  end  of  his  chapter 
on  poetry,  that  in  his  opinion  fables  were  not  invented 
to  produce  moral  effects.  On  this  point  he  says, 
"  I    do    rather   think   that   the   fable   was   first,    and 

*   Ibid.,   pp.    101-102. 

[hi] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

the  exposition  devised,  than  that  the  moral  was 
first,  and  thereupon  the  fable  framed."*  He  illus- 
trates his  opinion  by  certain  examples,  and  offers 
it  as  his  judgment  that  Homer  had  in  view  no  special 
inward  meaning  in  what  he  wrote.  Bacon,  then,  is 
to  be  taken  into  account  in  tracing  the  development 
of  the  idea  of  poetry  in  English  literary  criticism. 
On  the  one  hand  he  confirms  us  in  our  judgment  that 
the  doctrine  of  poetic  justice  was  traditional  with 
the  men  of  his  time,  and  on  the  other  hand  he 
suggests  a  departure  from  the  extreme  position 
recently  taken  by  Harington.  He  believes  that 
poetry  should  instruct,  but  at  the  same  time  he 
thinks  that  there  is  more  instruction  read  into  some 
of  the  earliest  poets  than  they  intended.  That  he 
took  up  this  subject  at  all,  is  to  be  explained  by 
the  fact  that  some  fourteen  years  earlier  Harington 
had  given  in  his  Apologie  an  exposition  of  the  three 
meanings  of  poetry,  the  literal,  the  moral  and  the 
allegorical.  It  was  against  the  allegorical  inter- 
pretation of  poetry  that  Bacon  argued.  He  did 
not  find  it  a  fault  in  the  poet  to  be  allegorical  in  his 
meaning,  but  he  thought  that  the  interpreters  had 
gone  too  far  in  using  this  method  of  reading  a  meaning 
into  the  works  of  the  masters.  However,  the  stand 
that  Bacon  took  in  regard  to  the  question  of  allegory 
does  not  change  the  fact  that  he  applied  the  principle 
of  poetic  justice   to  poetry  in   general. 

From  Bacon  to  Davenant  there  are  no  sources 
of  literary  criticism  in  English,  that  is,  from  1605 
to  1650.  Within  this  period  Shakespeare  wrote 
some  of  his  best  plays,  but  no  prefaces,  no  essays 

*   Ibid.,   p.    104. 

[112] 


BACON  AND  HIS  SUCCESSORS 

in  criticism, — nothing  but  plays;  when  he  died, 
the  drama  entered  upon  a  period  of  decline.  In 
1629  women  were  first  seen  on  the  English  stage, 
and  the  consequence  was  a  storm  of  protest,  but 
no  literary  critic.  In  1642  there  was  issued  an 
ordinance  of  both  houses  of  parliament  for  the 
suppressing  of  public  stage  plays  throughout  the 
Kingdom.*  This  law  went  into  effect  rigorously, 
and  as  a  result  the  English  theatre  shows  no  activity 
for  fourteen  years.  Then  came  the  period  of  the 
Restoration  with  Dryden  for  its  chief  poet  and  critic; 
it  was  also  the  period  which  produced  Rymer  who 
distinguished  himself  so  signally  as  an  advocate 
of  poetic  justice,  and  brought  the  doctrine  into 
disrepute  by  the  fury  with  which  he  used  it  as  an 
executioner's  axe  in  his  attack  upon  Shakespeare 
and  other  English  dramatists.  Between  Bacon  and 
Dryden  there  is  no  English  critic  of  consequence. 
A  few  names  may  be  mentioned.  Among  these  is 
Davenant  who  argued  for  fiction  in  poetry,  saying 
in  1650  that  it  is  "more  worthy  to  seek  out  truth 
in  the  Passions  then  to  record  the  truth  of  Actions;"! 
he  dealt  with  the  ethical  situation  in  these  words, 
"Poets  are  of  all  moralists  the  most  useful  .  .  .  'tis 
injurious  not  to  think  Poets  the  most  useful 
moralists."^  Hobbes  is  to  be  mentioned  for  the 
fact  that  in  1650  he  discussed  the  limits  within  which 
the  poet  might  depart  from  actual  historical  fact; 
he  says,  that  "  as  truth  is  the  bound  of  Historical, 
so    Resemblance    of    truth    is    the    utmost    limit    of 

*   Collier,   II.,  p.    104. 

t   Spingarn,  Critical  Essays,   II.,  p.   3. 

%  Ibid.,  II.,  p.  49. 

[H3] 


R>Etic  justice  in  the  drama 

Poetical  Liberty."*  Fleckno  in  1664  complained 
against  excessive  immorality  in  the  drama;  he 
followed  the  ethical  consideration  along  philosophical 
lines  and  reached  the  conclusion  that  the  chief  end 
of  the  drama  "  is  to  render  Folly  ridiculous,  and 
Virtue  and  Noblenesse  so  amiable  and  lovely,  as 
everyone  should  be  delighted  and  enamoured  with 
it."f  Thomas  Shadwell  in  1671  said  that  the  most 
proper  function  of  comedy  is  "  to  reprehend  some  of 
the  Vices  and  Follies  of  the  Age, "J  and  he  paid  his 
compliments  to  Dryden  by  saying,  "  I  must  take 
leave  to  Dissent  from  those  who  seem  to  insinuate 
that  the  ultimate  end  of  the  Poet  is  to  delight,  without 
correction  or  instruction.  "§  A  close  analysis  of  the 
opinions  of  these  four  writers  might  help  to  make 
our  case  a  little  stronger  if  any  one  should  doubt 
that  it  is  strong  enough. 

That  Rymer  did  not  introduce  and  could  not 
have  introduced  the  doctrine  of  poetic  justice  into 
English  criticism  needs  no  further  proof.  The  doctrine 
was  traditional,  as  we  have  shown,  since  English 
literary  criticism  began;  and  even  before  English 
literary  criticism  began,  it  was  a  recognized  principle 
of  the  drama,  as  is  evident  from  the  words  of  An 
Act  of  Parliament,  in  1543,  which  showed  a  spirit 
of  toleration  for  only  such  plays  as  had  for  object 
"  the  rebuking  and  reproaching  of  vices,  and  the 
setting  forth  of  virtue."  || 

*  Ibid.,  II.,  p.  62.  f  Ibid.,  II.,  p.  06. 

X  Ibid.,   II.,  p.    153.  §  Ibid. 

||  Collier,   I.,   p.    130. 


["4] 


DRYDEN'S  IDEA  OF  TRAGEDY 


CHAPTER  III 
Two  Prominent  Advocates  of  Poetic  Justice 

dryden's  idea  of  tragedy 

LET  us  turn  once  more  to  the  Dennis-Addison 
controversy.  It  has  been  taken  as  the  point 
of  departure  for  the  two  problems  of  research 
with  which  we  have  been  so  far  concerned,  the  one 
dealing  with  the  assertion  that  Aristotle  was  the 
author  of  the  doctrine  of  poetic  justice,  the  other 
dealing  with  the  proposition  that  this  doctrine  was 
first  introduced  into  English  literary  criticism  by 
Rymer.  A  third  line  of  investigation  is  suggested 
by  this  same  controversy,  since  the  contending 
forces  maintained  a  striking  difference  of  opinion 
in  a  matter  concerning  the  fundamental  function  of 
dramatic  art.  It  was  certainly  an  interesting  dis- 
cussion, considered  historically,  not  only  because  a 
large  portion  of  our  literary  criticism  developed  out 
of  the  controversy,  but  also  because  the  question 
of  poetic  justice  was  itself  closely  related  to  those 
other  questions  of  dramatic  criticism  which  were 
answered  in  such  a  spirit  of  dogmatism  by  the 
French  writers  of  the  seventeenth  century.  It  was 
a  matter  of  some  consequence  whether  or  not  the 
influence  of  Renaissance  Classicism  should  dominate 
English  literature;  and  on  this  account  it  is  worth 
while  attempting  to  discover  how  much  success  was 
achieved    by    Rymer    and    his    immediate   followers, 

[115] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

in  advocating  the  theory  of  poetic  justice,  and  how 
far-reaching  in  its  effects  upon  dramatic  art  in 
general  was  the  body  of  literary  criticism  which  took 
Rymer's   theory   into   consideration. 

First  of  all,  it  is  important  to  determine  what 
was  the  English  idea  in  regard  to  the  function  of 
the  drama  at  the  time  that  the  controversy  began. 
It  would  be  well  to  bear  in  mind  here  the  remark 
of  Spingarn,  already  quoted,*  that  towards  the  close 
of  the  seventeenth  century  the  work  of  Dryden 
showed  the  influence  of  French  classicism.  Such 
an  influence,  he  says,  had  been  felt  to  some  extent 
for  more  than  a  century,  but  it  was  not  the  influence 
of  a  dictator.  Dryden,  it  may  be  said,  was  an  apt 
and  ready  pupil  in  the  new  school,  observing  its 
disciplinary  laws  with  a  spirit  of  obedience  somewhat 
extraordinary  in  a  man  of  such  versatility  and  talent. 
This  does  not  mean,  however,  that  he  had  no  mind 
of  his  own  with  respect  to  the  principles  of  literary 
art.  His  shifting  policy  in  regard  to  religion  might 
be  taken  as  an  indication  that  he  was  not  a  man 
of   unwavering  convictions   in   other   matters,  f     We 

*  See  page   17. 

t  In  making  this  assertion  I  do  not  mean  to  imply- 
that  there  was  a  total  lack  of  honesty  in  Dryden's  pro- 
fession of  faith  either  as  a  Protestant  or  a  Catholic.  During 
the  years  of  his  greatest  activity  as  a  man  of  letters  he 
was  subjected  to  those  influences  that  prevailed  so  power- 
fully against  the  Church  of  Rome  throughout  England. 
In  the  time  of  the  Commonwealth  he  was,  of  course,  a 
Puritan;  and  when  Cromwell  died,  he  published  his  Heroic 
Stanzas  in  memory  of  the  Protector.  Two  years  later  he 
dedicated  to  the  leader  of  the  Restoration,  King  Charles, 
a  poem  called  Astraea  Redux,  and  subsequently  he  so 
increased  his  popularity  at  court,  that  he  was  appointed 
[116] 


DRYDEN'S  IDEA  OF  TRAGEDY 

know  that  his  career  in  politics  shows  such  varia- 
tions as  might  be  expected  from  a  man  who  would 
not  allow  his  political  beliefs  to  interfere  with  his 
popularity;  we  know  that  his  admiration  for  Aris- 
totle took  a  turn  in  1693  when  he  insinuated  that 
the  Greek  critic's  conclusions  on  tragedy  were  too 
narrow,  because  the  material  on  which  he  worked 
was  limited  to  the  plays  of  Sophocles  and  Euripides;* 
we  know  that  his  respect  for  Rymer  as  a  judicious 

to  the  office  of  poet-laureate  in  1668.  At  the  time  of 'the 
accession  of  James  II.,  when  he  embraced  the  Catholic 
faith,  Dryden's  reputation  as  a  man  of  letters  had  been  well 
established.  For  some  time  he  had  .labored  in  the  field 
of  literature  with  the  purpose  of  pleasing  the  populace,  as 
he  himself  had  clearly  stated  in  his  Defence  of  1668,  and 
he  had  treated  the  critics  with  notable  deference  in  spite 
of  their  attacks  upon  him;  but  now  he  has  higher  motives 
in  what  he  writes,  a  clearer  perception  of  what  is  the  ultimate 
good  of  living,  and  less  favors  to  seek  from  critics  or  pol- 
iticians. Then,  too,  it  is  not  to  be  forgotten  that  his  wife 
and  son  had  joined  the  Catholic  Church  and  had  contributed 
their  share  to  the  influences  which  brought  about  the  change 
in  his  own  attitude  towards  religion.  At  least,  he  is  to  be 
given  the  benefit  of  any  doubt  concerning  his  honesty  in 
making  the  change,  a  view  that  is  strengthened  considerably 
when  one  remembers  that  he  did  not  forsake  the  Catholic 
faith  at  the  time  of  the  Revolution  in  1688,  when  a  return 
to  Protestantism  might  have  had  the  effect  of  retaining 
him  in  the  office  of  poet-laureate  and  historiographer  royal. 
Rather  than  be  untrue  to  his  religious  convictions,  he  sacri- 
ficed the  income  which  the  post  might  bring  him,  and  ac- 
cepted the  alternative  of  making  a  living  as  best  he  could 
without  the  special  assistance  of  royal  patronage.  It  is 
probable  that  his  conversion  to  the  Church  of  Rome  was 
characterized  by  a  degree  of  sincerity  not  to  be  discovered 
in  his  career  as  aypolitician. 

*   Dryden,    Works,   XV.,   p.   383. 
[ji 1 7  ] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE   DRAMA 

critic,  in  1678,!  had  disappeared  by  1693  when  he 
severely  excoriated  him  for  his  ill-treatment  of 
contemporary  dramatists;!  and  we  know,  also,  that 
Dryden  not  only  changed  his  views  in  regard  to  the 
use  of  the  rhyming  couplet  but  also  in  regard  to 
the  definition  of  tragedy  itself.  In  1697  he  saw 
fit  to  modify  Aristotle's  definition  of  tragedy  in 
the  following  words :  "  It  is  an  imitation  of  one 
entire,  great,  and  probable  action;  not  told  but 
represented;  which,  by  moving  in  us  fear  and  pity, 
is  conducive  to  the  purging  of  those  two  passions 
in  our  minds.  "§  Here  he  limits  the  emotions,  with 
which  tragedy  is  concerned,  to  'fear  and  pity,' 
not  'admiration,  compassion,  or  concernment,'  as 
was  the  case  in  his  remarks  on  the  subject  eleven 
years  earlier.  ||  Towards  the  end  of  his  career  as  a 
dramatist  he  adds  other  emotions  to  these  in  order 
to  make  the  idea  of  tragedy  embrace  those  new 
passions  which,  as  he  says,  the  English  writers  have 
added.  This  change  of  view  took  place  in  the  year 
1693  when  Dryden,  writing  on  the  blank  pages  of 
a  copy  of  Rymer's  Last  Age  and  Short  View,  suggested 
some  Heads  of  an  Answer  to  Rymer.  This  contribu- 
tion to  literary  criticism  was  not  actually  published 

t  Dryden,  Preface  to  All  jor  Love,  or  the  World  Well 
Lost,  in  Works,  V.,  p.  338. 

%  Dryden,  Dedication  of  the  Third  Miscellany,  in  Works, 
XII.,  pp.  55  ff.  Dryden  is  hardly  to  be  blamed  for  his 
attack  on  Rymer,  since  he  was  led  to  do  this  in  a  spirit 
of  self-defence. 

§  Preface  to  Troilus  and  Cressida,  containing  The 
Grounds    0}    Criticism   in    Tragedy,    in    Works,    VI.,    p.    260. 

I!  An  Essay  on  Dramatic  Poesy,  edited   by  W.   P.   Ker, 

*.,   P.   58. 

[118] 


DRYDEN'S  IDEA  OF  TRAGEDY 

till  ten  years  after  the  author's  death;  nevertheless, 
it  is  interesting,  because  it  shows  a  development 
in  Dryden's  idea  of  tragedy.  He  says,  "love,  being 
an  heroic  passion,  is  fit  for  tragedy,"  and,  again, 
"consider,  if  pity  and  terror  be  enough  for  tragedy 
to  move;  and  I  believe,  upon  a  true  definition  of 
tragedy,  it  will  be  found  that  its  work  extends 
farther,  and  that  it  is  to  reform  manners  by  a  de- 
lightful representation  of  human  life  in  great  persons, 
by  way  of  dialogue.  If  this  be  true,  then  not  only 
pity  and  terror  are  to  be  moved,  as  the  only  means  to 
bring  us  to  virtue,  but  generally  love  to  virtue, 
and  hatred  to  vice,  by  showing  the  rewards  of  one, 
and  punishments  of  the  other:  at  least  by  rendering 
virtue  always  amiable,  though  it  be  shown  unfor- 
tunate, and  vice  detestable,  though  it  be  shown 
triumphant.  If,  then,  the  encouragement  of  virtue, 
and  the  discouragement  of  vice,  be  the  proper  ends 
of  poetry  in  tragedy,  pity  and  terror,  though  good 
means,  are  not  the  only.  For  all  the  passions,  in 
their  turns,  are  to  be  set  in  a  ferment;  as  joy,  anger, 
love,  fear,  are  to  be  used  as  the  poet's  common- 
places and  a  general  concernment  for  the  principle 
actors  is  to  be  raised,  by  making  them  appear  such 
in  their  characters,  their  words,  and  actions,  as  will 
interest  the  audience  in  their  fortunes."*  This 
analysis  of  the  problem  in  1693  shows  a  sort  of 
return  to  his  undeveloped  views  of  1668,  and  a 
breaking  away  from  the  stricter  interpretation  of 
Aristotle  which  he  favored  in   1679. 


*   Heads   of   an   Answer   to   Rymer,   in    Works,    XV.,    pp. 
3S2   ft". 

[119] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

dryden's  early  critical  opinions 
Strictly  speaking,  the  controversy  with  which 
we  are  chiefly  concerned  had  its  beginning  with 
Addison's  attack  on  the  theory  of  poetic  justice 
when,  in  1711,  he  called  it  "a  ridiculous  doctrine 
of  modern  criticism";  but  in  order  to  determine 
what  was  the  English  idea  of  tragedy  during  the 
period  which  produced  the  conditions  that  gave 
rise  to  the  controversy,  it  is  necessary  to  take  into 
consideration,  not  only  Dryden's  critical  opinions  con- 
cerning tragedy,  but  also  those  of  Rymer,  to  whom 
was  ascribed  the  distinction  of  introducing  into 
English  literary  criticism  the  doctrine  of  poetic 
justice.  Dryden  had  entered  the  field  of  literary 
criticism  before  Rymer,  and  continued  to  fulfil 
the  office  of  literary  critic  even  after  the  publication 
of  Rymer's  Short  View.  The  volume  of  his  critical 
work  is  vastly  greater  than  that  of  Rymer,  more 
conservative  also,  and  more  helpful.  On  some 
points  he  agreed  with  Rymer.  He  treated  him  with 
the  respect  that  should  be  shown  to  a  learned  and 
distinguished  man  of  letters.  He  seemed  to  be 
satisfied  with  the  theory  of  poetic  justice  as  it  was 
expounded  by  Rymer,  and  he  made  it  a  point  to 
exhibit  the  workings  of  the  theory  in  the  tragedies 
which  he  wrote.  But  these  are  generalizations. 
It  is  well  to  take  up  the  detailed  analysis  of  Dryden's 
more  important  critical  observations  and  show  the 
development  of  his  views  concerning  the  ethical 
function  of  poetry. 

Dryden's  first  conception   of  the  drama  seems 
to  have  been  that  it  was  merely  a  picture  of  life, — 
very  much  like  that  of  Dr.  Johnson  who,  a  century 
[  120] 


DRYDKN'S  EARLY  OPINIONS 

later,  wanted  the  drama  to  hold  up  the  mirror  to 
nature.  That  Dryden  held  this  opinion  is  the 
easiest  conclusion  to  draw  from  his  Prologue  to 
The  Wild  Gallant  which  was  first  acted  in  1663. 
"  Nature,"  he  says,  "is  old,  which  poets  imitate."* 
The  Prologue  to  the  Rival-Ladies,  a  comedy,  published 
in  1664,  shows  that  he  is  willing  to  be  classed  among 
those  whose  policy  was  censured  by  both  Plato 
and  Aristotle,  for  he  admits  that  the  poet  is  "  Bound 
to  please,  not  write  well."f  This,  of  course,  indicates 
that  he  does  not  worry  himself  about  the  ethical 
value  of  poetry.  By  the  year  1667  he  is  beginning 
to  take  his  work  more  seriously  and  to  look  to  the 
artistic  s!de  of  poetry  with  more  concern.  It  was 
in  that  year  that  he  published  The  Indian  Emperor, 
a  play  with  which  he  himself  was  particularly  well 
pleased.  "The  story  of  the  Indian  Prince,"  he  says 
in  the  Dedication  of  the  play,  "is,  perhaps,  the 
greatest  which  was  ever  represented  in  a  poem  of 
this  nature, — the  action  of  it  including  the  discovery 
and  conquest  of  a  new  world.  In  it  I  have  neither 
wholly  followed  the  truth  of  the  history,  nor  altogether 
left  it;  but  have  taken  all  the  liberty  of  a  poet,  to 
add,  to  alter,  or  diminish,  as  I  thought  might  best 
conduce  to  the  beautifying  of  my  work;  it  being 
not  the  business  of  the  poet  to  represent  historical 
truth,  but  probability." J  This  was  the  play  from 
which  Rymer  selected  a  passage  seven  years  later 
to  show  the  superiority  of  Dryden  over  the  .poets 
of  France,   Italy,  and  Greece. 


*   Dryden,    Works,   II.,   p.    30. 

t   Ibid.,   II.,  p.   141.  J   Ibid.,   II.,   p.   228, 

[12!    ] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

In  the  year  1668  Dryden  made  his  first  formal 
admission  that  it  is  the  business  of  the  poet  to 
instruct.  This  admission  appeared  in  A  Defence  of 
an  Essay  of  Dramatic  Poetry  being  an  answer  to  the 
Preface  of  the  Great  Favourite,  or  the  Duke  of  Lerma, 
which  was  published  with  the  second  edition  of  the 
Indian  Emperor.  He  acknowledges  that  he  himself 
endeavors  "to  please  the  people,"  for  such  "ought 
to  be  the  poet's  aim,"  but  he  adds  this  further  remark 
that  "  Moral  truth  is  the  mistress  of  the  poet  as 
much  as  of  the  philosopher;  poesy  must  be  ethical."* 
This  Defence  was  preceded  in  the  same  year,  1668, 
by  An  Essay  on  Dramatic  Poesy,  to  which  attention 
must  be  called,  for  the  reason  that  it  shows  how 
nearly  Dryden  understood  Aristotle's  use  of  the 
word  purgation  in  reference  to  the  emotions  of  pity 
and  fear,  and  on  the  other  hand  how  great  was  his 
mistake  in  thinking  that  Aristotle  referred  to  other 
emotions.  On  this  point  see  our  discussion  of  the 
term  katharsis  at  the  end  of  Chapter  I.  Dryden 
wrote  as  follows :  "  The  end  of  tragedies  or  serious 
plays,  says  Aristotle,  is  to  beget  admiration,  com- 
passion, or  concernment;  but  are  not  mirth  and 
compassion  things  incompatible?  And  is  it  not 
evident  that  the  poet  must  of  necessity  destroy  the 
former  by  intermingling  of  the  latter?  That  is, 
he  must  ruin  the  sole  end  and  object  of  his  tragedy, 
to  introduce  somewhat  that  is  forced  in,  and  is 
not  of  the  body  of  it.  Would  you  not  think  that 
physician  mad,  who  having  prescribed  a  purge, 
should  immediately  order  you  to  take  restringents 
upon  it?  "t  Evidently  Dryden  realizes  that  a 
*  Ibid.,  II.,  p.  303.  f  Essays,  Ker's  Edition,  I.,  p.  58. 
[  122] 


DRYDEN  ACCEPTS  THE   DOCTRINE 

pathological  effect  is  intended  by  the  Aristotelian 
purgation  of  the  emotions.  Such  an  interpretation 
is,  of  course,  correct,  and  agrees  with  that  of  Milton 
whose  opinion  on  the  same  subject  was  published 
three  years  later,  1671,  in  the  Preface  to  Samson 
Agonistes. 

DRYDEN    ACCEPTS    THE    DOCTRINE    OF    POETIC    JUSTICE. 

We  now  come  to  that  time  in  Dryden's  career 
when  he  takes  the  theory  of  poetic  justice  into 
account.  There  is  no  mistaking  what  he  means. 
He  is  dealing  directly  and  unequivocally  with  poetic 
justice,  though  he  does  not  use  the  technical  expres- 
sion, and  in  this  he  is  considerably  in  advance  of 
Rymer  to  whom  has  been  ascribed  the  distinction 
of  introducing  the  doctrine  into  English  literary 
criticism.  When  Dry  den  took  up  the  question  in 
the  Preface  to  An  Evenings  Love;  or  the  Mock 
Astrologer,  a  comedy,  in  1671,  Rymer  had  not  thought 
of  translating  Rapin's  Reflections,  for  the  simple 
reason  that  they  had  not  been  written;  and  seven 
years  were  to  elapse  before  he  would  at  all  distinguish 
himself  as  an  advocate  of  poetic  justice. 

Dryden's  Mock  Astrologer — that  is  the  name  by 
which  it  is  usually  known — had  been  acted  on  the 
public  stage  three  years  before  it  was  printed. 
It  had  been  subjected  to  some  criticism  which  Dryden 
thought  to  be  unfair,  and  for  this  reason  he  wrote 
a  defence  in  his  preface.  It  seems  that  the  leading 
characters  in  the  drama  were  debauched  persons, 
and  that,  in  spite  of  their  wickedness,  they  suffered 
no  misfortune  or  punishment  for  their  sins,  but 
on  the  contrary  participated  in  the  happy  ending  of 

[  123] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE   DRAMA 

the  play.  Those  who  called  attention  to  this  feature 
of  the  Monk  Astrologer  seemed  to  base  their  objection 
on  the  principle  that  it  is  a  law  of  comedy  that  virtue 
should  be  rewarded  and  vice  should  be  punished. 
In  answer  to  this  objection  Dryden  says  that  he 
knows  "  no  such  law  to  have  been  constantly  observed 
in  comedy,  either  by  the  ancient  or  modern  poets."* 
He  then  goes  on  to  cite  illustrations  in  support  of 
his  contention.  But  he  does  not  end  the  discussion 
with  arguments  of  this  kind;  he  goes  a  step  farther 
and  accounts  for  the  error  of  his  critics  by  saying 
that  they  made  no  distinction  between  the  rules 
of  comedy  and  those  of  tragedy.  "  In  tragedy," 
he  says,  "  where  the  actions  and  persons  are  great, 
and  the  crimes  horrid,  the  laws  of  justice  are  more 
strictly  observed;  and  examples  of  punishments 
to  be  made,  to  deter  mankind  from  the  pursuit  of 
vice."t 

Here  we  have  a  very  clear  and  concise  enun- 
ciation of  the  doctrine  of  poetic  justice.  Nothing 
in  Rymer  is  more  acceptable  than  this  as  a  declaration 
in  favor  of  the  application  of  the  principle  to  tragedy. 
Dryden,  it  is  true,  points  out  instances  in  which  he 
discovers  that  the  law  is  violated  among  the  ancients, 
as  for  instance  the  case  of  Oedipus  who  was  punished 
for  a  crime  "he  knew  not  he  had  committed  "J,  and 
Medea  who  escaped  "  from  punishment  after  murder  " ; 
but  these  are  the  only  exceptions  to  the  rule  which 
he  seems  to  remember,  in  consequence  of  which  he 
admits  that  such  cases  "  have  been  rare  among  the 
ancient  poets."     This  is,  indeed,  a  remarkable  con- 

*    Works,    III.,    p.    246. 
f   Ibid.,  III.,  p.   248.  %   Ibid. 

[J124] 


DRYDEN   ACCEPTS  THE   DOCTRINE 

tribution  to  literary  criticism,  not  only  because  it 
affords  us  a  very  striking  argument  against  the 
proposition  that  Rymer  was  the  English  author 
of  the  doctrine  of  poetic  justice,  but  also  because  it 
considers  the  subject  in  a  more  formal  way  than 
Rymer  ever  did  or  any  other  critic  who  wrote  on 
the  subject  before  the  famous  controversy  arose 
between  Dennis  and  Addison.  Before  laying  this 
notable  document  aside,  attention  is  to  be  called 
to  the  fact  that  Dryden  comes  to  the  conclusion,  that 
the  end  of  tragedy  is  chiefly  to  instruct,  that  of 
comedy   to   delight.* 

In  1672  his  disposition  to  assign  to  poetry  a 
moral  function  develops  along  new  lines.  In  that 
year  he  published  a  new  edition  of  Tyrannic  Love 
with  a  Preface  in  which  he  makes  this  observation: 
"  I  considered  that  pleasure  was  not  the  only  end  of 
poesy;  and  that  even  the  instructions  of  morality 
were  not  so  wholly  the  business  of  a  poet,  as  that 
the  precepts  and  examples  of  piety  were  to  be 
omitted.  For  to  leave  that  employment  altogether 
to  the  clergy,  were  to  forget  that  religion  was  first 
taught  in  verse. "f  We  can  notice  here  that  he  is 
departing  more  from  the  position  he  assumed  a  few 
years  earlier  when  the  instructive  office  of  poetry 
was  almost  entirely  ignored  in  his  plays.  He  has 
now  entered  the  period  when  he  is  ready  to  make  an 
apology  if  he  does  not  teach  a  helpful  lesson  by  means 
of  the  spectacle  presented.  He  is  even  ready  to 
defend  himself  if  any  one  accuses  him  of  violating 
the  law  of  poetic  justice.  We  have  already  noted 
that  he  made  such  a  defence  in  1671.     But  now,  in 

*   Ibid.,    III.,    p.    376. 

[125] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

1672,  he  adopts  new  tactics.  He  does  not  plead 
that  the  law  should  not  apply  to  comedy, — he  has 
written  a  tragedy  and  endeavors  to  show  that  he 
has  not  violated  the  law,  his  critics  to  the  contrary. 
He  even  points  out  the  peculiar  construction  of  his 
plot  whereby  he  succeeds  in  having  the  punishment 
of  the  crime  of  his  protagonist  "  immediately  succeed 
its  execution."*  Then,  too,  he  pleads  not  only  for 
his  own  play  but  for  the  general  defence  of  the 
doctrine,  when  he  says  that  if  it  sometimes  happens 
that  a  play  fails  to  exhibit  an  adequate  distribution 
of  punishments  and  rewards,  this  must  not  be  taken 
"  to  be  an  argument  against  the  art  any  more  than 
the  extravagances  and  impieties  of  the  pulpit,  in 
the  late  time  of  rebellion,  can  be  against  the  office 
and  dignity  of  the  clergy,  "t 

In  1678  Dryden  makes  a  very  formal  act  of 
faith  in  the  ancient  masters,  as  may  be  discovered 
in  his  Preface  to  All  for  Love,  or  the  World  Well  Lost, 
A  Tragedy.  He  had  just  read  Rymer's  discussion 
of  the  works  of  Beaumont  and  Fletcher,  and  he 
seemed  to  be  favorably  impressed  by  the  positon 
which  was  taken  by  this  patron  of  poetic  justice. 
There  appeared  to  be  no  doubt  in  his  mind  that  the 
Greek  models  should  be  followed  along  the  lines 
which  Rymer  had  pointed  out.  He  admits  that  he 
had  accepted  the  practice  of  the  ancients  as  the 
standard  by  which  All  for  Love  was  to  be  judged. % 
He  recognizes  specifically  the  principle  that  the  hero 
must  be  neither  perfect  in  virtue  nor  altogether 
wicked;     and,   of  course,   he   studiously   avoids   any 

*  Ibid.,  III.,  p.  378.  f  Ibid.,  III.,  p.  377. 

t  Ibid.,  V.,  p.  326. 
[126] 


DkYDEN  ACCEPTS  THE  DOCTRINE 

important  violation  of  the  doctrine  of  poetic  justice, 
as  may  be  obesrved  in  the  reading  of  the  play. 

The  Grounds  of  Criticism  in  Tragedy  was  published 
in  1679  as  a  portion  of  the  Preface  to  Troilus  and 
Cressida.  Three  of  the  topics  which  he  discusses 
in  this  Preface  are  worthy  of  particular  mention. 
The  first  is  the  relation  which  should  exist  between 
the  ethical  and  the  aesthetical;  the  second  concerns 
the  character  of  the  protagonist  in  so  far  as  he  may 
be  the  means  of  arousing  the  emotions;  the  third 
is  his  erroneous  interpretation  of  Aristotle's  defini- 
tion of  tragedy.  In  the  first  place,  he  holds  that 
the  general  end  of  all  poetry  is  to  "  instruct  delight- 
fully."* In  this  he  shows  a  development  of  opinion; 
eleven  years  earlier  he  ascribed  no  ethical  value  to 
comedy.  Now  he  makes  it  the  business  of  all  poetry 
to  instruct.  His  use  of  the  adverb  "delightfully" 
is  explained  in  his  own  words:  "Philosophy,"  he 
says,  "instructs,  but  it  performs  its  work  by  precept; 
which  is  not  delightful,  or  not  so  delightful  as 
example."!  The  second  topic  which  we  pointed  out 
dealt  with  the  means  of  arousing  the  emotions. 
He  argues,  under  this  head,  that  not  only  should  the 
chief  character  be  so  far  removed  from  the  realm 
of  real  villainy  as  to  be  somewhat  amiable,  in  order 
that  the  spectators  may  have  some  concernment  for 
his  sufferings,  but  also  that  it  is  the  business  of  the 
poet  to  depend  almost  wholly  on  this  one  character 
for  the  effect  intended  upon  the  emotion.  %  In 
this  he  comes  closer  to  the  opinion  of  Aristotle  than 
did    his    contemporary    Rymer,    who    made    it    his 

*   Ibid.,   VI.,   p.    262.  f   Ibid. 

t   Ibid.,  VI.,  p.   269. 
[  127  ] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

business  to  neglect  none  of  the  characters  of  the 
play,  but  to  see  that  in  so  far  as  possible  all  should 
be  treated  with  poetic  justice  and  thus  contribute 
their  share  to  the  agitation  of  the  emotions.  In 
discussing  the  third  topic,  Dryden  falls  into  an  error 
of  interpretation,  with  Rapin  for  a  guide.  The 
passage  in  which  this  error  occurs  follows  closely 
upon  his  explanation  of  the  expression,  "  to  instruct 
delightfully,"  and  contains  the  implied  admission 
that  he  accepts  the  view  of  Rapin.  "To  purge 
the  passions  by  example,"  he  says,  "is  therefore  the 
particular  instruction  which  belongs  to  tragedy. 
Rapin,  a  judicious  critic,  has  observed  from  Aris- 
totle, that  pride  and  want  of  commiseration  are  the 
most  predominant  vices  in  mankind;  therefore  to 
cure  us  of  these  two,  the  inventors  of  tragedy  have 
chosen  to  work  upon  two  other  passions,  which  are 
fear  and  pity."* 

How  erroneous  is  Rapin's  interpretation  of 
Aristotle  may  be  realized  when  one  considers  that 
Aristotle  did  not  regard  hardness  of  heart  as  one  of 
the  "predominant  vices  of  mankind,"  but  rather 
I  judge,  a  virtue  to  be  partially  acquired;  nor  did  he 
propose  to  strengthen  the  emotions  of  pity  and 
fear;  nor,  again,  did  he  intend  that  the  agitation 
of  these  emotions  should  act  as  a  purgative  for  the 
removal  of  the  opposite  kind  of  emotions.  Aris- 
totle intended  to  effect  the  purgation  of  these  two 
emotions  themselves,  as  was  proved  in  Chapter  I., 
and  in  this  he  probably  aimed  at  the  same  ultimate 
end  as  did  his  preceptor,  Plato,  who  desired  that 
men  should  be  free  from  the  coward-breeding  violence 

*  Ibid.,  VI.,  p.  262. 

[128] 


DRYDEN  ACCEPTS  THE   DOCTRINE 

of  the  emotions  of  pity  and  fear,  in  order  to  be  good 
citizens. 

Evidently  this  theory  which  Dryden  supported 
in  1679  is  different  from  that  which  he  advocated  in 
1668.  We  have  already  referred  to  what  he  said  at 
that  time;*  but  we  must  add  this  reflection,  that 
when  he  objected  to  the  intermingling  of  the  emotions 
of  admiration  and  compassion,  or,  as  he  also  ex- 
pressed it,  mirth  and  compassion,  he  did  so  because 
he  thought  that  since  they  were  of  a  contrary  nature, 
one  would  act  upon  the  other  as  a  restringent  upon 
a  purgative.  He  had  not  yet  discovered  that  Aris- 
totle named  the  kindred  emotions  of  pity  and  fear. 

The  year  1690  shows  Dry  den's  attempt  to  surpass 
the  ancient  masters  in  the  precise  observance  of 
Rymer's  theory  of  poetic  justice.  Strictly  speaking, 
the  theory  is  not  Rymer's,  though  Dryden  refers 
to  him  as  he  would  to  an  authority.  Dryden  himself, 
as  we  have  seen,f  had  accepted  all  the  essentials 
of  the  theory  years  before  it  was  formally  defended 
by  Rymer.  Moreover,  he  now  attempts  to  show 
how  he  eliminates  from  his  Don  Sebastian  the  mistake 
which  he  pointed  out  in  the  Oedipus  of  Sophocles 
in  1 67 1.  Like  Oedipus,  his  protagonist  is  guilty 
of  incest,  and  like  Oedipus  he  committed  the  offence 
unknowingly;  but  unlike  Oedipus,  he  escapes  serious 
misfortune  in  the  conclusion  of  the  play. J  To  put 
Don  Sebastian  to  death  would  have  been  the  easiest 
thing  to  do;    but,  as  Dryden  pointed  out,  it  would 

*  Loc.  cit.  p.  122.  f  Toe.   cit.   p.    123. 

X  Blindness  and  banishment  are  the  punishments  which 
are  meted  out  to  the  hero  in  Oedipus  Tyrannus,  death  in 
the  Oedipus  Coloneus. 

[  129] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

have  been  "  the  least  artful;  because,  as  I  have  some- 
where said,  the  poison  and  the  dagger  are  still  at 
hand  to  butcher  a  hero  when  a  poet  wants  the 
brains  to  save  him."*  Arguing  further  in  favor 
of  the  disposition  which  he  makes  of  his  protagonist, 
he  points  to  his  innocence,  and  says  "it  was  un- 
reasonable to  have  killed  him;  for  the  learned  Mr. 
Rymer  has  well  observed,  that  in  all  punishments 
we  are  to  regulate  ourselves  by  poetical  justice; 
and  according  to  those  measures,  an  involunatry 
sin  deserves  not  death;  from  whence  it  follows  that 
to  divorce  himself  from  the  beloved  object,  to  retire 
into  a  desert,  and  deprive  himself  of  a  throne,  was 
the  utmost  punishment,  which  a  poet  could  inflict, 
as  it  was  also  the  utmost  reparation  which  Sebastian 
could  make."t 

This  treatment  of  unintentional  crime  was  a 
new  departure  in  Dryden's  dramatic  writings;  the 
subject,  however,  was  not  new.  He  had  actually 
made  a  tragedy  of  the  famous  story  of  Oedipus  in 
1679;  but  he  neglected  to  rectify  there  the  mistake 
which  he  pointed  out  eight  years  previously  in  his 
Preface  to  the  Mock  Astrologer.  Though  in  1571  he 
thought  it  was  against  the  principle  of  poetic  justice 
to  have  Oedipus  suffer  for  a  crime  of  which  he  was 
morally  innocent,  and  though  he  still  held  to  the 
same  opinion  in  1690  when  he  defended  his  catas- 
trophe in  Don  Sebastian,  it  appears  somewhat  strange 
that  he  did  not  attempt  to  give  us  a  practical  appli- 
tion  of  his  theory  when  he  himself  wrote  the  play 
which    he    has    called    Oedipus.     There,    instead    of 

*   Dryden,   Works,  VII.,  p.  311. 
f   Ibid.,  VII.,  p.   312. 

[  1 3o  ] 


SUMMARY  OF  DRYDEN'S  VIEWS 

following  his  own  approved  principle  of  poetic 
justice,  he  heaps  misery  upon  the  hero,  very  much 
after  the  manner  of  Sophocles,  and  ends  the  play 
with  the  suicidal   act  of  Oedipus. 

A    SUMMARY    OF    DRYDEN'S   VIEWS. 

Here  we  may  begin  to  bring  to  a  close  our 
account  of  Dryden's  essays  in  literary  criticism.  We 
have  not  considered  them  all;  neither  have  we  con- 
sidered any  of  them  completely.  It  was  merely 
necessary  to  show  in  what  way  his  opinions  had  a 
bearing  upon  the  ethical  functions  of  poetry.  We 
have  shown  how  there  was  a  development  in  these 
opinions,  particularly  with  regard  to  the  question 
whether  or  not  it  is  the  chief  aim  of  the  poet  to 
please.  This  particular  phrase  of  his  theory  of 
poetry  shows  a  sort  of  irregular  development  in 
favor  of  the  ethical  view.  In  1664  he  declares 
that  the  poet  is  "  bound  to  please,  not  to  write 
well."*  In  1668  he  declares  that  "poesy  must  be 
ethical. "f  In  1671  he  seems  to  limit  this  require- 
ment to  tragedy 4  In  1679  he  makes  it  the  business 
of  all  poetry  to  "instruct  delightfully. "§  In  1692 
he  expresses  his  opinion  again  in  an  essay  on  the 
Original  and  Progress  of  Satire  ;\\  this  time  he  makes 
it  certain  that  in  his  judgment  instruction  is  the 
only  end  of  poetry,  but  he  maintains  that  this  end 
can  not  be  realized  unless  the  instruction  be  given 
pleasingly.  What  he  says  is  this:  "They  who  will 
not  grant  me,   that  pleasure  is  one  of  the  ends  of 

*  Loc.   cit.    p.    121.  f   Loc.  cit.   p.    122. 

I   Loc.   cit.   p.    124.  §   Loc.   cit.   p.    127. 

||   Dryden,   Essays,   Ker's  Edition,   II.,   p.    112. 

[131] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

poetry  but  that  it  is  only  a  means  of  compassing 
the  only  end,  which  is  instruction,  must  yet  allow, 
that  without  the  means  of  pleasure,  the  instruction 
is  but  a  bare  and  dry  philosophy."* 

His  uncertainty  regarding  the  effect  of  tragedy 
upon  the  emotions  has  been  made  apparent.  The 
mistake  into  which  he  fell,  in  thinking  that  Aristotle 
considered  admiration  as  one  of  the  emotions  proper 
to  tragedy,  was  the  cause  of  some  of  this  uncertainty, 
since  he  could  not  understand  how  any  intensity 
of  feeling  could  be  produced  by  contrary  emotions 
in  the  same  play.  This  difficulty  presented  itself 
to  his  mind  in  1668.  In  1679  he  shows  that  he 
understands  better  what  were  the  emotions  to  which 
Aristotle  refers,  namely,  pity  and  fear, — though  he 
thinks  these  are  a  purgative  for  pride  and  want  of 
commiseration.  The  latest  of  his  variations  of 
judgment  in  regard  to  this  question  appears  in  the 
Heads  of  An  Answer  to  Rymer,  in  1693.  This, 
properly  speaking,  is  not  a  formal  expression  of 
opinion.  Dryden  did  not  write  for  publication,  he 
merely  made  a  few  notes  on  the  blank  pages  of  a 
copy  of  Rymer's  Tragedies  of  the  Last  Age.  The 
document  may  be  taken,  however,  as  an  indication 
of  Dryden's  opinions  in  1693,  and  here  it  is  that  we 
find  him  ready  to  advance  a  theory  entirely  at 
variance  with  that  of  1668.  He  no  longer  finds  it 
difficult  to  conceive  of  contrary  emotions,  and  he 
goes  to  the  other  extreme  of  thinking  that  it  may 
be  the  business  of  tragedy  to  arouse  all  the  emotions 
in  turn,   "as  joy,  anger,  love,  fear."f 

This  document,  called  Heads  of  An  Answer  to 

*   Ibid.  f   I*oc-   cit-    P-    *'9- 

[132] 


SUMMARY  OF  DRYDEN'S  VIEWS 

Rymer,  is  worthy  of  more  than  passing  attention, 
not  only  because  it  helps  us  to  form  a  correct  judg- 
ment on  Dryden's  theory  of  poetry,  but  also  because 
it  throws  the  searchlight  of  critical  inspection  upon 
Dryden's  own  contemporary  and  friend,  in  whom 
we  are  particularly  interested,  Thomas  Rymer. 
One  of  the  conclusions  to  be  drawn  from  the  document 
is  this,  that  Dryden  indirectly  argues  against  the 
proposition  that  Aristotle's  idea  of  tragedy  embraced 
the  doctrine  of  poetic  justice.  He  holds  that  "if 
the  encouragement  of  virtue,  and  discouragement 
of  vice,  be  the  proper  ends  of  poetry  in  tragedy, 
pity  and  terror,  though  good  means,  are  not  the 
only."*  We  know,  however,  that  Aristotle  was 
careful  to  refer  only  to  the  emotions  of  pity  and 
fear,  those  that  Plato  mentioned.  It  seems  reason- 
able, then,  to  suppose  that  he  was  not  seeking  for 
such  emotions  as  would  produce  the  moral  effect 
of  making  men  love  virtue  and  hate  vice.  If  the 
selection  of  the  emotions  were  to  be  made  for  that 
purpose,  why  did  he  not  select  those  other  emotions 
which  Dryden  maintains  will  tend  to  this  same  end 
if  the  spectacle  conform  to  the  law  of  poetic  justice? 
There  is  another  point  which  Dryden  makes 
regarding  the  question  of  poetic  justice.  It  is  this: 
he  believes  it  possible  to  make  the  villain  exces- 
sively bad  without  violating  the  law  referred  to. 
He  argues  that  even  though  Rollo  commits  many 
murders,  poetic  justice  will  not  suffer,  because  "  we 
stab  him  in  our  minds  for  every  offence  which  he 
commits. "f     In    this,    of    course,    he    differs    from 

*   Dryden,   Works,  XV.,  p.   383. 
t   Ibid.,   XV.,   p.    387. 

[i33] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

Rymer.  Finally,  let  Dryden  declare  himself  once 
more  in  regard  to  the  "ridiculous  doctrine,"  of  his 
contemporary :  "  the  punishment  of  vice  and  reward 
of  virtue  are  the  most  adequate  ends  of  tragedy."* 

rymer's  first  contribution  to  literary  criticism. 

Thomas  Rymer  was  born  in  1641,  and  died  in 
1 713.  His  education  prepared  him  for  the  practice 
of  law;  but  in  this  field  of  activity  he  won  no  distinc- 
tion, chiefly  for  the  reason  that  he  felt  he  had  a 
talent  for  literary  work.  Consequently  he  abandoned 
his  profession  as  a  barrister  and  devoted  his  talents 
to  literary  criticism  and  history.  His  first  appearance 
as  an  author  occurred  in  the  year  1668 — the  year 
of  the  publication  of  Dryden's  Defence  of  an  Essay 
of  Dramatic  Poesy — when  he  published  a  translation 
of  a  Latin  anthology  from  Cicero's  works,  and  called 
it  Cicero's  Prince.  Next  in  order  came  his  transla- 
tion of  Rapin's  Reflections  on  Aristotle's  Treatise  of 
Poesie,  published  in  1674  with  a  Preface  by  the 
translator.  In  1678  he  published  a  drama  called 
Edgar,  and  his  famous  essay  entitled  The  Tragedies 
of  the  Last  Age.  The  drama,  written  to  illustrate 
his  idea  of  tragdey,  was  republished  in  1691  and  again 
in  1692.  It  was  not  acted.  Addison  regarded  it 
as  a  typical  failure,  f  Besides  this  he  wrote  some 
poetry  and  a  considerable  number  of  volumes  dealing 
with  problems  of  history  and  archaeology.  In  1693 
his  contributions  to  literary  criticism  appear  to  come 
to  an  end  with  the  publication  of  a  work  entitled 
A  Short  View  of   Tragedy.     It   is    not    evident    that 

*  Ibid.,  XV.,  p.  390. 
f  Spectator,   No.   692. 

[i34] 


RYMER'S  FIRST  CONTRIBUTION 

he  made  any  defence  against  the  excoriation  which 
he  received  from  Dryden  soon  after  the  publication 
of  the  Short  View. 

Let  us  proceed,  then,  to  an  investigation  of 
Rymer's  views  of  tragedy.  The  preface  to  his 
translation  of  Rapin's  Reflections  is  the  source  to 
which  we  must  turn  for  the  earliest  expression  of  his 
doctrines  in  literary  criticism.  It  can  hardly  be 
said  that  this  work  is  of  much  value  as  an  illustration 
of  his  idea  of  tragedy.  However,  it  will  not  be  out 
of  place  to  present  a  summary  of  the  essay.  First 
of  all,  he  observes  that  France  and  Italy  are  far  ahead 
of  England  as  regards  learning;*  then,  referring  to 
the  end  of  the  sixteenth  century,  he  says,  "At  this 
time  with  us  many  great  Wits  flourished;  but  Ben. 
Johnson,  I  think,  had  all  the  Critical  Learning  to 
himself;  and  till  of  late  years,  England  was  as  free 
from  critics,  as  it  was  from  Wolves, f  that  a  harmless 


*   Preface  in  Rapin's   Works,   II.,   p.    109. 

f  The  truth  of  this  assertion  is  quite  apparent  to 
any  one  who  investigates  the  critical  work  of  the 
first  half  of  the  seventeenth  century.  How  to  account 
for  this  is  a  problem  in  itself.  During  the  first  three  quarters 
of  the  sixteenth  century  peotry  had  a  life  and  death  struggle 
so  far  as  the  drama  was  concerned;  and  even  after  that  the 
poets  were  somewhat  handicapped  by  the  prejudice  of 
Puritanism.  In  consequence  of  this  and  for  other  reasons, 
we  notice  that  several  writers  came  forward  as  defenders 
of  the  Art  of  Poetry.  Soon  they  gained  the  ascendency, 
and  the  drama  achieved  immortal  triumphs  in  the  work 
of  Shakespeare.  In  consequence,  we  observe  that  the  policy 
of  defence  was  abandoned  and  the  poets  rested  in  apparent 
security.  This  tranquility  lasted  till  the  time  of  the  Civil 
War  and  triumph  of  Puritanism,  as  a  result  of  which  the 
theatre    was   closed,    to    be   reopened    again   in    the    time    of 

[i35] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

well  meaning  Book  might  pass  without  any  danger. 
But  now  this  Priviledge,  whatever  extraordinary 
Talent  it  requires,  is  usurped  by  the  most  Ignorant: 
And  they  who  are  least  acquainted  with  the  Game, 
are  aptest  to  Bark  at  everything  that  comes  in  their 
way."*  He  then  considers  Aristotle  in  the  light 
of  a  literary  dictator  and  seems  to  take  it  as  a  matter 
of  course  that  poets  should  "blindly  Resign"  to 
the  "  Practice  of  the  Ancients "  which  Aristotle 
"reduced  to  principles. "f  Next  he  makes  a  passing 
comment  on  Rapin's  complaint  that  the  English 
people  are  "delighted  with  cruel  things,"  admitting 

*  Rapin's  Works,  II.,  p.  1 10.  Shortly  before  the  time 
when  Rymer  made  these  remarks,  Davenant,  Hobbes, 
Fleeknoe,  Shadwell,  Milton  and  Dryden  had  made  obser- 
vations concerning  literary  art.  It  is  hard  to  tell  whether 
or  not  he  refers  to  any  of  these.  Rymer  was  at  the  time 
thirty-three  years  of  age.  Davenant  was  dead  six  years, 
Hobbes  was  eighty-six,  Fleeknoe  was  more  than  fifty, 
Shadwell  was  about  thirty-two,  Milton  was  sixty-four,  and 
Dryden  was  forty-three.  It  is  possible  that  some  more 
obscure  writers  may  have  fallen  under  the  lash  of  his  crit- 
icism. His  language  is  quite  revere  to  be  used  in  the  second 
paragraph  of  his  first  published  utterance  as  a  literary 
critic. 

t   Ibid.,  p.   ii.  , 

the  Restoration.  It  then  happened  that  the  influence  of 
French  classicism  began  to  be  felt  in  England,  and  this 
in  turn  contributed  its  share  to  the  revival  of  literary 
criticism.  It  is  also  to  be  remarked  that  the  practice  of 
writing  prefaces  became  popular  during  this  period,  and 
these  in  themselves  constitute  a  considerable  body  of  critical 
commentary.  Dryden  took  notice  of  this  innovation  and 
designated  it  as  a  borrowing  from  the  French.  Such  a 
practice  was  not  popular  in  the  time  of  Shakespeare,  a  fact 
that  we  have  some  reason   to  regret. 

[i36] 


RYMER'S  FIRST  CONTRIBUTION 

that  "  on  our  stage  are  more  murders  than  on  all 
the  Theatres  in  Europe,"  and  suggesting  that  the 
makers  of  tragedy  try  to  discover  whether  the  cause 
rests  with  themselves  in  their  idea  of  art  or  with  the 
people.*  Following  this,  Rymer  summarizes  Rapin's 
opinions  about  the  characteristics  of  language, 
commenting  in  sequence  on  the  adaptability  of 
English,  Italian,  French  and  German  to  the  uses  of 
poetry. t  He  then  takes  up  Rapin's  conclusions 
about  English  writers  and  offers  his  own  opinions 
on  the  subject,  praising  Spencer  as  "  the  first  of 
our  Heroick  Poets,"  but  complaining  that  "he 
wanted  a  true  Idea  "J  and  blaming  the  Italian 
influence  for  "  Debauching  great  Spencer's  Judg- 
ment" by  leading  him  to  be  guilty  of  the  "Vice  of 
those  times"  which  was  "to  affect  Superstitiously 
the  Allegory. "§  Sir  William  Davenant  is  the  subject 
of  a  discussion  in  which  there  is  both  praise  and 
blame;  and,  by  way  of  parenthesis,  it  is  worth 
while  drawing  special  attention  to  this  character- 
istic of  Rymer's  first  work  as  a  critic,  since  the 
contrary  was  the  case  in  his  later  commentaries  on 
the  work  of  English  dramatists.  There  is  hardly 
a  word  of  praise  to  be  found  in  all  that  he  said  about 
Beaumont  and  Fletcher,  Ben  Johnson,  Shakespeare, 
or  any  of  the  other  great  playwrights  whom  he 
condescended  to  notice.  So  extremely  one-sided 
was  his  criticism  that  it  has  been  called  brutal. 
To  return  to  our  summary :  his  remarks  on  Davenant 
revealed  his  partiality  for  the  rhyming  couplet  and 
his   dislike   of  the   quatrain.  ||  Cowley   receives   a   bit 

*   Ibid.,   p.    ii2.  f   Ibid.,  p.   113.         J   Ibid.,    p.    114. 

§   Ibid.,   p.    115.  ||   Ibid.,  p.   117. 

[i37] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

of  praise  and  a  proportionate  amount  of  blame; 
one  of  Cowley's  offences  consisted  in  this,  that  he 
chose  a  subject  which  on  account  of  its  historical 
character  kept  him  too  "strictly  ty'd  up  to  the 
Truth."  He  then  quoted  Aristotle  against  the  use 
of  history  in  poetry.*  Cowley  was  also  accused  of 
violating  the  law  which  calls  for  unity  of  action. 
Finally,  Rymer  draws  his  long  preface  to  a  close 
by  instituting  a  contest  in  poetry  on  the  description 
of  night.  He  assembles  his  contestants  from  Greece 
and  Italy  and  France  and  England.  Apollonius 
Rhodius  sings  for  the  Greeks,  Virgil  for  the  Latins, 
Tasso  for  the  Italians,  Marino  for  the  French,  Dryden 
for  the  English.!  And  Dryden  wins  the  contest.  Is  it 
not  strange  that  Dryden  should  ever  be  so  provoked 
as  to  become  unfriendly  to  Rymer?  The  break  in 
friendship  did  come,  but  both  men  had  advanced 
nineteen  years  in  experience,  in  judgment,  and  in 
the  knowledge  of  each  other's  faults.  This  tribute 
to  Dryden  was  the  last  item  of  critical  opinion  in 
Rymer 's  first  contribution  to  literary  criticism,  and 
it  is  probable  that  it  had  the  effect  of  making  Dryden 
susceptible  in  a  very  special  degree  to  the  influence 
of  French  classicism  of  which  Rymer  was  the 
exponent. 

A  concluding  wOrd  may  be  said  in  regard  to  the 

*  Ibid.,   p.    i  tS. 

f  Rymer  does  not  mention  Dryden's  name  or  give 
direct  indication  of  the  authorship  of  his  selection.  A  passage 
of  five  lines  is  quoted  from  The  Conquest  of  Mexico,  and  the 
reader  of  the  present  day  is  supposed  to  know  that  this 
is  the  subtitle  of  Dryden's  play  which  is  called  The  Indian 
Emperor,  and  that  the  verses  are  to  be  found  at  the  begin- 
ning of  Act   III.,  Scene  II. 

['38] 


RAPIN'S  INFLUENCE  ON   RYMER 

Preface  to  Rapin's  Reflections .  It  is  remarkable  for 
this,  that  it  contains  no  direct  critical  opinion  that 
might  lead  us  to  determine  what  was  Rymer's  idea 
of  tragedy.  Most  of  his  observations  are  based  upon 
a  somewhat  unscientific  conception  of  heroic  poetry 
in  general.  He  has  not  yet  reached,  in  his  develop- 
ment as  a  critic,  that  stage  which  shows  him  to  be 
a  confirmed  fault-finder.  He  has  entered  a  period 
of  formation,  he  has  made  himself  somewhat  familiar 
with  what  the  French  think  of  poetry,  and  he  needs 
time  to  apply  their  principles  to  the  English  drama. 
Rapin's  Reflections  were  to  help  him  towards  some 
independence  of  thought,  the  evidence  of  which 
he  was  to  exhibit  to  the  world.  Rapin's  Reflections 
were  to  have  an  influence  also  upon  Dryden.  For 
these  two  reasons  it  is  quite  proper  that  we  analyze 
these  Reflections  before  proceeding  to  the  discussion 
of  Rymer's  Tragedies  of  the  Last  Age.  We  can 
really  regard  the  Reflections  as  embodying  Rymer's 
critical  opinions  at  the  time,  for  we  have  his  commen- 
tary on  them  in  the  form  of  a  preface — the  contents 
of  which  have  been  set  forth — and,  with  that  as  a 
guide,  we  can  determine  to  what  extent  he  took 
exception  to  the  French  exposition  of  matters 
pertaining  to  poetry. 

RAPIN'S    INFLUENCE    ON    RYMER. 

Rene  Rapin,  French  Jesuit,  a  theologian  and 
litterateur,  was  in  some  respects  a  contemporary  of 
Rymer.  He  was,  however,  more  properly  a  con- 
temporary of  Milton,  for  he  was  born  at  Tours  in 
1 612    and    died   at    Paris   in    1678.     Taine   mentions 

[139] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

him  in  his  History  of  English  Literature*  as  one  of 
those  who  influenced  Dryden,  and  Taine's  translator 
refers  to  him  as  a  critic  who  is  "completely  -for- 
gotten, "f  Many  of  the  histories  of  French  literature 
neglect  to  give  any  account  of  him.  Nevertheless, 
as  we  shall  see,  he  exercised  a  considerable  influence 
upon  English  literature  in  his  own  life-time.  This 
influence  was  felt  not  only  in  the  critical  writing  of 
Rymer,  Dennis,  Gildon  and  Dryden,  but  also  in 
Dryden's  plays.  It  is  true,  however,  that  other 
French  influences  were  also  at  work  in  much  the 
same  direction;  for,  as  Taine  observes,  Dryden  was 
familiar  with  the  writings  of  Corneille,  Racine, 
Boileau  and  Bossu.J 

The  Reflections  on  Aristotle's  Poesie  were  first 
published  by  the  author  in  1674,  an<3  in  the  same 
year  they  were  translated  into  English  by  Rymer. 
The  work  is  divided  into  two  sections,  one  of  which 
treats  the  subject  in  general,  the  other  in  particular. 
In  Rapin's  generalizations  on  Aristotle  the  first 
thing  that  strikes  us  is  the  importance  which  he 
attaches  to  the  theory  that  the  drama  must  serve 
a  useful  purpose.  This,  it  may  be  observed,  has  a 
direct  bearing  upon  the  theory  of  poetic  justice. 
It  is  true  that  poetic  justice  is  that  principle  of 
dramatic  art  which  calls  for  a  proper  distribution 
of  rewards  and  punishments  within  the  action  of 
the  play,  and  that  it  is  a  question  among  critics 
whether  a  moral  effect  can  be  produced  by  any  drama 
which  ignores  this  principle.  The  advocates  of  the 
principle  of  poetic  justice  at  the  end  of  the  seventeenth 

*  Taine,   History  of  English  Literature,   II..   p.   3. 
t  Ibid.  %  Ibid. 

[  140] 


RAPIN'S  INFLUENCE  ON  RYMER 

century  and  the  beginning  of  the  eighteenth  seem 
to  be  one  of  the  opinion  that  the  moral  effect  is 
produced  only  by  means  of  a  strict  distribution  of 
rewards  and  punishments.  And  inasmuch  as  this 
was  the  opinion  they  held,  we  are  justified  in  presum- 
ing that  any  effort  of  contemporaneous  critics  to 
ascribe  to  the  drama  the  office  of  a  teacher  of  morality 
might  be  easily  construed  by  them  to  be  an  argument 
in  their  favor.  Those  who  were  opposed  to  the 
doctrine  of  poetic  justice  were  at  liberty  to  start 
with  the  proposition  that  it  is  the  chief  function  of 
poetry  to  please,  and  they  might  so  interpret  Aris- 
totle as  to  have  his  opinion  give  weight  to  theirs. 
They  might  be  wrong  in  making  such  an  interpreta- 
tion of  the  language  of  the  Greek  master,  and  they 
would  be  told  they  were  wrong  They  would  be 
told  that  Aristotle  gave  to  poetry  an  ethical  function 
and  that  the  question  of  giving  pleasure  was  second- 
ary. That  such  a  thing  was  possible  may  be  gathered 
from  Chapter  VII.  of  Rapin's  generalizations  on  the 
Poetics.  "The  Interpreters  of  Aristotle,"  he  says, 
"differ  in  their  Opinions.  Some  will  have  the  End  to 
be  Delight,  and  that  'tis  on  this  Account  it  labours 
to  move  the  Passions,  all  whose  motions  are  Delightful, 
because  nothing  is  more  sweet  to  the  Soul  than 
Agitation;  it  pleases  it  self  in  changing  the  Objects, 
to  satisfy  the  Immensity  of  its  Desires.  'Tis  true, 
Delight  is  the  end  Poetry  aims  at,  but  not  the 
principal  End,  as  others  pretend.  In  effects,  Poetry 
being  an  Art,  ought  to  be  profitable  by  the  quality 
of  its  own  nature,  and  by  the  essential  Subordination 
that  all  Arts  should  have  to  Polity,  whose  end  in 
general  is  the  public  Good.     This  is  the  Judgment 

[141] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

of  Aristotle,  and  of  Horace  his  chief  Interpreter."* 
The  foregoing  passage  has  been  quoted  not  only 
to  show  that  Rapin  was  aware  of  certain  disagree- 
ments among  the  interpreters  of  Aristotle,  but  also 
to  show  the  first  step  in  his  progress  towards  a 
declaration  touching  very  clearly  on  the  doctrine 
of  poetic  justice.  This  first  step  and  the  others 
that  follow  it  may  be  indicated  by  certain  propositions 
which  illustrate  Rapin's  line  of  argument.  First, 
he  explains  in  substance  the  disagreement  of  the 
critics  in  their  interpretation  of  Aristotle,  f  He 
then  indicates  that  he  himself  regards  the  conser- 
vation of  the  public  good  as  the  chief  end  of  poetry.  J 
At  the  same  time  he  holds  that  it  is  the  design  of 
poetry  to  delight§,  modifying  his  statement  by 
asserting  again  that  "  the  principal  end  of  Poesie  is 
to  profit"  |  and  assuring  us  that  "For  no  other 
end  is  Poetry  delightful  than  that  it  may  be  Profit- 
able."^] Here  he  attempts  to  show  how  this  profitable 
effect  may  be  produced.  Two  things  are  to  be 
considered,  namely,  the  manner  of  instruction  and 
the  matter  of  instruction.  With  regard  to  the  first 
he  shows  that  since  man's  nature  does  not  readily 
submit  to  the  precepts  of  morality,  an  effort  must  be 
made  to  overcome  this  difficulty  by  means  similar 
to  those  used  by  a  physician  who  mingles  "  Honey 

*  Rapin,  II.,  p.  141.  To  say  that  Horace  was  the 
chief  interpreter  of  Aristotle  is  to  go  a  step  too  far.  A 
considerable  body  of  literary  criticism  had  grown  up  between 
the  time  of  Aristotle  and  Horace,  and  it  is  a  question  whether 
or  not  Horace  was  at  all  acquainted  with  the  Poetics  of 
Aristotle. 

f   Ibid.,    p.    141.  t   Ibid.  §   Ibid. 

||   Ibid.,  p.    142.  %   Ibid.,  p.   143. 

[142] 


RAVIN'S  INFLUENCE  ON   RYMER 

with  the  medicine,  to  take  of  the  Bitterness";* 
in  other  words,  the  poet  must  make  the  dose  pleasant. 
Moreover,  he  asserts  that  the  poet  can  not  produce 
the  desired  moral  effect  unless  his  own  morals  are 
pure, — "  the  Muses  of  true  Poets  are  as  chaste  as 
Vestals." 

It  is  clear,  therefore,  that  there  must  be  a 
moral  lesson  and  that  this  lesson  must  be  presented 
in  a  pleasing  manner  by  a  worthy  teacher.  Rapin 
next  proceeds  to  show  what  that  lesson  should  be. 
It  is  unquestionably  a  lesson  which  illustrates  the 
doctrine  of  poetic  justice  as  it  was  advocated  by 
Rymer  four  years  later.  The  passage  is,  for  this 
reason,  so  important  that  it  should  be  quoted.  Rapin 
writes  as  follows:  "All  Poetry,  when  'tis  perfect, 
ought  of  necessity  to  be  a  public  Lesson  of  good 
Manners,  for  the  Instruction  of  the  World.  Heroick 
Poesie  proposes  the  Examples  of  great  Vertues  and 
great  Vices,  to  excite  Men  to  abhor  these,  and  to 
be  in  love  with  the  other:  It  gives  us  an  Esteem  for 
Achilles  in  Homer,  and  Contempt  for  Thersites: 
it  begets  in  us  a  Veneration  for  the  Piety  of  Aeneas 
in  Virgil,  and  Horror  for  the  Profaneness  of  Mezentius. 
Tragedy  rectifies  the  use  of  Passions,  by  moderating 
our  Fear,  and  our  Pity,  which  are  Obstacles  of 
Virtue;  it  lets  men  see  that  Vice  never  escapes 
Unpunished,  when  is  represents  ^Egysthus  in  the 
Electra  of  Sophocles,  punished  after  the  Ten  years 
Enjoyment  of  his  Crime.  It  teaches  us,  that  the 
Favours  of  Fortune,  and  the  Grandeurs  of  the  World, 
are  not  always  true  Goods,  when  it  shews  on  the 
Theatre,  a  Queen  so  unhappy  as  Hecuba  deploring 
*  Ibid. 

[i43] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

with  that  Pathetic  Air  her  Misfortunes  in  Euripides. 
Comedy,  which  is  an  Image  of  common  Conversation, 
corrects  the  publick  Vices,  by  letting  us  see  how 
ridiculous  they  are  in  particular."* 

Just  here  it  is  well  to  call  to  mind  what  was 
the  conception  of  poetic  justice  a  few  years  later 
when  Dennis  told  Addison  who  it  was  that  originated 
the  doctrine.  Ascribing  the  authorship  of  the 
doctrine  to  Aristotle,  he  based  his  opinion  on  a 
passage  in  the  Poetics  which  speaks  of  "  a  catastrophe 
favorable  to  the  Good  and  fatal  to  the  Wicked,  "f 
Addison  understood  what  was  meant  by  the  doctrine 
before  waiting  for  his  opponent's  explanation,  for 
he  had  described  it  as  a  current  law  of  the  drama 
that  required  tragedy  writers  to  free  the  good  from 
their  troubles  and  punish  the  wicked  for  their  wrong- 
doing before  bringing  their  plays  to  an  end.  X  Such 
was  the  idea  of  poetic  justice  thirty-seven  years 
after  the  time  when  Rymer  translated  Rapin's 
Reflections,  and  it  does  not  seem  that  the  idea  had 
changed  much  in  that  time.  It  had  received  the 
distinction  of  a  name  in  1678  when  Rymer  used  it 
as  a  principle  of  criticism  in  The  Tragedies  of  the 
Last  Age,  but  the  doctrine  was  not  new  to  him, 
neither  did  he  argue  as  one  who  thought  that  Beau- 
mont, Fletcher,  Jonson  or  Shakespeare  were  to  be 
excused  for  ignorance  of  such  a  law.  He  did  not 
take  to  himself  the  credit  of  discovering  the  law, 
nor  did  he  assert  that  literary  criticism  in  England 
had  not  yet  come  to  the  knowledge  that  such  a 
law    existed.     He    merely    took    the    dramatists    to 

*   Ibid.,   pp.    143-144.  f   Loc.  cit.  p.   5. 

X  Loc.  cit.  p.  2. 

[  144] 


RAPIN'S  INFLUENCE  ON  RYMER 

task,  and  he  pursued  that  task  with  a  vigor  that 
verged  on  ferocity.  He  certainly  regarded  their 
errors  as  unpardonable,  though  their  writings  had 
been  produced  a  hundred  years  before  his  time. 
It  is  not  surprising,  therefore,  that  Rymer  should 
take  Rapin's  remarks  on  poetic  justice  as  a  matter 
of  course  and  not  point  in  particular  to  the  above- 
quoted  passage  in  the  Reflections  as  his  authority 
for  a  new  and  wonderful  doctrine. 

Rapin  argued  for  poetic  justice  in  tragedy,  and 
his  argument,  as  we  see,  became  a  part  of  English 
literary  criticism,  by  adoption,  in  the  year  1674. 
What  Dennis  meant  when  he  said  that  Rymer  was  the 
first  who  introduced  the  doctrine  into  our  language,* 
or  what  Professor  Lounsbury  meant  when  he  reached 
the  same  conclusionf,  I  am  not  prepared  to  say; 
but  what  they  should  have  meant  is  this,  that  if 
it  may  be  in  any  way  imputed  to  Rymer  that  he 
introduced  the  doctrine  of  poetic  justice  into  English 
Literature,  such  imputability  originated  when  he 
published  his  translation  of  Rapin's  Reflection  on 
Aristotle's  Poesie.  This  work  may  have  been  the 
first  in  which  Rymer  found  an  expression  of  the 
doctrine.  Rapin  knew  the  principle  of  dramatic 
art  which  has  been  called  poetic  justice,  and  took 
occasion  to  show  how  effective  it  was  in  Greek 
tragedy.  He  says  distinctly  of  tragedy,  in  the  very 
first  sentence  that  deals  with  tragedy  by  name:  "it 
lets  men  see  that  Vice  never  escapes  Unpunished."! 

It  must  be  admitted,  however,  that  Rapin 
did  not  take  as  narrow  a  view  of  poetic  justice  as 

*  Loc.  cit.  p.  64.  t  Loc.  cit.  p.  65. 

%   Loc.   cit.    p.*  143 

[i45l 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

was  taken  by  Ryraer,  Dennis  and  other  extremists. 
Among  these  may  be  mentioned  the  American 
Commentator  on  Shakespeare, .  Denton  J.  Snider, 
who  argues  that  Desdemona  suffers  death  in  Othello 
because  she  was  a  wicked  woman,  inasmuch  as  she 
committed  the  offence  of  marrying  one  who  was 
not  of  her  race.*  It  is  probable  that  Rapin  did  not 
think  Desdemona  had  committed  a  crime  for  which 
death  should  be  the  penalty,  and  at  the  same  time 
it  is  not  likely  that  he  regarded  her  death  as  a  violation 
of  the  doctrine  of  poetic  justice.  We  must  remember 
that  according  to  his  philosophy  of  life,  "  the  Favours 
of  Fortune,  and  the  Grandeurs  of  the  World,  are 
not  always  true  Goods,  "f  and  on  this  principle  he 
approves  of  the  misfortunes  of  Hecuba.  From  this 
it  can  be  argued  that  Virtue  and  Innocence  are  not 
treated  with  poetic  injustice  when  they  sometimes 
suffer  misfortune,  and  even  death,  and  that  the 
law  of  poetic  justice  is  more  effectively  and  artistic- 
ally conserved  and  illustrated  by  such  a  catastrophe 
if  it  can  be  shown  that  the  unfortunate  and  unhappy 
are  actually  rewarded,  not  by  the  "favors  of  fortune" 
but  by  the  "  true  Good."  Such  a  method  of  reasoning 
has  not  been  overlooked  by  critics  who  see  poetic 
beauty  in  Desdemona's  death  and  Cordelia's  death 
and  in  the  tragic  sufferings  of  some  other  Shake- 
spearean characters;  and,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  this 
line  of  defence  has  proved  to  be  the  more  popular 
among  the  admirers  of  Shakespeare.  For  us  the 
important    observation    to    make    is    this,    that    one 

*  Snider,    The   Shakespearian    Drama.     The    Tragedies, 
pp.    88-89. 

t  Loc.  cit.  p.   143. 

[146] 


RAPIN'S  INFLUENCE  ON  RYMER 

may  consider  the  death  of  Desdemona  as  an  example 
of  poetic  justice  whether  we  believe,  with  Snider, 
that  her  death  was  a  fit  punishment  for  the  crime 
she  had  committed,  or  maintain,  with  Rapin's 
Reflections  to  guide  us,  that  her  death  was  a  real 
blessing,  a  reward  in  disguise. 

Having  set  forth  for  consideration  that  passage 
which  shows  Rapin  to  be  acquainted  with  the  idea 
embraced  by  the  expression,  poetic  justice,  and  having 
pointed  out  how  nicely  he  provides  for  such  excep- 
tional cases  as  those  cited  from  the  plays  of  Shake- 
speare, we  may  now  review  the  remaining  part  of 
the  Reflections  briefly  and  rapidly.  It  will  not  be 
necessary  to  mention  all  the  topics  he  treats;  a  few 
of  the  more  important  ones  will  be  sufficient.  Rapin 
argues  that  since  the  action  must  be  probable,  the 
Unities  of  Time,  Place  and  Action  must  be  observed,* 
that  fable  must  be  used  instead  of  historical  truth, f 
that  it  is  the  business  of  tragedy  to  make  man  proof 
against  excessive  fear  and  excessive  pity,!  that 
modern  tragedy  has  attempted  to  deal  with  other 
emotions,§  such  as  love  and  tenderness,  ||  but  without 
success;  for  these  tragedies  do  not  make  an  admirable 
impression  as  did  those  of  Sophocles  and  Euripides, 
and,  at  best,   they  last  only  a  year  or  two.^j 

These  are  the  leading  features  of  the  theory 
of  poetry  that  was  set  forth  by  Rapin  in  his  Reflections 
on  Aristotle's  Poesie.  Some  are  more  interesting 
than  others,  because  of  the  effect  which  they  produced 
on   literary   criticism    in    England    for   nearly   half   a 

*   Rapin,   II.,   p.    146.  f    Ibid.,  p.    156 

J    Ibid.,  p.   205.  §    Ibid.,    p.    209. 

||    Ibid.,    210.  1|    Ibid.,  p.   211. 

[i47] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

century.  Here  and  there  in  Dryden,  for  instance, 
are  evidences  of  such  effect.  In  his  Heads  of  an 
Answer  to  Rymer,  Dryden  discusses  the  question  of 
adding,  to  the  emotions  of  pity  and  fear,  others  such 
as  love  and  anger;  but  this  opinion  was  advanced 
so  long  after  the  publication  of  the  Reflections  that 
one  can  only  surmize  that  Rapin's  opinions  had  set 
Dryden  thinking.  It  is  unnecessary  to  follow  this 
and  other  similar  conjectures  to  any  further  issue, 
for  such  would  not  serve  the  purpose  of  this  inves- 
tigation. A  study  of  the  kind  would  be  of  value  in 
a  way,  and  interesting  too,  if  it  might  account  to 
any  considerable  extent  for  the  development  of 
Dryden's  idea  of  the  drama. 

"the  tragedies  of  the  last  age." 

Let  us  turn  again  to  Rymer.  He  had  translated 
Rapin  and  had  produced  a  critical  preface  which 
showed  to  what  extent  he  disagreed  with  the  author 
of  the  Reflections.  He  did  not  disagree  with  him 
in  any  important  particular.  He  accepted  French 
classicism  substantially  as  he  found  it  in  Rapin,* 
and  allowed  its  influence  to  work  upon  him  quietly 
for  four  years.  The  result  was,  that  he  formulated 
for  himself  a  theory  of  dramatic  art  that  made  the 
best  playwrights  of  English  literature  the  laughing 
stock   and    the   butt   of   ridicule   of   all   his   devoted 


*  Rymer  did  not  depend  entirely  on  Rapin  for  his 
knowledge  of  French  tendencies  in  literature.  His  acquain- 
tance with  the  French  language  made  it  possible  for  him 
to  read  the  works  of  all  those  French  critics  and  poets  who 
were  likely  to  preach  and  practice  whatever  was  new  in 
literary  development. 

[148] 


"TRAGEDIES  OF  THE   FAST  AGE" 

disciples.  How  numerous  these  disciples  were,  can 
be  gathered  from  the  fact  that  they  did  not  clamor 
for  the  production  of  Rymer's  Edgar,  though  it  was 
written  to  illustrate  the  practicability  of  all  the 
rules  of  tragedy  for  the  violation  of  which  he  blamed 
Shakespeare  and  the  rest.  He  published  the  play 
three  times,  but  it  was  not  acted. 

Let  us  see,  then,  what  are  the  characteristics  of 
his  idea  of  tragedy  in  the  year  1678,  when  he  first 
published  The  Tragedies  of  the  Last  Age.  The  first 
thing  to  be  observed  is  the  fact  that  the  work  contains 
a  sort  of  index  in  which  the  phrase,  poetical  justice, 
is  listed  with  five  page-references.  Here  we  have 
the  first  use  of  the  phrase  which  English  literary 
criticism  has  to  offer.  The  Index  is  called  "  The 
Contents,"  and  follows  the  title  page.*  In  this 
index  are  gathered  together  alphabetically  the 
propositions  which  most  strikingly  illustrate  Rymer's 
idea  of  Tragedy.  A  summary  of  these  propositions 
will  be  sufficient  for  our  present  purpose.  Unity  of 
action,  he  says,  is  necessary,  and  where  this  is 
observed,  "  the  Poet  can  not  easily  transgress  in 
the  unities  of  time  and  place — Historical  and  acci- 
dental truths  will  not  do  in  Tragedy — Kings  can  not 
be  accessory  to  a  crime — Man's  life  not  to  be  taken 
away  without  a  just  account — Poets  must  take  care 
that  the  Criminal  sin  not  too  far,  and  are  not  to  be 
trusted  for  an  Hell  behind  the  scenes — Wilful 
murder  not  to  be  suffer'd  in  Tragedy." 

So  much  for  "The  Contents"  of   the  book;    let 


*  I  have  not  been  able  to  consult  the  first  edition,  but 
presume  that  the  edition  of  1692  is  a  faithful  copy  of  the 
first,  as  far  as  the  Index  is  concerned. 

[  149] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE   DRAMA 

us  look  to  his  explanation  of  poetic  justice.  Referring 
to  the  plays  of  Sophocles  and  Euripides,  he  says  that 
they  taught  by  examples,  "And,  finding  in  History, 
the  same  end  happen  to  the  righteous  and  to  the 
unjust,  virtue  often  opprest,  and  wickedness  on  the 
Throne ;  they  saw  these  particular  yesterday  -  truths 
were  imperfect  and  improper  to  illustrate  the  universal 
and  eternal  truths  by  them  intended.  Finding  also 
that  this  unequal  distribution  of  rewards  and  punish- 
ments did  perplex  the  wisest,  and  by  the  atheist  was 
made  a  scandal  to  the  Divine  Providence.  They 
concluded  that  a  Poet  must,  of  necessity  see  justice 
exactly  administered,  if  he  intended  to  please."* 
The  outstanding  fact  in  these  words  of  Rymer  is 
something  else  than  a  mere  insistence  on  the  necessity 
of  poetic  justice.  He  has  already  come  to  the 
conclusion  that  poetic  justice  is  an  essential  require- 
ment of  the  drama,  and  he  proposes  to  make  a  good 
impression  at  the  start  by  presenting  his  line  of  argu- 
ment before  drawing  the  conclusion.  It  is  important 
to  observe  what  are  the  points  in  his  argument. 
First  of  all,  he  notes  that  Sophocles  and  Euripides 
objected  to  the  use  of  historical  truths  in  poetry 
because  these  truths  sometimes  represent  the  oppres- 
sion of  virtue  and  the  exaltation  of  the  wicked, — so 
Rymer  presumes  that  Sophocles  and  Euripides  were 
in  favor  of  the  idea  represented  by  poetic  justice. 
Again,  the  English  critic  ascribes  to  the  Greek  writers 
of  tragedy  the  intention  of  making  universal  and 
eternal  truths  rather  than  common  every-day  truths 
subserve  the  ends  of  poetry, — consequently  their 
idea  -of  poetry  would  be  the  direct  opposite  of  that 

*   Rymer,   The  Last  Age,  p.    14. 
[150] 


"TRAGEDIES  OF  THE  EAST  AGE" 

which  men  like  Dr.  Johnson  admire  when  they  praise 
Shakespeare  because  he  holds  the  mirror  up  to  nature. 
And  once  more,  Rymer  makes  Sophocles  and  Euripides 
object  to  any  violation  of  the  law  of  poetic  justice 
on  the  grounds  that  the  wisest  are  perplexed  by  such 
an  exhibition  of  incongruity,  and  that  the  atheist 
uses  it  as  an  argument  against  divine  providence. 
Herein  has  been  set  forth  Rymer's  first  discussion 
of  the  famous  doctrine.  He  has  barely  taken  time 
to  complete  his  introduction,  when  he  makes  a  very 
rapid  survey  of  the  beginnings  of  dramatic  art,  only 
to  show  that  the  ethical  value  of  the  drama  was 
first  recognized  by  Sophocles  and  Euripides;  and, 
going  a  step  farther,  he  seems  to  regard  this  as  the 
all-important  characteristic  of  their  writings.  He  is 
evidently  of  the  opinion  that  the  practice  of  poetic 
justice  originated  with  them  and  that  the  writers 
of  English  tragedy  made  a  great  mistake  when  they 
ignored  this  practice  of  the  ancients.  The  theory 
of  dramatic  art  which  he  thus  ascribed  to  Sophocles 
and  Euripides  became  the  guiding  principle  by 
which  he  proposed  to  pass  judgment  upon  certain 
plays  that  had  been  produced  in  the  golden  age  of 
English  Literature.  He  did  not  call  it  the  golden 
age,  though  Shakespeare  was  among  the  men  whom 
he  criticized.  He  did  not  have  a  good  word  to  say 
of  any  of  them  unless  by  comparison,  when,  at  the 
end  of  the  book,  he  says  of  Ben  Jonson's  play,  "  Let 
me  only  anticipate  a  little  in  behalf  of  the  Catiline, 
and  now  tell  my  thoughts  that  though  the  contrivance 
and  economy  is  faulty  enough,  yet  we  there  find 
(besides  what  is  borrowed  from  others)  more  of 
Poetry  and  of  Good  thought,  more  of  Nature  and  of 

[151] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

Tragedy,  then  peradventure  can  be  scrap't  together 
from  all  those  other  plays."*  What  he  thought  of 
Shakespeare  is  set  forth  near  the  end  of  his  next 
book  of  literary  criticism,  A  Short  View  of  Tragedy, 
the  first  edition  of  which  bears  the  date  of  1693. 
His  opinion  about  Shakespeare  is  there  delivered  in 
the  following  words:  "Shakespeare's  genius  lay  for 
Comedy  and  Humor.  In  Tragedy  he  appears  quite 
out  of  his  element;  and  he  raves  and  rambles,  without 
any  coherence,  any  spark  of  reason,  or  any  rule  to 
control  him,  or  set  bounds  to  his  phrenzy."f  It  is 
scarcely  to  be  wondered  at  that  the  admirers  of 
Shakespeare  should  speak  in  terms  of  contempt  in 
their  appreciation  of  Rymer  as  a  critic.  Dr.  Johnson 
says  his  criticism  exhibits  "  the  ferocity  of  a  tyrant,"  J 
but  he  admired  him  in  other  respects  and  approved 
of  his  doctrine  of  poetic  justice.  William  Warburton 
comes  to  Shakespeare's  defence  in  the  following 
words:  "In  the  Neighing  of  a  Horse  (says  Rymer), 
or  in  the  Growling  of  a  Mastiff,  there  is  a  meaning, 
there  is  a  lively  expression,  and,  may  I  say,  more 
Humanity  than  many  times  in  the  tragical  Flights 
of  Shakespeare.  The  Ignorance  of  which  censure 
is  of  a  Piece  with  its  Brutality. "§  It  is  an  interesting 
fact  that  Dry  den  could  overlook  the  attack  upon 
Shakespeare  so  long  as  his  own  dramas  were  not 
harshly   criticized.     In    1679  he   referred   to   Rymer 


*  Ibid.,    p.    143. 

f  Rymer,  A  Short   View  of  Tragedy,  p.   156. 

%  S.  Johnson,  in  Lives  0}  the  Poets,  .p  303,  in  vol.  7 
of  Works,  London,   1825. 

§  D.  N.  Smith,  Eighteenth  Century  Essays  on  Shake- 
speare,  p.    103. 

[152] 


"TRAGEDIES  OF  THE   LAST  AGE" 

as  "  My  friend"*  and  accepted  his  judgments,  saying, 
"  How  defective  Shakespeare  and  Fletcher  have  been 
in  all  their  plays,  Mr.  Rymer  has  discovered  in  his 
criticisms:  neither  can  we,  who  follow  them,  be 
excused  from  the  same  or  greater  errors,  "f  In  1690 
he  speaks  of  him  as  "the  learned  Mr.  Rymer '/'J 
but  in  1693  he  turns  against  him  in  the  Preface  to 
the  Miscellany  in  which  he  takes  exception  to  the 
critical  opinions  of  Scaliger  and  others,  and  then 
attacks  Rymer  in  the  following  fashion:  "But  there 
is  another  sort  of  insects,"  he  writes,  "  more  venomous 
than  the  former;  those  who  manifestly  aim  at  the 
destruction  of  our  poetical  church  and  state;  who 
allow  nothing  to  their  countrymen,  either  of  this 
or  of  the  former  age. — Peace  be  to  the  venerable 
shades  of  Shakespeare  and  Ben  Johnson! — I  think 
I  shall  be  able  to  defend  myself — I  leave  the  world 
to  judge,  who  gave  the  provocation."  ||  This  is 
merely  an  illustration  of  the  regard  in  which  Rymer 
was  held  by  critics.  Dryden,  it  may  be  remarked, 
so  modified  those  unfriendly  views  that  we  find  him 

*  Dryden,  Works,  Scott-Saintsbury  Edition,  vol.  VI., 
p.    258. 

t    Ibid.,   p.    264.   Preface  to  Troilus  and  Cressida. 

%  Ibid.,  Vol.  VII.,  p.  312.  Preface  to  Don  Sebastian. 
\\  Preface  to  the  Third  Miscellany,  Vol.  II.,  pp.  5-6, 
Ker  Edition.  This  bitter  attack  on  Rymer  was  occasioned 
by  certain  insinuations  contained  in  the  last  sentence  of 
the  Epistle  Dedicatory  that  was  published  with  the  Short 
View  of  Tragedy  in  1693.  Here  is  the  objectionable  passage: 
"Three,  indeed,  of  the  Epick  (the  two  by  Homer  and  Virgil's 
Aeneids)  are  reckon'd  in  the  degree  of  Perfection;  But 
amongst  the  Tragedies  only  the  Oedipus  of  Sophocles. 
That,  by  Corneille,  and  by  others  of  a  Modern  Cut,  quantum 
mutatus!" 

[i53] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

referring  at  the  end  of  his  life  to  "  our  learned  Mr. 
Rymer."* 

Poetic  justice,  then,  was  the  predominating 
principle  of  Criticism  in  The  Tragedies  of  the  Last 
Age.  Tried  by  this  principle,  Rollo,  A  King  and  no 
King,  and  the  Maids  Tragedy,  all  by  Beaumont  and 
Fletcher,  failed  miserably.  It  was  originally  Rymer's 
intention  to  treat  Shakespeare's  Othello  and  Julius 
Ccusar,  as  also  Ben  Jonson's  Catiline,  in  the  same 
manner;  but  finding  that  the  discussion  of  the 
works  of  Beaumont  and  Fletcher  was  sufficient  to 
make  a  volume  by  itself, f  he  paused  in  his  enter- 
prise,   with    the    intention    of    completing    it   later.  J 


*  Preface  to  the  Fables,  Ker,  II.  p.  249.  I  am  somewhat 
at  a  loss  to  understand  how  it  was  that  Dryden,  who  pro- 
fessedly disregarded  some  principles  of  literary  art  in  order 
to  give  the  people  what  they  wanted,  had  not  taken  personal 
offence  at  the  following  words  which  Rymer  used  in  The 
Tragedies  of  the  Last  Age  (p.  5).  "Amongst  those  who  will 
be  objecting  against  the  doctrine  I  lay  down  may  per- 
adventure  appear  a  sort  of  men  who  have  remember'd  so  and 
so;  and  value  themselves  upon  their  experience.  I  may 
write  by  the  Book  (say  they)  what  I  have  a  mind,  but  they 
Know  what  will  please.  These  are  a  Kind  of  Stage-quacks 
and  P^mpiricks  in  Poetry,  who  have  got  a  Receit  to  please." 
Dryden  had  more  than  once  declared  himself  in  regard  to 
this  matter.  He  had  done  it  in  the  Prologue  to  the  Rival- 
Ladies  in  1664,  admitting  that  he  was  "bound  to  please, 
not  write  well,"  and  again  in  1668,  in  A  Defence  oj  an  Essay 
0}  DramaUc  Poclry,  in  which  he  said;  "To  please  the  people 
ought  to  be  the  poet's  aim,  because  plays  are  made  for  their 
delight;  but  it  does  not  always  follow  that  they  are  pleased 
with  good  plays,  or  that  the  plays  which  please  are  always 
good." 

f  Last  Age,   p.    141.  %   Ibid. 

[i54] 


"TRAGEDIES  OF  THE  LAST  AGE" 

The  second  part  of  the  work  was  never  written. 
Considered  as  a  whole,  The  Tragedies  of  the 
Last  Age  is  an  argument  for  poetic  justice  by  example 
and  by  reason.  Here  and  there  throughout  the 
book  an  effort  is  made  not  only  to  show  how  Beaumont 
and  Fletcher  failed  to  observe  this  principle,  but 
also  to  illustrate  the  method  by  which  the  mistake 
could  be  rectified.  Such  an  illustration  he  makes 
in  his  discussion  of  Rollo.  He  gives  a  reconstruction 
of  the  play,  which  results  in  showing  how  the  hero 
to  whom  the  throne  of  the  kingdom  rightfully 
belongs,  loses  it  through  the  treachery  of  an  ungrateful 
villain,  by  whom  it  is  left  as  an  inheritance  to  his 
sons,  and  afterwards  regains  it  through  the  death 
of  these  two  sons.  The  problem  of  poetic  justice 
concerns  these  two  sons  in  the  matter  of  their  guilt 
and  the  manner  of  their  death.  They  are  guilty 
because  their  father  was  guilty  and  they  have 
succeeded  him  on  the  throne.  They  are  innocent 
to  a  sufficient  degree  to  be  objects  of  pity  in  the 
catastrophe.  They  are,  therefore,  neither  excessively 
good  nor  excessively  bad.  They  must  be  punished, — 
Rymer  takes  that  as  a  matter  of  course.  They  must 
die, — he  takes  that  as  a  matter  of  course.  How 
shall  they  die?  Each  by  the  hands  of  the  other. 
That  is  the  poetical  way;  for,  I  infer,  such  a  death 
would  represent  a  sort  of  reflex  of  crime  working 
against  itself;  the  father  through  one  of  his  sons 
would  avenge  his  own  crime  by  killing  the  other 
son.  Their  death  would  be  poetical  for  the  additional 
reason  that  it  would  indicate  the  mysterious  workings 
of  divine  Providence.  Their  comparative  innocence 
would  make  them  objects  of  compassion,  but  they 

[i55] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE   DRAMA 

must  not  be  entirely  innocent,  for  "  Then  no  Poetical 
Justice  could  have  touched  them:  guilty  they  were 
to  be,  in  enjoying  their  Father's  crime;  but  not  of 
committing  any  new."* 

That  is  the  way  in  which  Rymer  illustrates 
his  doctrine  of  poetic  justice.  His  argument  in 
favor  of  the  conclusion  that  may  be  drawn  from 
such  an  illustration  should  be  set  forth  in  his  own 
words,  particularly  since  the  passage  contains  certain 
expressions  that  struck  the  fancy  of  his  contem- 
poraries. His  argument  is  as  follows:  "The  Poets 
consider'd,  that  naturally  men  were  affected  with 
pitty,  when  they  saw  others  suffer  more  than  their 
fault  deserved;  and  vice,  they  thought,  could  never 
be  painted  too  ugly  and  frightful;  therefore,  whether 
they  would  move  pitty,  or  make  vice  detested,  it 
concern'd  them  to  be  somewhat  of  the  severest  in 
the  punishments  they  inflicted.  Now,  because  their 
hands  were  tied,  that  they  could  not  punish  beyond 
such  a  degree;  they  were  obliged  to  have  a  strict 
eye  on  their  Malefactor,  that  he  transgrest  not  too 
far,  that  he  committed  not  two  crimes,  when  but 
responsible  for  one:  nor,  indeed,  be  so  far  guilty, 
as  by  the  Law  to  deserve  death.  For  though 
historical  Justice  might  rest  there;  yet  poetical 
Justice  could  not  be  so  content.  It  would  require 
that  the  satisfaction  be  complete  and  full,  e're  the 
Malefactor  goes  off  the  Stage  and  nothing    left    to 

*  Ibid.,  p.  23.  "Rymer's  elaborate  directions  for 
removing  the  Romantic  offence  of  this  play,  and  adjusting 
it  to  classical  correctness  and  decorum  are  among  the  most 
involuntary  funny  things  in  Criticism."  Saintsbury,  in  A 
History  of  Criticism,   II.,   p.   394. 

[*56] 


"TRAGEDIES  OF  THE  LAST  AGE" 

God  Almighty,  and  another  world.  Nor  will  it 
suffer  that  the  Spectators  trust  the  Poet  for  a  Hell 
behind  the  scenes ;  the  fire  must  roar  in  the  conscience 
of  the  Criminal,  the  fiends  and  furies  be  conjured 
up  to  their  faces,  with  a  world  of  machine  and  horrid 
spectacles;  and  yet  the  Criminal  could  never  move 
pitty.  Therefore  amongst  the  Ancients  we  find 
no  Malefactors  of  this  kind;  a  wilful  Murderer  is 
with  them  as  strange  and  unknown,  as  a  Parricide 
to  the  old  Roman.  Yet  need  we  not  fancy  that 
they  were  squeamish,  or  unacquainted  with  any  of 
these  great  lumping  crimes  of  that  age;  when  we 
remember  their  Oedipus,  Orestes,  or  Medea.  But 
they  took  care  to  wash  the  Viper,  to  cleanse  away  the 
venom,  and  with  such  art  to  prepare  the  morsel: 
they  made  it  all  Junket  to  the  tast,  and  all  Physick 
in  the  operation."* 

In  several  respects  the  passage  just  quoted  is 
deserving  of  commentary.  One  point  in  particular, 
that  should  be  noted,  is  the  comparison  which  Rymer 
makes  between  historical  justice  and  poetic  justice. 
Elsewhere  he  explains  this  distinction  more  fully. 
Poetry,  he  holds,  is  more  severe  than  the  law  in 
searching  for  faults  in  the  conduct  of  men.  Poetry 
will  convict  them  of  crime  where  the  law  will  declare 
them  free.  Poetry  will  punish  them,  where  the  law 
will  acquit  them.  To  illustrate  this,  he  cites  the  case 
of  Orestes,  saying  that  the  poets  haunted  him  with 
the  furies  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  Areopagus 
judged  him  innocent  of  crime.  He  also  cites  the 
case  of  CEdipus  upon  whom  the  poet  heaped  misery 
and    misfortune,    while    the    "  Casuist    excus'd    his 


*   Last   Age,   pp.    25-27. 

[157] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  -THE  DRAMA 

invincible  ignorance."*  With  the  same  principle  in 
mind,  namely,  that  poetry  regards  as  a  crime  that 
which  the  law  may  excuse,  he  makes  the  point  that 
a  due  punishment  cannot  be  inflicted  on  the  villain 
unless  the  degree  of  his  guilt  is  kept  within  moder- 
ation. If  it  is  poetic  justice  to  inflict  such  punish- 
ments on  Orestes  and  Oedipus,  what  kind  of  justice 
would  it  be  to  inflict  these  same  punishments  upon 
them  if  they  had  been  guilty  in  the  fullest  sense 
before  the  law?  What  kind  of  justice  could  be  had, 
if  they  were  morally  guilty  not  only  of  the  crimes 
with  which  they  are  charged  but  also  of  other  crimes, 
serious  in  their  nature,  and  excessive  in  number? 
Rymer  does  not  make  his  inquiry  in  this  fashion, 
but  he  offers  a  solution  of  the  difficulty  here  proposed. 
He  does  not  think,  for  instance,  that  Beaumont 
and  Fletcher  have  used  the  plot  of  Rollo  in  such 
a  way  as  to  make  poetic  justice  possible.  "  We  see 
then  Rollo,"  he  says,  "fighting  with  his  own  Brother 
and  King,  equal  to  himself,  and  attempting  to 
poyson  him,  without  any  remorse;  killing  him  in 
their  mothers  arms,  without  any  provocation ;  calling 
the  Queen  their  Mother  Belldam,  and  with  drawn 
sword  threatning  to  kill  both  her  and  his  Sister, 
without  any  sense  of  honour  or  piety;  and  must  we 
not  imagine  a  Legion  of  Devils  in  his  belly?  When 
Rollo  has  murder'd  his  Brother,  he  stands  condemn'd 
by  the  Laws  of  Poetry;  and  nothing  remains  but 
that  the  Poet  see  him  executed,  and  the  Poet  is  to 
answer  for  all  the  mischief  committed  afterwards. 
But  Rollo  we  find  has  made  his  escape,  and  wo  be 
to  the  Chancellor,  to  the  Schoolmaster,  and  the 
*   Ibid.,   p.   25. 

[i58] 


"TRAGEDIES  OF  THE  LAST  AGE" 

Chancellors  Man;  for  those  are  to  be  men  of  this 
world  no  longer.  Here  is  like  to  be  Poetical  Justice, 
so  many  lives  taken  away,  and  but  the  life  of  one 
guilty  person  to  answer  for  all."* 

Rymer  felt,  of  course,  that  he  has  a  strong  case. 
He  knew  that  Aristotle  objected  to  characters  of 
excessive  badness  as  well  as  to  characters  of  perfect 
goodness.  The  authority  of  Aristotle  gave  him 
courage  to  advocate  his  principle  boldly.  More- 
over, he  was  aware  that  a  large  portion  of  the  literary 
criticism  that  had  been  produced  in  England  before 
his  time  had  been  directed  against  the  drama  because 
it  actually  depicted  criminal  conduct.  There  had 
been  at  times  too  much  suggestion  of  sensuality  in 
the  drama,  a  fault  for  which  the  plays  of  Fletcher 
were  condemned  by  Flecknojf  there  was  also  a 
disposition  among  English  playwriters  to  depict 
scenes  of  blood  to  a  degree  of  excess  which  was 
noted  by  Rapin  in  his  Reflections.  %  In  excesses  of 
this  kind,  there  was  nothing  artistic,  thought  Rymer, 
nothing  poetical,  and  very  little  chance  for  an  exact 
distribution  of  justice. 

The  fact  that  Rymer  allowed  for  "  no  hell 
behind  the  scenes,"  making  it  necessary  that  the 
criminal  should  receive  his  punishment  in  full  before 
the  play  ended,  was  another  argument  against 
excessive  guiltiness.  When  such  excess  actually 
occurred  in  the  real  world  outside,  the  capital  punish- 
ment inflicted  by  the  state  did  not  constitute  the 
entire  punishment  which  the  offender  was  to  suffer. 


*   Ibid.,   p.    37. 

f   Spingarn,   Critical  Essays,   II.,   p.   94. 

J    Last  Age,   p.    24. 

[  159] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

For  him  there  still  was  the  torment  of  the  life  here- 
after. Since,  therefore,  this  latter  kind  of  punishment 
could  not  be  exhibited  in  the  play,  a  corresponding 
amount  of  wickedness  ought  to  be  eliminated  from 
the  character  that  was  to  suffer.  If  the  protagonist 
is  to  cause  the  death  of  another,  the  act  must  be 
so  modified  that  it  can  not  be  classed  as  wilful  murder. 
If  the  crime  is  to  be  such  an  offence  as  that  which 
Oedipus  committed,  it  must  be  done  blindly.  If 
Rollo  and  Otto,  brothers  in  the  play  which  goes  by 
the  name  of  the  first,  must  kill  each  other,  as  Rymer 
suggests  by  way  of  revision,  they  must  "  unavoidably 
clash  against  each  other;  whilst  their  proper  inclina- 
tion in  vain  strives  against  the  violence."*  Crime 
can  be  punished  only  to  a  limited  extent  on  the 
stage,  and  if  the  offender  is  made  excessively  wicked, 
it  will  be  impossible  for  the  dramatist  to  put  in 
practice  the  law  of  poetic  justice.  Likewise  there 
could  be  no  poetic  justice  if  the  characters  were  all 
perfectly  good. 

It  is  clear,  then,  that  Aristotle's  objection  against 
excessive  vice  and  perfect  virtue  in  the  drama  is 
also  vigorously  supported  by  Rymer, — but  for  a 
special  reason;  he  sees  in  it  an  argument  for  poetic 
justice.  Dryden,  who  published  his  preface  to  All 
for  Love,  or  the  World  Well  Lost,  A  Tragedy,  in  the 
same  year  that  Rymer  published  the  opinions  above 
attributed  to  him,  touches  the  same  problem,  but  in 
a  manner  more  in  keeping  with  the  language  and 
meaning  of  Aristotle;  he  says,  "All  reasonable  men 
have  long  since  concluded,  that  the  hero  of  the  poem 
ought  not  to  be  a  character  of  perfect  virtue,  for 
*  Last  Age,  p.   24. 

[160I 


"TRAGEDIES  OF  THE   LAST  AGE" 

then  he  could  not,  without  injustice,  be  made 
unhappy;  nor  yet  altogether  wicked,  because  he 
could  not  then  be  pitied."*  There  is  here,  also,  a 
suggestion  of  the  dogma  of  poetic  justice  as  may 
be  noted  in  the  use  of  the  word  'injustice;'  but  the 
more  important  suggestion  is  contained  in  the  word, 
'pitied.'  Dryden  is  thinking  of  Aristotle's  definition 
of  tragedy  and  bases  his  objection  on  that  part  of 
the  definition  which  calls  for  a  purgation  of  the 
emotions  of  pity  and  fear.  At  any  rate,  Dryden 
holds  that  the  suffering  hero  should  be  virtuous 
enough  to  be  pitied  in  his  sufferings.  Even  here 
we  can  follow  Dryden  a  step  farther  to  show  that 
his  opinion  might  not  be  in  conflict  with  that  of 
Rymer;  for  the  arousing  of  pity  is  accomplished  by 
punishing  the  hero  more  than  he  deserves  according 
to  standards  of  civil  law, — and  such  is  the  thing 
that  Rymer  calls  poetic  justice. 

That  vice  is  not  to  be  depicted  unless  in  such 
a  way  as  to  create  a  sense  of  pity  or  terror,  is  elearlv 
the  opinion,  not  only  of  Dryden,  but  also  of  Rymer. 
The  discussion  of  Rollo  was  largely  concerned  with 
an  exposition  of  the  doctrine  of  poetic  justice;  this 
is  followed  by  a  discussion  of  A  King  and  no  King, 
another  of  the  plavs  of  Beaumont  and  Fletcher. 
In  this  case  Rymer  drops  the  question  of  poetic 
justice;  but  not  entirely.  His  most  important 
observations  concerning  the  play  show  that  the 
principle  of  poetic  justice  is  for  him  a  basic  principle,,; — 
at  times  even  the  very  expressions  he  uses  refer 
clearly  to  the  principle  itself.  Such  is  the  case, 
lor  instance,  when  he  says,  "  We  are  to  presume  the 

*    Dryden,    Works,   V.,   p.    326. 
[161] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

greatest  virtues,  where  we  find  the  highest  of 
rewards."*  In  this  case,  our  attention  is  called 
to  the  fact,  not  merely  that  virtue  should  be 
rewarded,  but  that  reward  should  be  in  exact  propor- 
tion to  the  merit. 

That  the  hero  should  not  be  altogether  wicked 
is  the  principal  theme  in  Rymer's  analysis  of  A 
King  and  no  King.  He  holds  that  the  criminal  act 
of  the  hero  must  be  portrayed  in  such  colors  and 
surrounded  by  such  circumstances  that  its  enormity 
may  not  prevent  the  spectator  from  pitying  him  in 
his  sufferings.  He  observes  that  in  the  writing  of 
the  ancients  "  Orestes  kill'd  his  Mother,  Hercules  his 
wife  and  Children,  Agamenmon  his  Daughter";  but 
he  shows  in  what  way  these  crimes  lose  the  quality 
of  malice,  for  he  describes  the  first  as  an  act  of 
justice,  the  second  as  an  act  of  frenzy,  and  the  last 
an  act  of  religion.  "These,"  he  says,  "were  all 
Tragedies  unhappy  in  the  catastrophe.  And  the 
business  so  well  prepared,  that  every  one  might 
see,  that  these  worthies  had  rather  have  laid  violent 
hands  on  themselves,  had  not  their  will  and  choice 
been  over-rul'd.  Every  step  they  made,  appear'd 
so  contrary  to  their  inclinations,  as  all  the  while 
shew'd  them  unhappy,  and  render'd  them  the  most 
deserving  of  pity  in  the  World,  "f  By  calling  atten- 
tion to  the  way  in  which  the  subject  of  murder  was 
treated  in  classical  antiquity,  Rymer  affords  an 
argument  for  .one  of  his  objections  to  A  King  and 
No  King.  Another  of  his  objections  he  sustains, 
by  showing  how  the  masters  treated  incestuous  love, 

*  Rymer,  Last  Age,  p.  61. 
t  Ibid.,  pp.   74-75- 

[162] 


"TRAGEDIES  OF  THE  LAST  AGE" 

taking  "it  in  the  fall  as  it  rowls  down  headlong  to 
desperation  and  misery."* 

In  the  third  part  of  The  Tragedies  of  the  Last 
Age,  Rymer,  in  discussing  the  Maids  Tragedy,  lays 
down  a  set  of  rules  that  are  remarkable  for  the  narrow 
ness  they  display.  One  of  these  is  that  a  man  shall 
not  be  killed  by  a  woman,  a  master  by  his  servant, 
or  a  King  by  his  subject,  neither  can  the  reverse 
of  these  actions  take  place.  "  Poetical  decency," 
he  says,  "  will  not  suffer  death  to  be  dealt  to  each 
other  by  such  persons,  whom  the  Laws  of  Duel 
allow  not  to  enter  the  lists  together."!  He  makes 
a  distinction  between  epic  poetry  and  tragedy  to 
the  effect  that  whereas  enemies  may  kill  one  another 
in  the  former,  "  In  Tragedy  all  the  clashing  is  amongst 
friends,  no  panegyrick  is  designed,  nor  ought  intended 
but  pitty  and  terror:  and  consequently  no  shadow 
of  sense  can  be  pretended  for  bringing  any  wicked 
persons  on  the  Stage. "J  But  he  can  not  set  forth 
his  conclusions,  drawn  from  a  study  of  A  King  and 
No  King,  without  asserting  in  favor  of  poetic  justice, 
that  "  Poetry  will  not  permit  an  affront,  where 
there  can  be  no  reparation,"  and  arguing  that  the 
King  and  Amintor  should  be  made  to  kill  each  other; 
for  "  then  poetical  Justice  might  have  had  its  course, 
though  no  way  could  pity  be  due  to  either  of  them."§ 

Rymer's  opinion  about  the  three  plays  which 
he  criticized  in  The  Tragedies  of  the  Last  Age  is 
summarized  in  the  assertion  that  they  contain 
"Monsters  enough  for  one  Bartholomew -fair."  ||     In 

*   Ibid.,   p.    76.  f  Ibid.,  p.   117. 

X   Ibid.,   p.    120.  §   Ibid.,   p.    126. 

||  Ibid.,  p    142. 

[163] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

other  words,  he  has  come  to  the  conclusion  that  the 
wickedness  of  the  characters  depicted  by  Beaumont 
and  Fletcher  is  out  of  proportion  with  any  punishment 
which  it  is  in  the  province  of  tragedy  to  inflict; 
therefore,  it  is  impossible  that  in  these  cases  the  law 
of  poetic  justice  should  be  observed.  The  fault  does 
not  seem,  in  his  judgment  to  be  peculiar  to  these 
two  writers  alone;  rather  does  it  seem  that  the 
fault  is  general  and  that  it  is  to  be  accounted  for  by 
the  fact  that  the  poets  of  England  neglected  the 
study  of  Aristotle. 

RYMER'S   CRITICISM    OF    SHAKESPEARE. 

A  Short  View  of  Tragedy  was  Rymer's  next 
work  in  literary  criticism.  What  appears  to  be  the 
first  edition  bears  the  date  1693;  nevertheless  the 
book  was  published  in  1692,  as  appears  evident  from 
the  fact  that  in  December  of  that  year  it  was  reviewed 
by  Motteux  in  the  Gentleman's  Journal.  This  work 
is  by  no  means  so  important  as  its  predecessor.  In 
Chapter  I.  the  author  presents  the  outline  of  an 
ideal  tragedy  dealing  with  "  the  memorable  Adven- 
ture of  the  Spaniards  in  88  against  England"*  and 
suggests  that  "  Mr.  Dryden  might  try  his  Pen  on 
this  Subject. "f  Chapter  II.  is  largely  devoted  to 
an  attempt  to  describe  the  function  of  poetry.  "  In 
the  days  of  Aristophanes,"  he  says,  "it  was  on  all 
hands  agreed,  that  the  best  Poet  was  he  who  had 
done  the  most  to  make  men  vertuous  and  serviceable 
to  the  Publick."J  The  next  chapter  sets  forth 
the  hostile  attitude  of  Christian  Rome  to  plays  and 

*  Rynicr,  Short   View,   p.    13. 

t  Ibid.,    17.  %  Ibid.,  21. 

[164] 


RYMKR'S     CRITICISM     OF     SHAKESPEARE. 

players.  In  the  same  chapter  he  mentions  other 
objections  that  arose  in  Plato's  time,  and  some 
that  prevailed  in  England.  Chapter  V.  is  devoted 
to  the  history  of  poetry  in  Italy,  France  and  England. 
In  Chapter  VI.  he  gives  further  consideration  to  the 
history  of  English  poetry.  Chapter  VII.  consists 
chiefly  of  a  tirade  against  Shakespeare,  with  Othello 
as  a  horrible  example.  In  the  next  chapter,  the  last, 
a  further  attack  is  made  on  Shakespeare  because  of 
the  mistakes  which  occur  in  Julius  Cccsar. 

To  classify  Rymer's  objections  to  these  two  plays 
of  Shakespeare  would  be  in  itself  a  difficult  task. 
He  follows  the  plays  with  a  running  commentary 
that  makes  note  of  an  endless  variety  of  errors, — 
there  is  not  a  word  of  praise.  To  illustrate :  he  quotes 
Desdemona's  "  O  good  Iago,  What  shall  I  do  to  win 
my  Lord  again?"  and  sneeringly  remarks,  "No 
Woman  bred  out  of  a  Pig-stye,  could  talk  so  meanly."* 

Poetic  Justice  is  dealt  with  only  in  a  passing 
way  in  the  Short  View.  Certain  passages,  however, 
have  a  bearing  upon  the  doctrine.  That  which 
Denton  J.  Snider  regards  as  the  crime  for  which 
Desdemona  must  be  punished  is  pointed  out  by 
Rymer  as  part  of  her  punishment  for  some  unknown 
offence.  He  does  not  think  she  has  done  a  wrong 
for  which  she  can  be  punished.  Snider  thought 
that  she  committed  a  crime  when  she  married  a 
man  not  of  her  race;|  Rymer  thinks  that  the  marriage 
itself  is  a  calamity,  a  sort  of  punishment,  but  he  does 
not  know  the  crime  which  preceded  it.  "  We  may 
ask  here,"  he  says,  "what  unnatural  crime  Desde- 
mona, or  her  Parents  had  committted,  to  bring  this 

*   Ibid  ,131.  |   Loc.   cit.    p.    146. 

[165] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

Judgment  down  upon  her;  to  Wed  a  Black-amoor, 
and  innocent  to  be  thus  cruelly  murder'd  by  him. 
What  instruction  can  we  make-  out  of  this  Catas- 
trophe? Or  whither  must  our  reflection  lead  us? 
Is  not  this  to  envenome  and  sour  our  spirits,  to  make 
us  repine  and  grumble  at  Providence;  And  the 
government  of  the  World?  If  this  be  our  end,  what 
boots  it  to  be  vertuous?"*  The  end  of  the  play 
strikes  Rymer  as  a  horrible  example  of  "blood  and 
butchery;"!  then,  too,  it  exhibits  a  wholesale  viola- 
tion of  the  law  of  poetic  justice,  for  he  says,  "  Our 
Poet  against  all  Justice  and  Reason,  against  all 
Law,  Humanity  and  Nature,  in  a  barbarous  arbitrary 
way,  executes  and  makes  havock  of  his  subjects, 
Hab-nab,  as  they  come  to  hand.  Desdemona  dropt 
her  Handkerchief;  therefore  she  must  be  stifl'd. 
Othello,  by  law  to  be  broken  on  the  wheel,  by  the 
Poets  cunning  escapes  with  cutting  his  own  Throat. 
Cassio,  for  I  know  not  what,  comes  off  with  a  broken 
shin.  Iago  murders  his  benefactor,  Roderigo,  as 
this  were  poetical  gratitude.  Iago  is  not  yet  kill'd, 
because  there  yet  never  was  such  a  villain  alive. 
The  Devil,  if  once  he  brings  a  man  to  be  dip't  in  a 
deadly  sin,  lets  him  alone,  to  take  his  course:  and 
now  when  the  Foul  Fiend  has  done  with  him,  our 
wise  authors  take  the  sinner  into  their  poetical 
service;  there  to  accomplish  him,  and  do  the  Devils 
drudgery."! 


*  Rymer,  Short  View,  pp.   137-138. 

t  Ibid.,  p.  139. 

t  Ibid.,  pp.  139-140. 

V166] 


VIEW  OF  RYMER'S   OPINIONS. 
A    GENERAL    VIEW    OE    RYMER'S    OPINIONS. 

A  summary  of  Rymer's  critical  work  may  be 
made  to  this  effect:  in  1674  he  adopted  whatever  of 
the  theory  of  poetic  justice  was  to  be  found  in 
Rapin's  Reflections.  This  means  that  he  agreed 
with  Rapin  in  saying  of  tragedy  that  "  it  lets  men  see 
that  vice  never  escapes  Unpunished"*  though  it  can 
not  be  asserted  that  he  could  see  any  blessing  in 
disguise  in  the  misfortunes  of  Hecuba  in  the  same 
way  as  Rapin  did.f  In  1678  he  entered  the  field  of 
literary  criticism  in  the  fullest  sense  of  the  word  by 
the  publication  of  The  Tragedies  of  the  Last  Age. 
In  this  work  he  shows  himself  to  be  a  rigorist  in  the 
matter  of  poetic  justice.  He  formulated  his  idea 
of  the  doctrine  more  fully  than  had  been  done  by 
any  English  writer  before  his  time,  and  took  a  position 
more  radical  than  that  of  any  of  his  predecessors 
in  France  or  Italy.  His  theory  is  not  taken  directly 
from  Aristotle  or  from  any  other  critic.  He  bases 
it  directly  on  the  tragedies  of  Sophocles  and  Euripides. 
Nevertheless,  he  follows  Aristotle,  without  saying 
so,  in  arguing  that  there  must  be  no  excess  of  goodness 
or  badness  in  the  characters  portrayed,  but  his  reason 
for  this  is  not  to  be  found  in  Aristotle.  His  theory 
admits  no  mercy  for  the  one  who  is  to  suffer,  and  in 
making  himself  clear  on  this  point  he  introduced  into 
literary  criticism  the  eighteenth  century  expression 
that  there  should  be  "no  hell  behind  the  scenes. "J 

Rymer's  chief  characteristic  was  that  of  an 
extremist.     He  bound  the  drama  to  a  set  of  arbitrary 

*  Loc.  cit.  p.   143.  t  Loc.  cit.  p.   143. 

X  Loc.  cit.   p.    149. 

[167] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

lules,  contrary  to  the  practice  of  the  best  dramatists 
of  ancient  and  modern  times.  He  appeared  to  be 
satisfied  with  Sophocles  and  Euripides,  but  it  can 
not  be  shown  that  their  writings  were  entirely  in 
harmony  with  all  his  laws.  His  zeal  to  find  in  their 
plays  a  warrant  for  the  most  important  of  his  theories 
made  him  prone  to  look  for  helps  of  that  kind  rather 
than  to  discover  what  might  count  against  him. 
Addison  who  came  after  him  could  refer  to  the  same 
sources  for  arguments  just  the  opposite  of  those 
which  were  advanced  by  Rymer. 

Rymer,  however,  was  not  the  only  English  critic 
of  his  time  to  believe  in  the  doctrine  of  poetic  justice. 
Dennis,  as  we  have  noted,  was  one  of  those  who 
defended  his  position,  but  Dennis  came  after  him 
and  belongs,  as  it  were,  to  the  second  epoch  of  that 
critical  agitation  which  had  poetic  justice  for  its 
theme.  To  that  same  epoch  Addison,  of  course, 
belongs,  and  Gildon  also.  Their  opinions  on  the 
subject  will  be  set  forth  in  the  next  chapter. 


[168] 


DENNIS  DKFKNDS  THE  DOCTRINE. 


CHAPTER  IV. 
Later  Development  of  the  Doctrine  of  Poetic  Justice. 

JOHN   DENNIS   DEFENDS  THE    DOCTRINE. 

JOHN  Dennis,  the  opponent  of  Addison  in  the 
first  English  controversy  about  the  origin  of  the 
doctrine  of  poetic  justice,  was  born  in  London  in 
1657,  fifteen  years  before  the  date  of  Addison's  birth 
and  sixteen  years  after  that  of  Rymer.  He  is 
related  to  both  of  these  through  the  common  bond 
of  literary  criticism,  and  to  each  one  separately  in 
a  special  manner  the  account  of  which  is  to  engage 
our  immediate  attention. 

John  Dennis  was  the  literary  successor  of  Thomas 
Rymer.  When  Rymer's  activity  as  a  literary  critic 
ceased  in  1093,  that  of  Dennis  began.  The  special 
theories  which  were  held  by  Rymer  were  almost  all 
adopted  by  Dennis,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the 
latter  entered  upon  his  career  as  a  literary  critic 
by  objecting  to  some  of  the  opinions  which  Rymer 
had  advanced.  Rymer  had  published  the  last  of 
his  three  important  critical  works,  A  Short  View  of 
Tragedy,  in  which  he  made  it  clear  that  there  was 
nothing  to  be  admired  in  the  works  of  the  English 
writers  of  tragedy.  The  result  was,  that  Dennis 
made  a  reply  called  the  Impartial  Critic.  It  was 
published  in  1693  and  may  be  properly  regarded  as 
his  introductory  contribution  to  English  literary 
[169] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

criticism.  Its  chief  importance  lies  in  the  fact,  that 
it  shows  the  attitude  of  Dennis  towards  Rymer 
whose  pet  doctrines  of  poetic  justice  he  was  to  defend 
so  perseveringly  in  his  essays,  and  practice  so  faith- 
fully in  his  plays.  With  that  feature  of  his  work 
we  are  chiefly  concerned,  in  order  to  show  in  what 
way  the  controversy  of  1711  began  and  how  it  affected 
later  literary  criticism. 

In  1701  Dennis  published  a  work  called  The 
Advancement  and  Reformation  of  Modern  Poetry. 
This  was  his  first  important  critical  work.  He  had 
already  gained  some  experience  as  a  man  of  letters; 
he  had  acquired  considerable  practice  as  a  critic  of 
matters  pertaining  to  the  stage,  and  was  classed 
among  the  friends  of  the  theatre;  and  besides  this 
he  had  already  written  three  dramas.  To  these 
considerations  must  be  added  the  fact  that  he  was 
now  a  man  of  settled  views  and  mature  judgment, 
having  reached  his  forty-second  year. 

The  first  impression  to  be  gotten  from  the 
Advancement  and  Reformation  of  Modern  Poetry  is, 
that  Dennis  would  be  prejudiced  against  any  drama 
that  should  fail  to  produce  a  good  moral  effect.  It 
is  not  even  necessary  to  read  the  book  beyond  the 
introductory  pages  in  order  to  get  this  impression. 
The  work  proper  is  preceded  by  an  Epistle  dedicatory 
in  which  Dennis  makes  a  comparison  between 
Sophocles  and  Shakespeare  in  such  a  way  as  to 
suggest  what  kind  of  reformation  is  needed  in  modern 
poetry.  He  remarks  that  the  Oedipus  of  Sophocles 
is  a  very  religious  play,  whereas  the  Julius  Ccesar 
of  Shakespeare  is  just  the  contrary.  "For,"  he  says, 
explaining  why    he    makes    this    observation,  "with 

[170] 


DENNIS  DEFENDS  THE  DOCTRINE. 

submission  to  your  Lordship's  Judgment  I  conceive 
that  every  tragedy  ought  to  be  a  very  solemn  Lecture, 
inculcating  a  particular  Providence,  and  showing 
it  plainly  protecting  the  good,  and  chastening  the 
bad,  or  at  least  the  violent;  And  that  if  it  is  other- 
wise, it  is  either  an  empty  amusement,  or  a  scandalous 
and  pernicious  Libel  upon  the  government  of  the 
world."  Here  again  we  have  the  traditional  view 
of  those  who  maintained  that  poetry  must  necessarily 
instruct.  Of  course,  Dennis  would  not  recognize 
the  existence  of  a  moral  lesson  in  any  play  that  did 
violence  to  the  principle  of  poetic  justice.  He  does 
not  mention  the  doctrine  by  name  in  this  dedicatory 
epistle;  but  he,  nevertheless,  shows  himself  to  be 
uncompromisingly  in  favor  of  the  doctrine,  just  as 
his  predecessors  did  more  than  half  a  century  before 
Rymer  was  born.  In  referring  to  the  protection  of 
the  good  and  the  chastising  of  the  bad,  Dennis  had 
in  mind  the  doctrine,  just  as  surely  as  was  the  case 
when  he  told  Addison  who  invented  the  doctrine  and 
who   introduced   it   into   the    English   language. 

Like  Rymer,  he  was  an  extremist  in  his  concep- 
tion of  what  is  proper  in  poetic  justice.  He  main- 
tained that  it  was  not  sufficient  to  punish  the  leading 
characters  for  their  crimes, — the  minor  characters 
must  be  treated  according  to  the  same  strict  rule. 
For  instance,  he  gives  Shakespeare  no  chance  to 
escape  from  the  reproach  of  being  a  bad  dramatic 
artist,  when  he  puts  him  in  a  dilemma  with  respect 
to  the  plot  of  Julius  Ccesar.  "The  Killing  of  Julius 
Caesar  in  Shakespeare,"  he  says,  "is  either  a  Murder 
or  a  Lawful  Action;  if  the  Killing  of  Caesar  is  a 
Lawful    Action,    then    the    Killing    of    Brutus    and 

[171] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

Cassius  is  a  downright  Murder;  and  the  poet  has 
been  guilty  of  polluting  the  Scene  with  the  blood 
of  the  very  best  and  last  of  the  Romans.  But  if 
the  Killing  of  Caesar  is  Murder,  and  Brutus  and 
Cassius  are  very  justly  punished  for  it;  then  Shake- 
speare is  on  the  other  side  answerable  for  introducing 
so  many  noble  Romans,  committing  in  the  open 
face  of  an  Audience,  a  very  horrible  Murder,  and  only 
punishing  two  of  them;  which  proceeding  gives  an 
occasion  to  the*  people  to  draw  a  dangerous  inference 
from  it  which  may  be  destructive  to  Governments, 
and  to  Human  Society."*  This  kind  of  argument 
shows  that  Dennis  is  a  faithful  disciple  of  Rymer; 
for  the  objection  which  is  here  raised  to  the  play 
is  such  as  may  be  legitimately  drawn  from  Rymer's 
analysis  of  the  subject.  In  his  work  called  The 
Tragedies  of  the  Last  Age,  Rymer  complains  not  so 
much  that  none  of  the  malefactors  was  punished  in 
the  plays  which  he  censured,  as  that  the  distribution 
of  rewards  and  punishments  was  unequal.  He  wants 
the  fate  of  the  lesser  characters  to  conform  to  the 
general  rule. 

Again,  Dennis  follows  Rymer  and  Rapin  in  his 
discussion  of  the  emotions  of  pity  and  fear.f  thinking 
he  understands  correctly  Aristotle's  reference  to 
these  two  emotions,  His  interpretation  is,  of  course, 
consistent  with  the  theory  that  Aristotle  wants  to 
teach  men  to  be  good  by  having  them  learn  from  the 
stage  how  unprofitable  it  is  to  be  bad,  —  a  theory 

*   Dennis,  Epistle    Dedictory    to   The  Advancement  and 

Reformation  oj  Modern  Poetry. 

t  Dennis,  Advancement  and  Reformation  oj  Modern 
Poetry,    p.    68. 

[172] 


DENNIS  DEFENDS  THE  DOCTRINE. 

which  presumes  that  Aristotle  intended  tragedy  to 
observe  the  law  of  poetic  justice — but  such  an  inter- 
pretation is  erroneous,  as  we  have  already  shown.* 

Dennis  makes  very  clear  his  conception  of  the 
relation  of  poetic  justice  to  comedy,  and  deserves 
to  be  quoted  on  the  subject.  After  showing  that 
whether  the  end  of  comedy  be  to  please  or  to  instruct, 
this  must  be  accomplished  by  what  is  called  the 
ridiculum,  he  makes  a  distinction  between  tragedy 
and  comedy,  saying  that  "if  comedy  shews  men 
unfortunate,  it  usurps  upon  Tragedy.  >The  great 
Disorders  of  the  world  are  caus'd  by  great  Passions, 
and  they  are  punish 'd  by  Tragedy.  The  little  Passions 
cause  little  disquiets,  and  make  us  uneasie  to  our- 
selves and  one  another,  and  they  are  expos'd  by 
Comedy.  For,  that  which  wTe  call  Humour  in 
Comedy  is  thought  to  be  poetical  justice  sufficient 
for  it.  Not  that  at  last  the  Characters  in  Comedy 
may  be  chastiz'd  at  the  Catastrophe  for  faults  which 
they  have  committed;  but  that  very  chastisement 
ought  to  be  wrapped  up  in  the  Ridiculum,  or  the 
Catastrophe  can  not  be  truly  Comical. "t  It  is  in 
this  way  that  Dennis  indicated  the  applicability  of 
the  doctrine  of  poetic  justice  to  comedy.  His  treat- 
ment of  the  subject  was  at  the  time  new  and  original, 
since  this  phase  of  the  discussion  had  not  been 
taken  up  by  his  predecessors.  What  Rymer  would 
say  on  the  subject  we  can  only  guess  at;  it  is  very 
likely  that  he  would  approve  of  the  argument  which 
Dennis  made. 

Three  years  elapsed  before  Dennis  published  his 

*   See   pp.    60   ff. 

f    Advancement  and  Reformation  oj  Modern  Poetry,  p.  55. 

[173] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

next  important  critical  work,  called  The  Grounds 
of  Criticism  in  Poetry.  The  date  of  publication  is 
the  year  1704.  In  this  work,  as  in  the  other,  poetry 
is  considered  in  the  light  of  morality.  "Poetry," 
he  says,  "has  two  ends,  a  subordinate  and  a  final 
one,  the  subordinate  one  is  Pleasure,  and  the  final 
one  is  instruction."*  He  goes  even  farther  than 
this,  for  he  argues  in  favor  of  a  close  relation  between 
poetry  and  religion,  saying  that  not  only  is  poetry  a 
help  to  religion,  but  that  poetry  unaided  by  religion 
can  not  attain  its  highest  perfection.  This  is  practic- 
ally the  thesis  which  Dennis  attempts  to  enlarge 
upon  in  the  hundred  and  twenty-seven  pages  which 
constitute  the  book.  Further  commentary  on  it  is 
unnecessary. 

In  the  year  1712  Dennis  brought  out  a  collection 
of  letters  which  he  had  written  during  the  preceding 
year.  The  book  is  small,  but  it  gives  a  pretty  com- 
plete record  of  what  Dennis  had  to  say  to  Addison 
on  the  question  of  poetic  justice;  it  also  contains 
his  opinions  on  Shakespeare.  The  book  is  called 
An  Essay  on  the  Genius  and  Writings  of  Shakespeare 
with  some  Letters  of  Criticism  to  the  Spectator.  The 
great  Elizabethan  dramatist  is  praised  and  blamed. 
In  one  place  Dennis  says  that  "Shakespeare  was  one 
of  the  greatest  Genius's  that  the  World  e'er  saw  for 
the  Tragic  Stage,  "f  In  another  place  he  shows  how 
this  praise  is  to  be  taken;  he  asks  "what  would 
he  not  have  been,  if  he  had  joined  to  so  happy  a 
Genius  Learning  and  the  Poetical  Art? "J  These  two 
statements  appear  to  be  entirely  contradictory.    The 

*  Grounds  of  Criticism,  p.  8. 

t  An  Essay  etc.,   p.    i.  J  Ibid.,  p.  3. 

[i74] 


DENNIS  DEFENDS  THE  DOCTRINE. 

difficulty,  however,  vanishes  when  one  understands 
the  principle  upon  which  he  based  his  opinions.  By- 
insinuating  that  Shakespeare  did  not  possess  the 
poetical  art,  he  meant  that  Shakespeare  depicted 
historical  events  rather  than  fables.  Some  of  his 
dramas,  it  is  true,  contained  a  reconstruction  of  the 
facts  of  history,  but  that  consideration  would  not 
of  icself  remove  the  difficulty.  A  poet  might,  accord- 
ing to  Dennis,  make  an  entirely  original  plot  and  use 
it  for  the  purposes  of  tragedy  or  comedy,  but  he  would 
not  by  that  fact  become  a  poetical  artist.  His  plot 
might  not  be  poetical  fiction  at  all;  for  poetical 
fiction  portrays  idealized  truth,  and  idealized  truth 
can  not  be  portrayed  in  any  story  that  violates  the 
law  of  poetical  justice.  In  order  that  any  dramatist 
be  characterized  as  a  poetical  artist  he  must  present 
to  Dennis  the  spectacle  of  rewarded  virtue  and 
punished  vice.  Shakespeare  had  not  done  this.  He 
may  have  been  successful  in  using  the  bare  events  of 
history, — so  successful  as  to  be  a  genius, — but  how 
much  greater  would  have  been  his  success  if  he  had 
only  had  the  poetical  art.  If  he  had  used  the  fable, 
"he  would  have  mov'd  ten  times  more."*  Why  this 
should  be  so,  Dennis  then  proceeds  to  show,  conclud- 
ing his  argument  in  this  wise,  "Tis  observable,  that 
both  in  a  Poetical  Fiction  and  an  Historical  Relation, 
those  Events  are  most  entertaining,  the  most  surpris- 
ing, and  most  wonderful,  in  which  Providence  most 
plainly  appears.  And  tis  for  this  Reason  that  the 
Author  of  a  Just  Fable,  must  please  more  than  the 
Writer  of  an  Historical  Relation,  "f  Our  author 
indicates   that   the   pleasure   derived   from   the   one 

*  Ibid.,  p.  5.  t  Ibid.,  p.  6, 

[i75] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

differs  from  that  derived  from  the  other  only  in  a 
comparative  degree,  and  from  this  we  might  care- 
lessly conclude  that  the  poetical  art  of  one  writer 
differs  from  that  of  the  other  only  in  degree  also; 
but  such  a  conclusion  is  not  to  be  drawn  from  what 
Dennis  says.  In  the  first  place,  he  does  not  regard 
it  the  chief  aim  of  poetry  to  please.  The  chief  aim 
of  the  true  poet  is  to  instruct,  and  there  can  be  no 
instruction  without  poetical  fable,  and  there  can  be 
no  poetical  fable  without  poetic  justice.  This 
poetic  justice  must  be  constant  and  complete,  "The 
Good,"  he  says,  "must  never  fail  to  prosper,  and  the 
bad  must  be  always  punish'd."* 

Rymer  and  others  before  him  had  thought  of 
only  one  reason  for  insisting  on  poetic  justice;  Dennis 
finds  a  supplementary  reason.  With  his  predecessors 
he  holds  to  the  opinion  that  the  violation  of  the 
doctrine  of  rewards  and  punishments  means  a  lesson 
that  is  hurtful  to  morality;  but  he  goes  farther  into 
the  argument  than  the  others  did;  for  he  maintains 
that  if  this  law  were  not  constantly  and  rigidly 
observed  in  poetry,  "  the  Incidents  and  particularly 
the  Catastrophe  which  is  the  grand  Incident,  are 
liable  to  be  imputed  rather  to  Chance,  than  to 
Almighty  Conduct  and  to  Sovereign  Justice. "f  In 
other  words,  there  would  be  no  practical  lesson  to 
be  drawn  from  the  occasional  observance  of  the  rule. 
Men  would  not  carry  into  their  lives  any  dread  of 
doing  wrong,  since  punishments  would  seem  to  be 
distributed  without  any  regard  to  merit  or  demerit; 
and  in  consequence  of  this,  men  would  be  disposed 
to  act  as  if  there  were  no  moral  law. 

*  Ibid.,  pp.  6-7.  t  Ibid.,  p.   7. 

[176] 


DENNIS  DEFENDS  THE  DOCTRINE 

Dennis  does  not  say  that  the  effect  of  a  positive 
moral  lesson  in  one  play  might  be  offset  by  the 
lack  of  a  moral  lesson  in  the  next  play  which  the 
individual  should  witness;  but  this  inference  follows 
logically  from  his  reasoning  on  the  subject.  He 
does  say,  however,  that  such  a  thing  can  happen 
within  a  single  play.  It  is  not  sufficient  that  the 
leading  characters  be  punished  or  rewarded  according 
to  their  deserts.  The  same  strict  law  must  apply  to 
all.  "The  want  of  this  impartial  Distribution  of 
Justice,"  he  says,  "makes  the  Coriolanus  of  Shake- 
speare to  be  without  Moral.  'Tis  true  indeed 
Coriolanus  is  Kill'd  by  those  Foreign  Enemies  with 
whom  he  had  openly  sided  against  his  Country,  which 
seems  to  be  an  Event  worthy  of  Providence,  and 
would  look  as  if  it  were  contriv'd  by  infinite  Wisdom, 
and  executed  by  supreme  Justice,  to  make  Coriolanus 
a  dreadful  Example  to  all,  who  lead  on  Foreign 
Enemies  to  the  Invasion  of  their  native  Country; 
if  there  were  not  something  in  the  Fate  of  the  other 
characters,  which  gives  occasion  to  doubt  of  it,  and 
which  suggests  to  the  sceptical  Reader  that  this 
might  happen."* 

Here  we  have  in  a  single  sentence  the  exposition 
of  the  doctrine  which  Addison  described  as  ridiculous. 
Dennis,  as  may  he  noticed,  declared  for  the  punish- 
ment of  all  wrongs  that  are  committed,  no  matter 
whether  the  agent  be  a  prominent  character  or  one 
of  minor  importance.  Addison  maintained  that 
this  requirement  was  excessively  and  ridiculously 
strict.  He  did  not  deny  that  good  plays  might  be 
written  in  conformity  to  such  a  plan,  but  he  objected 

*  Ibid. 

[i77] 


1>0ETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

strenuously  to  the  proposition  that  this  should  be  a 
universal  law.  In  order  that  there  might  be  no 
possible  misunderstanding  of  what  Dennis  meant, 
he  made  a  careful  analysis  of  Shakespeare's  "Corio- 
lanus."  He  showed  in  what  way  Aufidius  is  the 
principal  Murderer  in  the  play,  and  called  attention 
to  the  fact  that  he  not  only  escapes  punishment  but 
seems  to  be  rewarded.  "But  not  only  Aufidius," 
says  Dennis,  "  but  the  Roman  Tribunes,  Sicinius  and 
Brutus,  appear  to  me  to  cry  aloud  for  Poetick 
Vengence.  For  they  are  guilty  of  two  faults,  neither 
of  which  ought  to  go  unpunished."*  The  procuring 
of  the  banishment  of  Coriolanus  was  one  of  these 
faults;  the  using  of  dishonorable  methods  to  attain 
this  end  was  the  other  fault.  After  proving  to  his 
own  satisfaction  that  these  are  real  faults,  he  closes 
his  discussion  of  the  play  by  observing  that  the 
tribunes  escape  punishment. 

One  of  the  reasons  why  Dennis  goes  so  minutely 
into  the  examination  of  this  play  was  that  he  had 
written  a  play  of  his  own  on  the  same  subject  about 
six  years  earlier.  Referring  to  the  fact,  he  says, 
"  I  humbly  conceive  therefore  that  this  want  of 
Dramatical  Justice  in  the  Tragedy  of  Coriolanus, 
gave  occasion  for  a  just  Alteration,  and  that  I  was 
oblig'd  to  sacrifice  to  that  Justice  Aufidius  and  the 
Tribunes,  as  well  as  Coriolanus.  "f  This,  however, 
is  not  the  only  Shakespearean  play  in  which  he  finds 
this  fundamental  error.  "Indeed,"  he  says,  "Shake- 
speare has  been  wanting  in  the  exact  Distribution 
of  Poetical  Justice  not  only  in  his  Coriolanus,  but 
in  most  of  his  best  Tragedies,  in  which  the  Guilty 
*  Ibid.,    p.    8.  t  Jbid.,  p.  10. 

[178] 


DENNIS  DEFENDS  THE  DOCTRINE 

and  the  Innocent  perish  promiscuously;  as  Duncan 
and  Banquo  in  Macbeth,  as  likewise  Lady  Macduffe 
and  her  Children;  Desdemona  in  Othello;  Cordelia, 
Kent,  and  King  Lear,  in  the  Tragedy  that  bears 
his  Name;  Brutus  and  Porcia  in  Julius  Caesar,  and 
young    Hamlet    in    the    Tragedy    of    Hamlet."* 

The  passage  cited  from  the  first  of  the  three 
letters  which  consititute  the  Essay  on  Shakespeare 
gives  us  so  clear  a  notion  of  what  Dennis  conceived 
poetic  justice  to  be,  that  further  quotation  is  un- 
necessary. He  argues  for  the  use  of  fiction  instead 
of  fact,  and  insists  that  the  distinguishing  feature 
of  fiction  is  the  unfailing  regularity  with  which  it 
portrays  the  reward  of  all  virtues  and  the  punish- 
ment of  all  vices.  He  holds  that  the  non-observance 
of  this  rule  in  poetry  has  the  effect  of  making  men 
indifferent  to  the  consequences  of  their  acts;  and 
he  strengthens  this  conclusion  by  saying  that  chance 
would  appear  to  supplant  Providence  in  determining 
the  fate  of  the  individual. 

Further  examination  of  the  remaining  critical 
work  of  Dennis  shows  a  strict  adherence  to  these 
views.  His  theory  regarding  rewards  and  punish- 
ments, thus  enunciated,  was  not  modified  in  any 
essential  during  the  remaining  years  of  his  life. 
The  letter  from  which  we  have  made  our  quotations 
was  written  on  the  first  of  February  1711.  On  the 
fourteenth  of  the  following  April  Addison  took  up 
the  discussion  of  the  drama,  and  two  days  later  he 
paid  his  compliments  to  Dennis  by  speaking  of 
poetic  justice  as  "A  ridiculous  doctrine  of  modern 
criticism,  "f     Dennis  replied  immediately  in  a  letter 

*   Ibid.,  p.  9.  t   Loc.  cit.  p.   2. 

[  i79] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

To  the  Spectator  upon  his  Paper  on  the  16th  of  April, 
saying  of  it  that  "there  are  as  many  Bulls  and 
Blunders  in  it  almost  as  there  are  Lines,  and  all 
deliver'd  with  that  insolent  and  blust'ring  Air,  which 
usually  attends  upon  Error,  and  Delusion,  while 
Truth,  like  the  Deity  that  inspires  it,  comes  calmly 
and  without  noise."*  This  was  the  letter  which  gave 
to  Aristotle  the  distinction  of  making  "a  very  formal 
Recommendation  of  the  impartial  and  exact  Execu- 
tion of  Poetical  Justice/'f  and  to  Rymer  the  distinc- 
tion of  having  been  the  first  to  introduce  the  doctrine 
"into  our  native  Language."!  There  is  no  weakness 
shown  by  Dennis  in  his  defence;  he  follows  his  usual 
method,  putting  his  argument  into  a  sort  of  sorites, 
saying  that  the  doctrine  of  poetic  justice  "is  itself 
the  Foundation  of  all  the  Rules,  and  even  of  Tragedy 
itself.  For  what  Tragedy  can  there  be  without  a 
Fable?  or  what  Fable  without  a  Moral?  or  what  Moral 
without  Poetic  Justice?  What  Moral,  where  the 
Good  and  the  Bad  are  confounded  by  Destiny,  and 
perish  alike  promiscuously.  "§ 

In  all  this,  Dennis  holds  faithfully  to  the  position 
taken  by  Rymer;  and  in  one  more  point,  worthy 
of  mention,  he  follows  the  theory  of  his  predecessor. 
With  Rymer  he  maintains  that  there  should  be  no 
punishments  left  for  the  life  to  come.  "  The  Creatures 
of  a  poetical  Creator,"  he  says,  "are  imaginary  and 
transitory;  they  have  no  longer  duration  than  the 
Representation  of  their  respective  Fables;  and  con- 
sequently if  they  offend,  they  must  be  punish'd 
during  that  Representation." j|     But  Dennis  adds  to 

*  An  Essay  etc.,  p.   39.  f   Ibid.,  p.  41. 

X  Ibid.  §   Ibid.,   p.   42.  ||  Ibid.,  p.  45. 

[180] 


DENNIS  DEFENDS  THE  DOCTRINE 

Rymer's  thoughts  on  this  subject  a  consideration 
that  Rymer  seemed  not  to  approve  of;  for  Dennis 
admits  that  he  is  "far  from  pretending  that  poetical 
justice  is  an  equal  Representation  of  the  Justice  of 
the  Almighty,"  saying  that  it  is  "but  a  very  narrow 
and  a  very  imperfect  Type  of  it."  ||  Rymer,  on  the 
contrary  required  that  the  punishment  be  excessive 
from  the  point  of  view  of  civil  law  in  order  to  get  at 
the  equivalent  of  divine  retribution;  and  in  order 
that  this  be  possible,  he  made  the  guilt  so  devoid 
of  malice  that  the  retribution  could  take  place  in 
the  play.  With  Aristotle  he  held  that  it  is  wrong 
to  punish  a  perfectly  good  person,  and  Dennis  held 
that  opinion  also.  But  his  idea  of  the  proper  kind 
of  tragic  guilt  provides  for  a  nearer  approach  to 
divine  retribution,  in  degree,  than  Dennis  thinks 
possible.  To  drop  a  handkerchief,  as  Desdempna 
does,  is  to  do  no  tragic  wrong,  thinks  Rymer.  The 
tragic  guilt  arises  out  of  a  deed  that  is  per  se  wrong, 
such  as  manslaughter  or  incest;  not  out  of  actions 
that  are  in  themselves  indifferent  or  good.  In  order 
that  such  tragic  guilt  be  balanced  by  an  exact  dis- 
tribution of  poetic  justice,  leaving  no  retribution 
for  the  life  hereafter,  Rymer  proposes  that  the  agent 
be  impelled  to  the  action  involuntarily  or  in  ignorance 
of  the  conseqences;  and  to  illustrate  this  principle 
he  points  to  the  sin  of  Oedipus,  and  suggests  certain 
modifications  in  the  Rollo  of  Beaumont  and  Fletcher. 
It  even  seems  that  Rymer  would  go  farther  in  the 
severity  of  his  punishments  than  divine  justice  would 
allow, — the  reason  being,  that  while  on  the  one 
hand  he  would  thereby  make  men  fear  to  do  wrong, 

*  Ibid. 

[181] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

on  the  other  hand  he  would  arouse  in  them  a  feeling 
of  pity  for  the  unfortunate  sufferer.  Dennis  does 
not  seem  to  argue  for  such  excess,  and  yet  it  is 
difficult  to  prove  that  he  is  willing  to  argue  against 
it.  The  most  we  can  say  is  this,  that  Dennis  thinks 
of  dramatical  justice  as  something  less  than  divine 
justice,  while  Rymer  gives  us  the  impression  that 
the  agent  of  an  act,  materially  vicious  but  blindly 
committed,  should  be  punished  more  severely  than 
the  civil  law  would  allow.  From  the  point  of  view 
of  divine  justice  there  is  no  guilt  where  there  is  no 
moral  responsibility;  and  consequently  Rymer's 
stage  punishments  seem  to  be  excessive  as  compared 
with  those  of  the  next  world. 

In  his  Letter  to  the  Spectator  upon  his  Paper  on 
the  24th  of  April,  Dennis  reaffirms  his  position  without 
argument.  Addison  had  practically  ignored  his 
former  letter,  deigning  only  to  quote  from  his  transla- 
tion of  the  Fourth  Satire  of  Boileau  the  least  deserving 
couplet  he  could  find.  Dennis  felt  hurt  at  this,  as 
might  be  expected,  and  so  we  have  his  letter  on  the 
subject.  The  Dennis-Addison  controversy  was  at 
an  end,  though  Dennis  took  occasion  two  years  later 
to  criticize  his  opponent's  Cato.  To  show  that  he 
discussed  the  play  from  the  point  of  view  of  poetic 
justice  and  to  illustrate  how  unchanging  are  his 
opinions  on  this  subject,  it  will  be  sufficient  to  quote 
from  his  Remarks  upon  Cato  one  short  passage.  "The 
poetical  persons  in  tragedy,"  he  says,  "exist  no 
longer  than  the  reading  or  the  representation,  the 
whole  extent  of  their  enmity  is  circumscribed  by 
those;  and  therefore  during  the  reading  or  represen- 
tation, according  to  their  merits  or  demerits,  they 
[182] 


ADDISON  INSTITUTES  A  REVOLT 

must  be  punished  or  rewarded.  If  this  is  not  done, 
there  is  no  impartial  distribution  of  poetical  justice, 
no  instructive  lecture  of  a  particular  providence, 
and  no  imitation  of  the  divine  dispensation."* 

The  Remarks  upon  Cato  was  not  the  last  critical 
work  that  Dennis  produced.  In  1617  he  published 
his  Remarks  on  Pope's  Translation  of  Homer,  and  in 
1726  he  published  a  treatise  called  The  Stage  De- 
fended. These  and  his  other  minor  contributions  to 
literary  criticism  might  be  helpful  in  illustrating 
completely  his  theory  of  the  drama;  but  with  such 
a  task  we  are  not  concerned.  In  closing  our  examina- 
tion of  his  critical  writings  it  is  pertinent  to  refer 
to  the  fact  that  he  was  unsuccessful  in  his  efforts 
to  put  his  theory  into  practice.  He  wrote  plays  that 
illustrated  in  particular  the  workings  of  the  doctrine 
of  poetic  justice,  but  none  of  them  were  received 
with  the  welcome  he  had  expected.  His  own  reflec- 
tions on  this  fact  were  set  forth  in  1721  in  his  Preface 
to  the  second  edition  of  Coriolanus.  The  failure  of 
this  particular  play  reminds  one  of  the  fate  of  Rymer's 
Edgar  which  was  never  acted,  though  it  was  published 
three  times.     Coriolanus  was  acted  only  three  times. 

JOSEPH  ADDISON  INSTITUTES  A  REVOLT. 

Joseph  Addison  was  about  thirty-nine  years  of 
age  when  he  began  his  discussion  of  the  drama  in 
No.  39  of  the  Spectator.  The  only  point  in  which  this 
paper  dealt  with  the  problem  we  have  under  consider- 
ation is  contained  in  the  unpretentious  introductory 
sentence.     "As  perfect  Tragedy,"  says  Addison,  "is 

*  Quoted  in  Johnson's  Life  of  Aristotle,  Works  VII., 
P-    458. 

[183] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

the  noblest  Production  of  human  Nature,  so  it  is 
capable  of  giving  the  Mind  one  of  the  most  delight- 
ful and  most  improving  Entertainments."  Here  we 
have  an  echo  of  the  teaching  of  Horace  on  the  function 
of  poetry.  Emphasis  is  not  given  to  the  ethical 
value  of  tragedy,  nor  is  the  ethical  consideration 
entirely  neglected;  there  is  a  sort  of  balancing  of 
the  moral  and  the  aesthetic,  the  preference,  if  any, 
being  given  to  the  latter.  That  this  should  be 
Addison's  opinion  about  tragedy,  and  that  he  set 
it  forth  in  the  first  sentence  of  his  treatise  on  the 
drama,  is  particularly  interesting  in  view  of  the 
fact  that  the  subsequent  quarrel  about  poetic 
justice  gave  rise  to  the  question  whether  or  not  it 
is  the  chief  aim  of  the  drama  to  instruct. 

In  No.  40  of  the  Spectator  Addison  again  makes 
his  first  sentence  very  suggestive,  by  referring  at 
once  to  the  law  of  poetic  justice.  "The  English 
Writers  of  Tragedy,"  he  says,  "are  possessed  with 
a  Notion,  that  when  they  represent  a  virtuous  or 
innocent  person  in  Distress,  they  ought  not  to  leave 
him  till  they  have  delivered  him  out  of  his  Troubles, 
or  made  him  triumph  over  his  Enemies."  This  is 
not  the  first  time  that  we  have  used  this  quotation. 
This  and  the  two  sentences  which  follow  it  constitute 
the  beginning  of  the  controversy  on  poetic  justice 
and  offered  us  a  starting  point  for  our  inquiry  into 
the  Greek  origin  and  English  basis  of  the  doctrine. 
It  was  in  the  third  of  these  sentences*  that  Addison 
confessed  his  ignorance  as  to  the  origin  of  the  doctrine, 
thus  drawing  from  Dennis  the  reply  in  which  the  name 
of  Rymer  was  joined  with  that  of  Aristotle.    Addison, 

*  Loc.  cit.   p.   2. 

[184] 


ADDISON   INSTITUTES  A  REVOLT 

of  course,  rejected  the  doctrine,  saying  that  there 
was  nothing  to  support  it  in  theory  or  practice.  In 
supporting  his  contention,  he  argues  that  such  a 
strict  distribution  of  rewards  and  punishments  is 
contrary  to  the  experiences  of  life,  since  fortune  and 
misfortune,  happiness  and  unhappiness,  pleasure 
and  pain,  are  the  common  portion  of  all  men  regard- 
less of  the  fact  whether  they  are  good  or  not.  Then, 
taking  it  for  granted  that  it  is  "the  principal  Design 
of  Tragedy"  to  arouse  the  emotions  of  pity  and  fear, 
he  says  that  this  end  will  be  defeated  if  the  spectator 
can  apply  a  formula  to  the  drama  and  thereby 
anticipate  the  ending;  for  "whatever  Crosses  and 
Disappointments  a  good  Man  suffers  in  the  Body 
of  the  Tragedy,  they  will  make  but  small  Impression 
on  our  Minds,  when  we  know  that  in  the  last  Act 
he  is  to  arrive  at  the  End  of  his  Wishes  and  Desires." 
That  is  the  argument  from  reason;  the  argument 
from  authority  is  based  on  Aristotle  and  on  the 
writers  of  tragedy.  He  notes  that  Aristotle  favors 
the  kind  of  tragedy  that  has  an  unhappy  ending. 
It  seems,  however,  that  by  using  this  as  an  argument 
against  poetic  justice  he  goes  a  little  too  far.  He 
should  have  taken  into  account  the  character  of  the 
hero  as  Aristotle  conceived  him.  Aristotle  contended 
that  the  hero  should  be  neither  excessively  good  nor 
excessively  bad.  As  a  result,  therefore,  the  Aris- 
totelian hero  was  to  be  guilty  of  some  fault.  The 
punishment  of  such  a  fault  would  be  in  line  with  the 
requirements  of  poetic  justice.  But  Addison  thinks 
the  unhappy  ending  is  inconsistent  with  the  "ridicu- 
lous doctrine,"  the  reason  being  that  he  has  in  mind 
the  unhappy  ending  of  a  virtuous  character,  whereas 

[185] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

Aristotle  makes  it  very  clear  that  the  protagonist 
is  to  be  neither  notably  good  nor  remarkably  bad; 
he  distinctly  says  that  the  unhappy  end  is  to  be  the 
outcome  of  "some  error  or  frailty."*  But  in  order 
that  we  may  not  appear  to  make  Aristotle  an  advo- 
cate of  poetic  justice,  it  is  necessary  to  reiterate 
what  has  already  been  shown,  that  he  is  opposed  to 
plays  which  illustrate  not  only  the  adversity  of  the 
bad  but  also  the  prosperity  af  the  good.  He  favors 
a  one-sided  presentation  which  will  arouse  only  the 
emotions  of  pity  and  fear.  The  arousing  of  these 
emotions  comes  about  through  the  very  severe 
calamities  which  befall  the  hero  for  his  errors.  Aris- 
totle, though  he  was  silent  concerning  this  matter, 
would  not  give  prominence  to  the  reward  of  virtuous 
conduct,  because  in  this  way  he  would  excite  contrary 
emotions  that  would  weaken  the  activity  of  the  two 
emotions  with  which  tragedy  is  properly  concerned. 
Why  he  should  restrict  tragedy  to  the  exercise  of 
these  two  emotions,  we  have  already  shown. f 
Addison  was  right  in  thinking  that  Aristotle  was 
not  an  advocate  of  poetic  justice,  but  he  was  wrong 
in  the  argument  he  advanced  to  support  his  opinion. 
In  his  discussion  of  the  tragedies  which  were 
written  by  Shakespeare  and  others,  Addison  makes 
a  very  sensible  and  effective  argument  in  favor  of 
his  thesis.  He  points  to  the  success  achieved  by 
many  English  tragedies  in  which  the  favorites  of 
the  audience  came  to  unhappy  ends.  Othello  and 
King  Lear  are  mentioned  among  these.  Speaking 
of   the   latter  in   particular,   he   says  that  it  is   an 

*   Poetics  XIII.,  in  Butcher,  p.  43. 
f   Loc.   cit.   p.    53. 

[  186] 


ADDISON  INSTITUTES  A  REVOLT 

admirable  tragedy,  "as  Shakespeare  wrote  it;  but 
as  it  is  reformed  according  to  the  Chymerical  Notion 
of  Poetical  Justice,  in  my  humble  opinion  it  has 
lost  half  its  Beauty".*  In  order,  however,  to  show 
a  spirit  of  fairness  and  to  justify  a  middle  course 
which  he  adopts,  he  admits  that  there  have  been 
several  good  plays  in  which  the  doctrine  of  poetic 
justice  was  observed.  He  mentions  a  few  by  name 
and  then  remarks,  that  he  "  must  also  allow,  that 
many  of  Shakespeare's,  and  several  of  the  most 
celebrated  Tragedies  of  Antiquity,  are  cast  in  the 
same  Form."  In  conclusion  he  says,  "I  do  not 
therefore  dispute  against  this  way  of  writing 
Tragedies,  but  against  the  criticism  that  would 
establish  this  as  the  only  method ;  and  by  that  means 
would  very  much  cramp  the  English  Tragedy, 
and  perhaps  give  a  wrong  Bent  to  the  Genius  of 
our  Writers.  "  And  this  was  the  paper  that  provoked 
Dennis  to  write  a  reply  that  exhibited  more  personal 
feeling  than  good  judgment  and  to  let  his  temper 
get  the  best  of  him  in  public. f 

The  nearest  approach  to  a  development  of 
Addison's  views  on  this  subject  occurs  in  No.  548 
of  the  Spectator.     Though  the  article  was  published 

*  Addison  refers  to  Nahum  Tate's  version  with  which 
Dr.   Johnson   was  so   pleased   half  a   century  later. 

t  This  paper  was,  according  to  Pope,  the  occasion  of 
John  Dennis's  "deplorable  frenzy"  in  Lentot's  book  shop, 
March  27th,  1712.  "Opening  one  of  the  volumes  of  the 
Spectator,  in  large  paper,  (he)  did  suddenly,  without  the 
least  provocation,  tear  out  that  No. — ,  where  the  author 
treats  of  poetical  justice,  and  cast  it  into  the  street."  (Narr. 
of  Dr.  Rob.  Norris,  Pope's  Works,  X.,  p.  459).  See  G. 
Smith's  Edition  of  the  Spectator,  p.   331,  note. 

[i87l 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

anonymously,  there  is  sufficient  reason  to  ascribe  the 
authorship  of  it  to  Addison.  The  question  of 
poetic  justice  is  taken  up  again  and  treated  from 
the  point  of  view  of  goodness  or  badness  in  the  hero. 
He  accepts  Aristotle's  limitations  concerning  the 
character  of  the  hero  and  admits  that  he  should 
not  be  "perfect  or  faultless;  not  only  because  such 
a  Character  is  improper  to  move  Compassion,  but 
because  there  is  no  such  thing  in  nature. "  He 
still  holds  out  against  poetic  justice,  citing  as  an 
argument  that  Homer  gives  a  happy  ending  to 
Achilles  in  spite  of  his  "morally  vicious"  character. 
That  he  refers  to  Homer  at  all,  is  accounted  for  by 
his  theory  that  if  the  law  of  poetic  justice  should 
apply  to  tragedy,  it  should  apply  also  to  the  epic. 
In  one  particular,  contribution  No.  548  of  the 
Spectator  shows  a  modification  of  the  opinion  set 
forth  in  No.  40.  In  the  latter  paper  Addison  seems 
to  have  arrived  at  the  conclusion  that  it  is  quite 
proper  that  the  very  wicked  should  come  to  an 
unhappy  end.  Furthermore,  he  shows  a  little 
consideration  for  poetic  justice  in  the  accounting 
for  the  sufferings  of  the  so-called  virtuous,  on  the 
grounds  that  no  human  being  can  be  so  good  as  not 
to  deserve  misfortunes.  Since  he  has  admitted  this, 
we  find  that  he  narrows  the  field  of  his  objection  to 
the  doctrine  of  rewards  and  punishments.  With 
Dennis  he  will  admit  that  the  very  bad  should  be 
always  punished;  with  him  he  will  admit  that  the  less 
wicked  may  be  punished  for  justice'  sake,  but  not 
always.  He  still  insists  that  the  moderately  bad 
may  avoid  at  times  the  consequences  of  human 
frailty,  and  that  the  very  good  may  be  brought  to 
[188I 


CHARLES  GtLDON 

an  excessively  unhappy  end.  He  will  not  surrender 
the  liberties  of  the  dramatic  writer  to  all  the  arbitrary 
provisions  implied  by  poetic  justice;  neither  will  he 
make  that  liberty  so  large  as  to  permit  the  very 
wicked  to  escape.  On  this  point  he  says,  "The 
best  of  Men  are  vicious  enough  to  justify  Providence 
for  any  misfortunes  and  Afflictions  which  may  befall 
them,  but  there  are  many  men  so  criminal  that 
they  have  no  claim  or  Pretence  to  Happiness. 
The  best  of  men  may  deserve  punishment,  but  the 
worst  of  men  cannot  deserve  Happiness. "  Such 
a  passage  as  this,  it  seems,  could  be  used  to  advan- 
tage by  Gervinus  and  Snider  and  others  who  cling 
to  the  doctrine  of  poetic  justice  and  at  the  same 
time  hold  Shakespeare  in  such  reverence  that 
they  discover  tragic  guilt  where  Dennis  and  Rymer 
find  none.  With  the  authority  of  Addison  to  support 
them  they  can  more  insistently  declare  that  Desde- 
mona's  death  is  the  proper  punishment  for  her 
crime.  Unhappy  ends  of  all  kinds  may  be  accounted 
for  on  the  theory  that  "  the  best  of  Men  are  vicious." 

CHARLES  GILDON  ACCEPTS  THE  TRADITIONAL  VIEW. 

The  controversy  was  in  a  measure  one-sided. 
Addison  was  alone.  Opposed  to  him  personally 
there  was,  it  is  true,  only  Dennis.  But  there  were 
others  besides  Dennis  who  had  the  same  idea  of 
dramatic  poetry.  Contemporaneous  with  Dennis,  and 
almost  equally  strong  in  his  defence  of  the  theory, 
was  Charles  Gildon  who  was  born  in  1688  and  died 
in  1724.  He  was  an  author  of  plays  as  well  as  a 
literary  critic,  and  in  this  he  resembled  Dennis. 
The  earliest  of  his  plays  represents  an  attempt  at 
[  189] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

constructing  a  tragedy  according  to  the  principles 
of  poetic  justice.  But  earlier  than  the  time  when  he 
became  a  writer  of  plays  he  had  an  opportunity  to 
declare  himself  in  favor  of  the  same  doctrine.  In 
1694  he  published  a  collection  of  Letters  and  Essays, 
part  of  which  were  written  by  himself,  and  part  by 
other  persons.  The  Epistle  dedicatory  to  this 
work  contains  a  declaration  of  his  views  in  regard 
to  the  punishment  of  wickedness  and  the  rewarding 
of  virtue  in  poetry.  "The  Poets  indeed,"  he  says, 
"have  been  the  bold  Persecutors  of  Vice  in  All 
Ages,  and  have  ever  rewarded  Virtue  with  Immor- 
tality. "  The  preface  of  the  same  book  shows  that 
he  did  not  approve  of  the  severity  with  which  Rymer 
criticized  English  writers,  and  Shakespeare  in  par- 
ticular; he  declares  that  he  is  "sorry  that  a  Man  of 
Mr.  Rymer's  learning  should  be  so  bigotted  to  the 
Antients,  as  to  become  an  enemy  to  the  Honor 
of  his  own  Country  in  that  thing,  which,  is  perhaps 
the  only  we  can  truly  pretend  to  excel  all  others 
in,  viz  Poetry."  And  not  only  in  the  preface,  but 
throughout  the  book,  this  same  spirit  of  hostility 
is  made  manifest.  It  would  seem  that  Gildon  can 
imagine  no  critic  so  devoid  of  merit  as  Rymer,  and 
consequently  so  worthy  of  scorn  and  condemnation. 
As  a  source  for  an  expression  of  Gildon's  views, 
the  Miscellaneous  Letters  and  Essays  on  Several 
Subjects  might  easily  be  overlooked,  since  super- 
ficially the  book  does  not  appear  to  be  one  of  Gildon's 
works,  nor  is  it  mentioned  under  his  name  in  the 
National  Dictionary  of  Biography  The  title  page 
does  not  bear  his  name,  but  rather  the  names  of 
several  to  whom  the  letters  were  addressed,  and  the 
[190] 


CHARLES  GILDON 

authorship  is  ascribed  to  "Several  Gentlemen  and 
Ladies."  Nevertheless,  many  of  the  contributions 
are  signed  by  Gildon,  and  others  that  bear  no  signa- 
ture are  evidently  by  his  hand.  Those  to  which  we 
shall  call  attention  were  probably  written  by  Gildon 
in  the  years  1693  and  1694. 

First  of  all,  The  Epistle  Dedicatory,  signed  by 
Gildon,  contains  an  argument  on  the  thesis  that 
Poetry  is  "A  Friend  to,  and  promoter  of  Virtue; 
and  an  Enemy  of  Vice."  This  same  thesis  is  dis- 
cussed in  the  second  article  in  the  book,*  also  signed 
by  Gildon.  Article  number  three  is  An  Apology 
for  Poetry,  in  an  Essay  directed  to  Walter  Moil  Esq. 
It  is  unsigned,  but  may  be  justly  attributed  to 
Gildon,  and,  as  such,  would  offer  an  interesting  study 
if  compared  with  his  Complete  Art  of  Poetry  which  was 
published  twenty-four  years  later.  In  the  Apology 
he  treats  pretty  fully  of  the  aim  of  poetry  with 
respect  to  pleasure  and  instruction,  and  seems  to 
favor  an  opinion  much  like  that  of  Dryden  in  his 
later  years.  He  says,  "  That  the  End  of  Poetry  is 
Noble,  since  it  reaches  the  greatest  Pleasure  and  the 
Sure  Profit,  of  our  Minds,  and  of  our  Life,  Since 
'tis  directed  to  the  Praise  of  the  Omnipotent,  the 
Celebration  of  Virtues,  the  Rewards  and  Glory  of 
Noble  Acts,  the  Punishment  and  Infamy  of  Evil: 
Since  to  it  we  owe  all  the  increases  of  our  Knowledge ; 
and  finally  since  it  effects  all  those  noble  Ends  it 
aims  at."f  Here,  of  course,  he  recognizes  the 
doctrine  of  poetic  justice  in  a  passing  way.  He  does 
not  lay  any  stress  upon  it,  probably  because  there 

*  Miscellaneous  Letters,  etc.,  pp.  5—6. 
f   Ibid.,  pp.  27-28. 

[191] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

was  no  need  of  emphasizing  a  rule  which  had  stood 
the  test  of  criticism  for  nearly  twenty  years,  with 
Rymer  as  an  advocate  of  the  doctrine  and  Dryden 
as  its  brilliant  exponent.  The  extreme  opposition 
which  Gildon  manifested  towards  Rymer  seems  quite 
unusual,  since  Rymer 's  critical  opinions  arose  out 
of  the  doctrine  of  poetical  justice.  One  would 
expect  Gildon  to  reject  the  principles  upon  which  his 
contemporary's  judgments  were  based,  rather  than 
the  conclusions  which  were  based  on  those  principles. 
In  spite  of  his  attitude  towards  this  extreme  advocate 
of  the  ethical  in  poetry,  Gildon  afterwards  wrote  plays 
in  conformity  with  most  of  the  rules  which  Rymer 
insisted  upon. 

One  of  the  important  articles  in  this  book  is 
titled  Some  Reflections  on  Mr.  Rymer's  Short  View 
of  Tragedy,  and  an  A  ttempt  at  a  Vindication  of  Shake- 
speare, in  an  Essay  directed  to  John  Dryden  Esq.  It 
is  particularly  remarkable,  because  is  shows  into 
what  detail  Gildon  can  go  in  his  examination  of 
Rymer's  work,  without  a  formal  discussion  of  poetic 
justice.  The  nearest  he  comes  to  the  subject  is  in 
the  paragraph  where  he  declares  that  Genuis  can  not 
bear  to  be  too  much  bound  down  by  rules.  He 
says:  "All  that  is  great  of  Humane  things,  makes 
a  nearer  approach  to  the  Eternal  Perfection  of 
Greatness,  and  extends  as  much  as  possible  its  limits 
towards  being  Boundless:  'Tis  not  govern'd  by 
Common  Rules  and  Methods,  but  Glories  in  a  Noble 
Irregularity."*  This  same  article  contains  another 
passage  that  is  worth  while  quoting,  for  the  reason 
that  it  gives  a  more  satisfactory  explanation  of  the 
*  Ibid.,   p.   91. 

f  192] 


CHARLES  GILDON 

relation  of  the  ethical  and  aesthetical  functions  of 
the  drama  than  is  found  in  the  writings  of  his  prede- 
cessors. He  says  of  Shakespeare  that  all  his  faults 
"  have  not  been  able  to  frustrate  his  obtaining  the 
end  of  All  just  Poems,  Pleasure  and  Profit.  To 
deny  this,  wou'd  be  to  fly  in  the  Face  of  the  Known 
experience  of  so  many  Years.  He  has  (I  say)  in 
most,  if  not  all,  of  his  Plays  attained  the  full  end 
of  Poetry  Delight  and  Profit,  by  moving  Terror  and 
Pity  for  the  Changes  of  Fortune,  which  Humane 
Life  is  subject  to,  by  giving  us  a  lively  and  just 
Image  of  them  (the  best  Definition  of  a  Play)  for 
the  Motives  of  these .  Passions  afford  us  Pleasure, 
and  their  Purgation  Profit."*  To  this  passage  should 
be  added  another  taken  from  the  letter  To  my 
Honoured  and  Ingenius  Friend  Mr.  Harrigan,  for 
the  Modern  Poets  against  the  Ancients.  Again  he 
makes  an  attack  against  Rymer  as  one  of  those  who 
have  not  treated  the  English  writers  fairly;  his 
argument,  however,  is  against  all  "  the  Enemies  of 
the  Moderns,"  who,  he  says,  "deny  them  to  be 
Poets  because  they  have  not  strictly  observed  the 
rules  laid  down  by  Aristotle,  but  by  that  they 
discover  themselves  either  ignorant  or  negligent  of 
the  most  chief  and  important  end  of  Poetry,  that 
is  Pleasure — all  those  that  exclaim  against  the 
Liberty  some  of  our  English  Poets  have  taken, 
must  grant  that  a  Variety  that  Contributes  to  the 
main  design  can  not  divide  our  concern:  And  if 
so,  'tis  certainly  an  Excellence  the  Moderns  have 
gained  above  the  Ancients,  "f  From  all  this  it  would 
seem  that  Gildon  puts  pleasure  before  profit,  not 
*   Ibid.,  p.   92.  t   Ibid.,   pp.    223-224. 

[  193] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

only  in  the  order  of  their  occurrence  in  a  play,  but 
also  in  the  order  of  their  importance;  and  it  seems 
also  that  he  is  ready  to  reject  the  kind  of  dramatic 
law  that  is  based  on  the  ipse  dixit  of  Aristotle.  A 
further  argument  for  this  second  conclusion  may 
be  drawn  from  the  most  important  of  the  articles 
in  this  collection,  An  Essay  at  a  Vindication  of  Love 
in  Tragedies  against  Rapin  and  Mr.  Rymer.  Directed 
to  Mr.  Dennis. 

The  Essay  in  question  does  not  bear  Gildon's 
signature,  but  it  is  undoubtedly  his.  Aristotle,  it 
must  be  remembered,  mentioned  only  two  passions 
in  his  definition  of  tragedy.  Rapin  in  his  Reflections 
noted  a  modern  tendency  to  introduce  other  emotions. 
Dyden  in  his  Heads  of  an  Answer  approved  of  such 
an  enlargement  of  the  idea  of  tragedy,  and  now 
we  find  Gildon  making  an  elaborate  argument  in 
favor  of  the  modern  tendency.  He  makes  it  a  point 
however,  to  show  that  the  use  of  the  passion  of  love 
and  kindred  passions  helps  to  bring  about  the 
purgation  of  pity  and  fear,  by  which  explanation 
he  avoids  any  positive  overthrow  of  Aristotle. 

It  was  not  until  1698  that  Gildon  wrote  any- 
thing that  strikingly  indicated  his  faith  in  the  dogma 
of  poetic  justice.  In  that  year  he  published  a 
tragedy  called  Phaeton,  in  the  preface  of  which  he 
expressed  himself  as  follows  in  regard  to  rewards  and 
punishments:  "No  unfortunate  character  ought  to 
be  introduced  on  the  Stage,  without  its  Humane 
Frailties  to  Justine  its  Misfortunes:  For  unfortunate 
Perfection,  is  the  Crime  of  Providence,  and  to  offer 
that,  is  an  Impiety  a  Poet  ought  never  to  be  guilty 
of;    being  directly  opposite  to  his  duty  of  Rewarding 

[  194] 


CHARLES  GILDON 

the  Innocent,  and  punishing  the  Guilty;  and  by 
that  means,  to  establish  a  just  notion  of  Providence 
in  its  most  important  Action,  the  Government  of 
Mankind. 

"This  the  great  Sophocles  has  been  notoriously 
guilty  of  in  his  Oedipus  Tyrannus,  where  he  punishes 
Oedipus  for  an  Accident,  as  much  as  for  the  most 
criminal  offences."  Here  we  have,  on  the  one  hand, 
the  doctrine  on  poetic  justice  in  all  its  strictness, 
as  Rymer  would  have  it;  but,  on  the  other  hand, 
we  have  a  notion  of  wrong  which  in  its  application  to 
Sophocles,  gives  us  a  result  to  which  Rymer  would 
not  subscribe.  There  is  more  on  the  subject  in  the 
preface,  but  nothing  that  will  help  materially  to 
show  the  development  of  Gildon's  opinion  on  poetic 
justice.  We  might  also  examine  the  tragedy  itself, 
Phaeton,  and  the  other  plays  which  he  wrote  during 
the  following  four  or  five  years;  but  this  would  also 
show  a  lack  of  development  along  these  lines.  What 
he  said  in  the  preface  to  Phaeton  in  1698  was  repeated 
in  substance  when  he  published,  in  1703,  The  Patriot 
or  the  Italian  Conspiracy,  a  Tragedy,  the  Epistle 
Dedicatory  of  which  shows  that  he  regards  it  the 
"Business  and  Aim"  of  dramatic  poetry  "to  Reward 
Virtue,  to  Expose  Vice,  to  regulate  our  Criminal 
Passions  by  Examples,  always  more  touching,  than 
Precept."  The  chief  significance  of  what  has  been 
here  quoted  is  observable  only  when  we  call  to  mind 
his  critical  views  of  1G94.  He  then  put  pleasure 
before  profit;  he  now  thinks  of  profit  only  as  the  end 
of  poetry,  without  making  any  particular  reference 
to  pleasure.    . 

For   the   further   exemplification    of   his   theory 

[i95] 


Noetic  justice  in^the  drama 

of  poetry  we  can  refer  at  once  to  the  most  important 
of  his  works  on  the  subject,  The  Complete  Art  of 
Poetry,  published  in  London  in  1718.  In  the  fourth 
Dialogue  of  this  work  he  gives  both  sides  of  the 
Dennis- Addison  controversy  and  concludes  by  saying 
that  Dennis  had  the  better  of  the  argument.  He 
next  discusses  the  purgation  of  the  emotions  of 
pity  and  fear  in  a  passage  that  will  bear  repetition. 
"Aristotle,"  he  says,  "never  pretends  that  Tragedy 
is  designed  to  eradicate  and  destroy  these  two 
passions,  but  that  it  is  to  purge  them,  that  is,  to 
take  away  that  Violence  which  they  may  have  on 
a  Mind  too  much  possess'd  by  them,  and  reduce 
them  to  such  a  Degree  of  Temperance,  as  that  they 
may  not  have  a  Power  of  carrying  us  from, or  Contrary 
to  the  Rules  and  Dictates  of  right  Reason;  and  this 
is  certainly  best  done  by  their  Motion;  for  by  the 
Frequence  or  Vehemence  of  that  Motion,  the  Passion 
grows  naturally  of  less  Force  and  Power,  as  Experience 
may  convince  us.  I  have  known  a  certain  Tragedy, 
in  our  English  Language,  which  on  first  reading 
mov'd  compassion  so  much,  that  it  was  impossible 
to  stop  a  Flood  of  Tears;  yet  I  have  read  it  so  often 
and  let  it  move  me  so  much,  that  at  last  I  could 
peruse  it  without  a  Tear.  .  .  .  This  excess  of  Pity 
is  what  Tragedy  would  correct;  the  same  may  be 
said  of  Fear  or  Terror."* 

It  can  hardly  be  denied  that  Gildon  gives  us  a 
satisfactory  interpretation  of  what  Aristotle  meant 
by  his  reference  to  these  emotions;  though  it  is  not 
evident  that  he  attempted  to  compare  Plato  and 
Aristotle  in  their  discussion  of  these  two  emotions. 
*  Gildon,  The  Complete  Art  of  Poetry,  I.,  p.  197. 
[196I 


CHARLES  GILDON 

Again,  Gildon  shows  a  return  to  the  Aristotelian 
idea  in  designating  pity  and  fear  as  the  only  emotions 
to  be  aroused.  In  1694  he  showed  a  disposition  to 
add  other  emotions,  such  as  love;  but  in  1718  he 
comes  back  to  the  strict  Aristotelian  requirement 
in  this  regard,  saying  that  "Admiration  is  too  calm 
a  Passion  for  Tragedy,"  and  that  Love  is  "directly 
opposite  to  that  Majesty"*  which  this  kind  of  poetry 
requires.  His  definition  is  not,  however,  identical 
with  that  of  Aristotle,  for  he  calls  tragedy  "An  Imita- 
tion of  some  one  serious,  grave  and  entire  Action, 
of  a  just  Length,  and  contain'd  within  the  Unities 
of  Time  and  Place;  and  which  without  Narration, 
by  the  Means  of  Terror  and  Compassion,  purges 
those  Passions,  and  all  others  which  are  like  them, 
that  is,  whose  Prevalence  can  throw  us  into  the 
same  or  the  like  Misfortunes. "f 

The  chief  thing  to  be  said  about  The  Complete 
Art  of  Poetry  is  this,  that  it  lays  down  practically 
the  same  principles  that  Rymer  had  borrowed  from 
the  French,  but  makes  no  attempt  to  apply  these 
principles  unwisely,  thus  avoiding  the  greatest  of 
Rymer's  errors.  Gildon  believed  in  the  doctrine  of 
poetic  justice,  and  examplified  the  workings  of  the 
doctrine  in  his  plays;  but  he  did  not  distinguish 
himself  by  any  unusual  defence  of  the  doctrine. 
The  opportunity  to  enter  into  the  discussion  of  the 
subject  came  to  him  when  he  reproduced  the  original 
arguments  made  in  the  Dennis  Addison  controversy  ; 
but  the  opportunity  was  not  accepted.  Gildon 
dismissed  the  subject  by  praising  the  defence  made 
by  Dennis.     We  can,  therefore,  conclude  that  Dennis 

*   Ibid.,  I.,  p.   199.  f   Ibid.'  I.,  p.   222. 

L>97] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

and  Gildon  held  substantially  the  same  opinion  on 
the  doctrine  of  poetic  justice. 

Contemporaneous  with  Dennis,  Addison  and 
Gildon  there  were  several  other  critics  whose  con- 
tributions to  literature  might  be  searched  for  passages 
that  would  indicate  the  stand  they  took  in  regard 
to  this  problem  of  literary  criticism,  but  such  a 
search  would  be  unprofitable.  We  were  chiefly 
concerned  with  showing  what  was  meant  by  poetic 
justice  at  the  time  when  Addison  became  a  defender 
of  the  liberties  of  the  dramatist  and  insisted  that  the 
reputation  of  English  writers  of  tragedy  should  not 
be  blasted  by  the  enforcement  of  any  universal  and 
arbitrary  rule  such  as  Dennis  and  critics  of  his  kind 
proposed.  This  revolt  would  have  come  eighteen 
years  earlier  than  it  did,  if  Dryden  had  not  applied 
the  rule  of  poetic  justice  to  many  of  his  own  plays. 
He  could  see  then,  as  well  as  Addison  did  in  1711, 
how  hurtful  to  the  reputation  of  Shakespeare  were 
the  arbitrary  principles  of  literary  criticism  by  which 
Rymer  attempted  to  measure  the  greatness  of  the 
world's  best  poets.  Dryden  had  committed  himself 
absolutely  to  the  practice  of  an  exact  and  impartial 
distribution  of  rewards  and  punishments,  and  for 
this  reason  he  did  not  go  about  the  defence  of 
Shakespeare  in  the  right  way.  Addison  was  free  in 
this  respect;  he  realized  that  Shakespeare  was  one 
of  the  world's  greatest  dramatists,  and  he  concluded 
that  if  Shakespeare  had  violated  any  important 
dramatic  law,  it  was  time  to  inquire  into  the  origin 
of  such  dramatic  law.  The  answer  to  his  inquiry 
revealed  the  fact  that  the  law  to  which  he  most 
objected    was    formulated    before    Shakespeare    was 

[198] 


EIGHTEENTH  CENTURY  CRITICS 

born  and  that  it  grew  out  of  a  study  of  plays  which 
were  not  necessarily  greater  than  those  that  Shakes- 
peare himself  had  written.  Inasmuch,  therefore,  as 
the  revolt  against  poetic  justice  began  when  English 
men  of  letters  realized  the  harm  that  such  a  doctrine 
would  do  to  the  reputation  of  the  greatest  poet  *of 
the  greatest  age  of  English  poetry,  it  is  well  to  take  a 
rapid  glance  at  some  of  the  appreciations  of  Shakes- 
peare which  are  representative  of  literary  criticism 
in  the  last  two  hundred  years.  The  question  of 
poetic  justice  has  not  become  a  dead  issue  even  in 
our  own  day,  and  for  that  reason  we  may  confidently 
expect  to  find  it  discussed  here  and  there,  not  only 
in  studies  dealing  with  Shakespeare,  but  also  in  such 
critical  works  as  take  note  of  development  in  the 
idea  of  tragedy. 

OTHER  EIGHTEENTH  CENTURY  CRITICS. 

Dr.  Samuel  Johnson  is  the  most  distinguished 
of  the  eighteenth  century  English  commentators  on 
Shakespeare  to  whom  we  can  turn  for  an  opinion 
on  poetic  justice.  The  preface  to  his  edition  of 
Shakespeare,  published  in  1765,  contains  a  passage 
which  shows  that  he  regarded  poetic  justice  as  a 
necessary  law  of  the  drama.  Shakespeare's  first 
defect,  he  says,  "  is  that  to  which  may  be  imparted 
most  of  the  evil  in  books  or  in  man.  He  sacrifices 
virtue  to  convenience,  and  is  so  much  more  careful 
to  please  than  instruct,  that  he  seems  to  write 
without  any  moral  purpose.  From  his  writings 
indeed  a  system  of  social  duty  may  be  selected,  for 
he    that    thinks    reasonably    must    think    morally; 

[  199] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

but  his  precepts  and  axioms  drop  casually  from  him; 
he  makes  no  just  distribution  of  good  or  evil,  nor  is  he 
always  careful  to  show  in  the  virtuous  a  disapproba- 
tion of  the  wicked ;  he  carries  his  persons  indifferently 
through  right  and  wrong,  and  at  the  close  dismisses 
them  without  further  care,  and  leaves  their  examples 
to  operate  by  chance.  This  fault  the  barbarity  of 
his  age  can  not  extenuate;  for  it  is  always  a  writer's 
duty  to  make  the  world  better,  and  justice  is  a  virtue 
independent  on  time  or  place."* 

But  Dr.  Johnson's  opinion  underwent  a  change 
as  regards  poetic  justice,  and  on  this  account  it  is 
necessary  to  call  attention  to  certain  parts  of  the 
passage  just  quoted.  Several  of  the  expressions 
used  indicate  that  he  has  in  mind  the  principle  that 
the  good  must  be  rewarded  and  that  the  wicked 
must  be  punished.  What  else  can  he  mean,  for 
instance,  when  he  speaks  of  "A  just  distribution 
of  good  or  evil?"  He  does  not  refer  to  the  actions 
of  the  persons  of  the  play,  but  rather  to  the  conse- 
quences of  their  actions,  as  is  evident  from  the 
context;  in  other  words,  Shakespeare  is  accused  of 
establishing  a  relation  between  an  act  and  its  conse- 
quences that  can  not  be  approved  of  on  the  grounds 
of  justice.  To  do  this,  is  to  commit  a  wrong  from  the 
point  of  view  of  dramatic  art  and  also  from  the  point 
of  view  of  ethics.  If  Johnson  tolerated  any  deviation 
from  the  rule  of  poetic  justice,  it  would  be  hardly 
fair  to  say  that  he  accused  Shakespeare  of  violating 
a   fundamental    principle    of   dramatic   art,    but   the 

*  Eighteenth  Century  Essays,   Edited   by   D.    N.   Smith, 
p.    123. 

[  200  ] 


EIGHTEENTH  CENTURY  CRITICS 

fact  remains  that  he  admits  of  no  exception  to  the 
rule,  since  he  insists  that  "  it  is  always  a  writer's 
duty  to  make  the  world  better."  It  is,  of  course, 
clear  that  Dr.  Johnson  thinks  Shakespeare  has  not 
always  done  his  duty  in  this  respect,  not  only  because 
the  consequences  of  actions  do  not  constantly  illus- 
trate the  workings  of  a  just  Providence,  but  also 
because  the  virtuous  characters  which  he  portrays 
do  not  in  all  cases  show  a  disapproval  of  what  is 
wrong. 

This  was  the  attitude  of  Dr.  Johnson  towards 
the  doctrine  of  poetic  justice  in  1765.  Observe  now 
the  change  that  took  place  about  fifteen  years  later. 
It  was  then  that  he  published  his  Lives  of  the  Poets, 
and  had  occasion  again  to  deal  with  this  same 
problem  in  literary  criticism.  It  will  be  remembered 
that  his  Life  of  Addison  contains  a  pretty  full  account 
of  the  Remarks  of  Dennis  on  Addison's  Cato.  After 
quoting  the  passage  in  which  Dennis  declares  that 
everywhere  throughout  the  play  Addison  "  makes 
virtue  suffer  and  vice  triumph,"*  Dr.  Johnson  makes 
a  commentary  which  shows  that  he  now  entertains 
opinions  that  are  just  the  opposite  of  those  which 
he  expressed  in  1765.  "Whatever  pleasure  there 
may  be,"  he  says,  "in  seeing  crimes  punished  and 
virtue  rewarded,  yet,  since  wickedness  often  prospers 
in  real  life,  the  poet  is  certainly  at  liberty  to  give 
it  prosperity  on  the  stage.  For  if  poetry  has  an 
imitation  of  reality,  how  are  its  laws  broken  by 
exhibiting  the  world  in  its  true  form?  The  stage 
may  sometimes  gratify  our  wishes;  but  if  it  be  truly 
'the  mirror  of  life,'  it  ought  to  show  us  sometimes 

*  Johnson,   Life  of  Addison,   Works,   VII.,   p.   458. 
[  201  ] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

what  we  are  to  expect."*  The  change  of  opinion  is 
signally  apparent.  He  no  longer  holds  that  it  is 
always  the  duty  of  the  poet  to  picture  the  ideal; 
he  rather  holds  that  there  should  be  exceptions  to 
this  rule,  in  order  to  show  us  what  we  are  to  expect 
in  real  life.  It  is  hardly  fair,  then,  to  characterize 
Dr.  Johnson  as  an  advocate  of  poetic  justice,  even 
though  he  supported  the  doctrine  in  the  preface 
from  which  we  have  quoted.  It  is  not  likely  that 
Dr.  Johnson  was  ready  in  his  later  years  to  find 
fault  with  Shakespeare  as  he  did  in  1765,  when  he 
favored  a  happy  ending  for  Lear,  and,  as  Professor 
Lounsbury  remarks,  "  wished  to  see  the  virtue  of 
Cordelia  rewarded  as  well  as  the  wickedness  of  her 
sisters  punished. "f 

Dr.  Johnson's  final  judgment  on  the  drama 
was,  that  it  should  be  the  mirror  of  life,  and  in  this 
he  agreed  with  Addison,  who  justified  his  contention 
by  saying  that  the  ancient  writers  of  tragedy  "  treated 
Men  in  their  Plays  as  they  are  dealt  with  in  the 
World;  by  making  Virtue  sometimes  happy  and 
sometimes  miserable."!  And  Johnson,  more  than 
any  other  critic,  is  to  be  given  the  credit  of  making 
'  the  mirror  of  life '  a  suggestive  phrase  in  literary 
criticism,    just   as   it   is   likewise   true   that   Rymer 

*  One  could  scarcely  ask  for  a  more  explicit  statement 
of  the  doctrine  of  realism.  No  matter  how  great  is  the  objec- 
tion to  be  raised  against  some  of  our  modern  exponents  of 
realism,  we  must  still  remember  that  the  underlying  principles 
upon  which  this  theory  of  art  is  based  have  been  enuciated 
by  literary  critics  of  considerable  distinction  and  merit. 
Not  the  least  of  these  were  Johnson  and  Addison. 

f   Lounsbury,  Shakespeare  as  a  Dramatic  Artist,  p.  413. 

%  Spectator,  No.  40. 

[  202  ] 


EIGHTEENTH  CENTURY  CRITICS 

deserves  the  credit  of  introducing  into  our  language 
the  expressive  phrase,   'poetical   justice.' 

Between  the  time  of  the  publication  of  Dr. 
Johnson's  edition  of  Shakespeare  and  the  writing 
of  his  Life  of  Addison,  Sir  William  Cook  produced  a 
work  called  The  Elements  of  Dramatic  Criticism. 
Like  many  before  him,  he  falls  into  an  error  in  the 
interpretation  of  Aristotle's  definition  of  tragedy, 
calling  it  "  the  imitation  of  an  action,  which,  by 
means  of  terror  and  compassion,  refines  and  purifies 
in  us  all  sorts  of  passion."  The  mistake  of  interpre- 
tation consists  in  this,  that  '  all  sorts  of  passion ' 
is  too  comprehensive  a  phrase.  Cook  did  not, 
however,  make  the  mistake  of  thinking  that  Aris- 
totle's definition  of  tragedy  called  for  a  spectacle 
in  which  the  reward  of  virtue  was  to  be  protrayed, 
though  he  admits  that  "  there  are  other  kinds  of 
tragedy,  no  doubt,  where  the  good  and  the  bad 
are  rewarded."*  He  is  correct  in  his  observation 
that  "  our  pity  is  engaged  for  the  persons  represented, 
and  our  terror  is  upon  our  own  account,  "f  His 
idea  of  the  character  of  the  tragic  hero  is  the  same 
as  that  of  Aristotle;  for  he  says,  "the  only  character 
then,  most  fitted  for  a  tragical  subject,  lies  in  the 
middle,  neither  eminently  good,  nor  eminently  bad, 
where  the  misfortunes  are  not  the  effects  of  deliberate 
vice,  but  of  some  involuntary  fault."!  Judged  by 
such  principles,  Shakespeare  is  to  be  blamed  for 
Macbeth  and  Richard  III.,  even  though  Cook  is 
silent  on  this  particular  point. 

The  publication  of  The  Elements  of  Dramatic 
Criticism  in  1775  supplies  us  with  a  sort  of  transitional 

*   Ibid.  t   Ibid.  %   Ibid.,    p.    31. 

[203] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

stage  in  Dr.  Johnson's  development  as  a  dramatic 
critic:  before  that  time  Dr.  Johnson  approved  of 
the  doctrine  of  poetic  justice;  after  that  time  he 
rejected  it.  Cook  himself  follows  Aristotle  by 
admitting  the  application  of  the  rule  to  some  kinds 
of  tragedy,  while  finding  no  place  for  it  in  the  ideal 
type.  Poetic  justice  calls  for  a  representation  of 
the  rewards  of  virtue  as  well  as  the  punishments 
of  vice;  whereas  true  tragedy,  according  to  Aristotle 
and  Cook,  deals  chiefly  with  the  misfortunes  of  a 
character  moderately  good  and  moderately  bad. 

In  Volume  I.  of  the  Retrospective  Review,  published 
in  London  in  1820,  we  find  an  excellent  discussion 
of  the  doctrine  of  poetic  justice.  The  very  first 
article  in  the  Review  deals  with  Rymer  and  his 
theory  of  tragedy,  but  it  is  rather  expository  than 
critical.  Article  X.  in  the  same  volume  is  far  more 
interesting  and  valuable,  for  it  contains  an  up-to-date 
argument  against  the  "ridiculous  doctrine."  The 
article  deals  with  the  writings  of  John  Dennis,  chiefly 
for  the  purpose  of  analyzing  his  views  in  regard 
to  the  doctrine  of  rewards  and  punishments,  which, 
as'  the  author  of  the  article  declared,  "  involves  one 
of  those  mistakes  in  humanity  which  it  is  always 
desirable  to  expose."*  Then,  after  quoting  a  lengthy 
passage  from  Dennis,  the  reviewer  goes  on  to  say, 
"  It  may  be  sufficient  answer  to  all  this — and  much 
more  of  the  same  kind  which  our  author  has 
adduced — that  little  good  can  be  attained  by  repre- 
sentations which  are  perpetually  at  variance  with 
our  ordinary  preceptions.     The  poet  may  represent 


*  Retrospective  Review,   1820,  Vol.   I.,  p.   311. 
[204] 


EIGHTEENTH  CENTURY  CRITICS 

humanity  as  mightier  and  fairer  than  it  appears  to 
a  common  observer.  In  the  mirror  which  he  'holds 
up  to  nature'  the  forms  of  might  and  of  beauty  may 
look  more  august,  more  lovely,  or  more  harmonious, 
than  they  appear  in  the  'light  of  common  day,' 
to  eyes  which  are  ungifted  with  poetic  vision.  But 
if  the  world  of  imagination  is  directly  opposed  to 
that  of  reality,  it  will  become  a  cold  abstraction,  a 
baseless  dream,  a  splendid  mockery.  We  shall 
strive  in  vain  to  make  man  sympathise  with,  beings 
of  a  sphere  purely  ideal,  where  might  shall  be  always 
right,  and  virtue  its  own  present  as  well  as  exceeding 
great  reward."* 

It  is  hardly  necessary  to  make  any  comment  on 
a  criticism  so  explicit  as  this.  Addison  and  Dr. 
Johnson  had  given  expression  to  the  same  thoughts, 
but  not  so  forcibly,  when  they  argued  that  the 
drama  should  give  us  a  picture  of  life.  In  some 
respects  our  reviewer  of  1820  goes  deeper  into  the 
analysis  of  the  problem  than  any  of  his  predecessors, 
for  he  rejects  the  doctrine  of  poetic  justice,  and 
discovers  in  the  violation  of  that  law  a  lesson  of 
moral  import.  "Though  the  poet,"  he  says,  "can 
not  make  us  witnesses  of  the  future  recompense  of 
that  virtue,  which  here  struggles  and  suffers,  he  can 
cause  us  to  feel,  in  the  midst  of  its  very  struggles 
and  sufferings  that  it  is  eternal.  He  makes  the 
principle  of  immortality  manifest  in  the  meek  sub- 
mission, in  the  deadly  wrestle  with  fate,  and  even  in 
the  mortal  agonies  of  his  noblest  characters." 

But    our    reviewer    is    not    ready    to    give    the 

*  Ibid. 

[  205] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

dramatist  unlimited  freedom.  He  will  not  allow 
the  drama  to  be  injurious  to  the  morals  of  society. 
He  wishes  to  avoid  the  abuses  for  which  the  stage 
was  noted  in  those  times  when  Puritanism  made  its 
most  violent  attacks  upon  plays  and  players.  The 
doctrine  of  poetic  justice  became  a  bye  word  with 
critics  as  a  result  of  an  effort  to  make  the  effect 
of  the  drama  harmonize  with  the  moral  law.  Our 
reviewer  has  shown  how  that  harmony  may  be 
preserved  even  when  the  good  perish,  but  he  does 
not  pretend  to  show  how  such  harmony  can  exist 
if  the  drama  be  without  law  to  regulate  it.  He 
has  no  prejudices;  he  is  willing  to  have  it  serve  a 
good  purpose  in  literary  criticism,  and  he  assigns 
to  it  the  duty  of  keeping  strict  watch  upon  the  real 
immoralities  of  the  stage;  for  he  says,  "The  only 
real  violation  of  poetical  justice  is  in  the  violation 
of  nature,  to  array  vice  in  attractive  qualities,  which 
excite  an  interest  in  its  favor,  whatever  may  be  its 
destiny.  When,  for  example,  a  wretch,  whose  trade 
is  murder,  is  represented  as  cherishing  the  purest 
and  deepest  love  for  an  innocent  being — when 
chivalrous  delicacy  of  sentiment  is  conferred  on  a 
pirate,  tainted  with  a  thousand  crimes — the  effect 
is  immoral,  whatever  doom  may,  at  last,  await 
him.  If  the  barriers  of  virtue  and  of  evil  are  melted 
down  by  the  current  of  spurious  sympathy,  there 
is  no  catastrophe  which  can  remove  the  mischief; 
and,  while  these  are  preserved  in  our  feelings,  there 
is  none  which  can  truly  harm  us.  Virtue  makes 
even  the  deeper  impression  when  it  is  afflicted."* 

*   Ibid.,   p.   312. 

[206] 


kECENT  OPINIONS 

RECENT  OPINIONS  ABOUT  POETIC  JUSTICE. 

What,  it  may  be  asked,  is  the  present  day 
attitude  in  regard  to  the  vexing  problem?  What 
is  the  outcome  of  the  war  that  has  been  waged  in 
literary  criticism?  In  some  respects  the  war  has 
not  been  ended,  though  the  field  over  which  it  is 
now  waged  is  not  so  extensive  as  formerly.  Critics 
will  no  longer  be  heard  if  they  attempt  to  argue  that 
Richard  III.  is  so  excessively  wicked  that  he  can 
not  be  punished  according  to  the  requirements  of 
poetic  justice;  nor  will  they  be  heard  if  they  condemn 
Shakespeare  for  the  unhappy  deaths  of  Cordelia  and 
Desdemona.  There  is,  however,  a  tendency  to 
regard  poetic  justice  as  one  of  the  legitimate  determi- 
nants of  fate,  but  not  the  only  one.  We  are  aware 
that  poetic  justice  was,  without  any  question  what- 
ever, the  determinant  of  fate  in  Rymer's  Edgar. 
He  wrote  his  play  to  illustrate  the  workings  of  his 
theory.  We  know,  also,  that  many  of  Dryden's 
plays  were  written  within  the  limitations  imposed 
by  such  a  rule,  and  we  have  Dryden's  own  words 
for  this.  Dennis  and  Gildon  also  wrote  plays  in 
which  poetic  justice  was  unquestionalby  the  deter- 
minant of  fate.  It  is  proper,  therefore,  to  regard 
poetic  justice  as  a  determinant  of  fate  in  the  drama. 
To  this,  no  one  can  reasonably  object.  To  say, 
however,  that  this  must  be  the  determinant  of  fate 
in  all  tragedies,  or  what  is  more,  in  all  kinds  of  drama. 
is  to  advocate  an  extreme  rule  against  which  literary 
criticism  has  rebelled  ever  since  the  days  of  Addison. 
Present-day  literary  criticism  has  worked  out  the 
problem   of  the  determinant  of  fate  in   a   scientific 

[207] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

manner;  and  to  no  one,  more  than  to  Professor 
Moulton,  is  due  the  credit  of  putting  the  best  ideas 
on  the  subject  in  such  a  form  that  they  may  be 
readily  understood. 

It  is  easy  to  get  the  impression  that  Professor 
Moulton  is  an  extremist  in  his  views  on  poetic  justice, 
because  he  makes  such  a  systematic  effort  to  show 
a  just  relation  between  sin  and  its  consequences. 
Wherever,  in  Shakespeare's  plays,  a  great  crime  is 
committed,  he  endeavors  to  show  how  the  act  brings 
upon  itself  the  retribution  which  follows.  But 
Moulton  does  not  bind  himself  to  any  theory  of 
poetic  justice.  Chance  itself  is  to  be  regarded  as  a 
determinant  of  fate,  destiny  is  another  determinant, 
and  to  these  he  adds  two  others  called  a  personal 
providence,  and  an  accumulation  of  pathos.  These 
determinants  of  fate  may  be  found  operating  in 
different  plays  by  the  same  author,  and  sometimes 
two  or  more  of  them  may  be  found  in  a  single  play. 
Many  of  the  Greek  tragedies  have  destiny  as  a 
determinant  of  fate.  Shakespeare's  Tempest  illus- 
trates the  workings  of  a  personal  providence  in  the 
character  of  Prospero.  Desdemona's  death  is  an 
illustration  of  an  accumulation  of  pathos  and  has  a 
beauty  of  its  own  that  satisfies  high  ideals  in  dramatic 
art.  In  Macbeth  we  have  the  workings  of  Nemesis, 
a  term  used  to  indicate  a  modified  conception  of 
poetic  justice;  and  in  Romeo  and  Juliet  we  find 
chance  operating  to  bring  about  the  issues  of  the 
play.  Moulton,  then,  did  not  go  to  the  extreme 
of  making  poetic  justice  the  only  determinant  of 
fate,  nor  did  he  formulate  for  it  a  definition  to  which 
exception  might  be  readily  taken. 
[208] 


RECENT  OPINIONS 

What  Moulton  understands  by  poetic  justice 
were  best  presented  in  his  own  words.  "The  first 
of  the  great  determinants  of  fate  in  the  drama," 
he  says,  in  his  work  on  Shakespeare  as  a  Dramatic 
Artist,  "is  Poetic  Justice.  What  exactly  is  the 
meaning  of  this  term.  It  is  often  understood  to 
mean  the  correction  of  justice,  as  if  justice  in  poetry 
were  more  just  than  the  justice  of  real  life.  But 
this  is  not  supported  by  the  facts  of  dramatic  story. 
An  English  judge  and  jury*  would  revolt  against 
measuring  out  to  Shylock  the  justice  that  is  meted 
to  him  by  the  court  of  Venice,  though  the  same 
persons  beholding  the  scene  in  a  theatre  might  feel 
their  sense  of  Poetic  Justice  satisfied;  unless,  indeed, 
which  might  easily  happen,  the  confusion  of  ideas 
suggested  by  this  term  operated  to  check  their 
acquiescence  in  the  issues  of  the  play.  A  better 
notion  of  Poetic  Justice  is  to  understand  it  as  the 
modification  of  justice  by  considerations  of  art. 
This  holds  good  even  where  justice  and  retribution 
determine  the  fate  of  individuals  in  the  Drama; 
in  these  cases  our  dramatic  satisfaction  still  rests 
not  on  the  high  degree  of  justice  exhibited,  but  on 
the  artistic  mode  in  which  it  works.  A  policeman 
catching  a  thief  with  his  hand  in  a  neighbor's  pocket 
and  bringing  him  to  summary  punishment  affords 
an  example  of  complete  justice,  yet  its  very  success 
robs  it  of  all  poetic  qualities;  the  same  thief  defeating 
all  the  natural  machinery  of  the  law,  yet  overtaken 

*  Rymer,  Last  Age,  p.  25.  "Poetry,"  he  says,  "dis- 
covered crimes  the  Law  would  never  find  out;  and  punished 
those  the  Law  had  acquitted." 

f   Moulton,    Shakespeare   as   a    Dramatic    Artist,    p.    255. 

[  209] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

after  all  by  a  questionable  ruse  would  be  to  the 
poetic  sense  far  more  interesting,  "f 

This  exposition  of  poetic  justice  takes  into 
account  only  in  a  very  uncertain  degree  the  original 
notion  of  an  exact  distribution  of  rewards  and 
punishments.  When  the  doctrine  was  first  discussed 
by  Rymer  in  such  a  way  as  to  give  it  a  distinctive 
place  in  literary  criticism,  emphasis  was  laid  on  the 
fact  that  each  and  every  one  of  the  characters  in 
the  drama  should  be  rewarded  or  punished  accord- 
ing to  a  common  standard  of  justice.  Besides  this 
it  was  required,  as  Moulton  oberves,  that  the  punish- 
ments imposed  should  be  more  severe  than  those 
which  the  civil  law  would  allow.  To  some  extent 
the  seventeenth  century  idea  of  artistic  method  in 
retribution  is  similar  to  that  which  Moulton  illustrates. 
In  its  main  features,  however,  the  idea  is  so  trans- 
formed as  to  be  made  acceptable.  Above  all  things, 
it  is  not  a  hard  and  fast  rule  against  which  dramatist 
must  not  offend.  When  Moulton  proposes  Pathos 
as  one  of  the  determinants  of  fate,  he  shows  clearly 
that  he  rejects  poetic  justice  as  a  universal  rule 
of  tragedy. 

Moulton's  idea  of  poetic  justice  is  such  as  to 
admit  of  subdivision.  First  of  all,  he  recognizes  a 
form  of  poetic  justice  which  he  calls  Nemesis.  By 
this  he  means  the  "artistic  link  between  sin  and 
retribution."*  Besides  Nemesis  there  are  other 
forms  which  he  distinguishes  by  no  special  name. 
He  makes  this  distinction,  however:  Nemesis  implies 
a  relation  between  sin  and  retribution;  other  forms 
may   involve   no   sin   whatsoever,    as,   for   instance, 

*  Ibid. 

[  210] 


RECENT  OPINIONS 

the  case  where  "fate  may  be  out  of  accord  with 
character,  and  the  correction  of  this  ill  distribution 
will  satisfy  the  dramatic  sense."*  By  means  of  these 
subdivisions  of  the  subject  Moulton  stretches  the 
idea  of  poetic  justice  to  the  farthest  limits,  and  then 
finding  that  it  will  not  serve  all  the  needs  of  dramatic 
art,  he  says  that  "however  widely  the  term  be 
stretched,  justice  is  only  one  of  the  determinants 
of  fate."f 

The  great  mistake  of  many  critics  has  been  to 
read  too  much  into  literature.  Moulton  has  almost 
placed  himself  among  the  number  of  these  by  dis- 
covering in  Shakespeare  more  than  Shakespeare 
was  consciously  responsible  for.  In  his  work  called 
The  Moral  System  in  Shakespeare,  and  later  called 
Shakespeare  as  a  Dramatic  Thinker,  Moulton  makes 
a  most  interesting  attempt  to  show  that  Shake- 
speare's plays  are  filled  with  lessons  of  great  moral 
import.  That  any  great  poet  in  any  age  could  con- 
sciously work  out  all  the  intricate  relations  which 
Moulton  discovers  in  the  plays  of  Shakespeare  would 
be  quite  improbable.  Moulton  saves  himself  from 
reproach  by  merely  observing  the  harmony  existing 
between  crime  and  retribution;  he  does  not  maintain 
that  Shakespeare  deliberately  intended  or  was  aware 
of  all  these  poetical  effects. 

It  is  hard  for  the  literary  artist,  or  the  literary 
critic,  or  the  general  public,  to  get  away  from  the 
thought  that  our  ideas  of  justice  must  not  be  violated 
by  dramatic  spectacles.  This  same  spirit  shows 
itself  in  the  technical  instruction  which  is  set  before 
the    young    playwright.     In    a    recent    work    called 

*   Ibid.,  p.   257.  t   Ibid. 

[211] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

The  Technique  of  the  Drama,  I  find  a  definition  which 
calls  for  a  recognition  of  the  principle  of  rewards 
and  punishments.  The  author  of  the  work,  W.  T. 
Price,  has  the  following  to  say  on  the  subject:  "That 
idea  only  is  dramatic  that  can  be  put  into  shape  of 
sustained  action — an  action  that  is  complete  and 
organic,  with  unity  of  theme  and  purpose,  that 
invites  our  attention  at  the  outset,  arouses  an  interest 
as  it  proceeds,  and  conforms  itself  in  our  sympathies, 
at  last  coming  to  a  conclusion  in  its  disposition  of 
the  characters  that  accords  with  out  views  of 
justice."* 

Courtney,  in  a  book  called  The  Idea  of  Tragedy, 
expresses  the  modern  attitude  of  literary  men  to 
the  question  of  poetic  justice.  Referring  to  the 
origins  of  the  drama,  he  notes  that  in  combination 
with  the  "notion  of  divine  jealousy,  we  find  the 
idea  also  of  an  inexorable  law  of  destiny  to  which  the 
Olympian  Gods  were  themselves  subject,  a  great 
hard  iron  despotism  of  fate,  without  ears  to  listen 
to  human  prayers,  without  eyes  to  see  the  range 
of  human  misery.  It  was  an  irreverent  theory  for 
any  one  who  believed  that  the  world  was  governed 
by  intelligence,  regulated  by  justice,  and  tempered 
with  mercy;  moreover,  for  purposes  of  tragedy, 
it  was  an  undramatic  theory,  "f  This  is  Courtney's 
introduction  to  a  discussion  of  Greek  tragedy,  wherein 
he  shows  how  the  dramatists  avoided  a  portrayal 
of  the  workings  of  an  absolutely  blind  fate,  but 
chose  rather  to  account  for  the  unhappiness  of  their 
heroes  by  discovering  some  frailty  in  their  characters. 

*   Price,  The  Technique  oj  the  Drama,  p.  2. 
t  Courtney,  The  Idea  oj  Tragedy,  pp.   19—20. 

[  212  ] 


RECENT    OPINIONS 

"Observe,"  says  Courtney,  "with  what  punctilious 
jealousy  iEschylus  holds  the  scales  even,"  in  the 
case  of  Orestes.  "He  shall  be  punished,  driven 
from  land  to  land  by  the  Furies,  which  in  other 
words,  are  strings  of  conscience;  but  he  shall  be 
saved  at  last,  because  the  motive  of  his  actions 
was  a  good  one,  and  because  Zeus  wills  not  the  death 
of  a  sinner.  Will  you  say  there  is  no  justice  in  divine 
decrees?  Will  you  say  that  man  is  helpless  in  the 
hands  of  fate?  Will  you  says  that  the  laws  of 
heredity  are  adamantine  in  their  force  and  stringency? 
iEschylus  will  not  have  it  so.  The  divine  ordinance 
is  worked  out  through  human  frailty.  No  one  is 
punished,  except  for  acts  of  cruelty,  which,  in  them- 
selves, invite  their  proper  retribution."*  Here  we 
see  the  method  Courtney  follows  in  reading  poetic 
justice  into  the  ancient  Greek  drama.  In  this,  he 
is  only  doing  what  was  done  by  many  others  before 
him,  though  all  do  not  agree  that  the  Greek  drama 
illustrates  the  theory  with  sufficient  regularity  to  be 
a  warrant  for  the  conclusions  drawn. 

However  willing  Courtney  was  to  admit  that 
the  Greeks  observed  the  law  of  poetic  justice,  he  was 
very  far  from  granting  that  Shakespeare  did  anything 
of  that  kind.  He  himself  asks  the  question  directly, 
"was  Shakespeare  a  believer  in  poetic  justice? "t 
His  answer  to  the  question  is  very  positive  and  in 
the  negative,  and  he  bases  his  judgment  on  practically 
the  same  argument  that  was  used  by  Dr.  Johnson 
in  his  Life  of  Addison  in  1779.  "Good  and  evil," 
says  Courtney,  "are  great  facts  in  human  life,  and 
it  is  absurd  to  say  that  good  always  triumphs.  Evil 
*  Ibid.,    p.    24.  t   Ibid.,   pp.   66-67. 

[213] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

triumphs  as  well.  Looking  at  the  mundane  sphere 
in  which  the  beneficent  and  maleficent  forces  are 
warring,  we  can  not  say  that  everything  is  for  the 
best  in  this  best  of  possible  worlds.  But  there  is 
a  higher  form  of  poetic  justice,  which  means  nothing 
more  and  nothing  less  than  being  true  to  the  facts," 
Here  we  have  the  defence  of  Shakespeare  based  upon 
the  idea  that  it  is  the  business  of  the  drama  '  to 
hold  the  mirror  up  to  nature."  It  is  substantially 
the  same  argument  as  Addison  used  in  defending 
the  liberties  of  the  stage,  and  in  its  main  features 
has  been  used  by  all  the  defenders  of  Shakespeare 
who  are  opposed  to  the  doctrine  of  poetic  justice. 
But  some  of  the  modern  critics  of  Shakespeare 
have  attempted  to  show  that  he  has  not  violated 
this  rule.  Gervinus  and  Ulrici  among  the  Germans, 
and  Snider  here  in  our  own  country,  have  accepted 
the  doctrine  of  poetic  justice  with  all  the  hardships 
it  imposes  on  tragedy,  and  have  endeavored  to 
explain  away  many  of  the  difficulties  which  Shake- 
speare puts  in  their  way,  not  by  saying  that  Shake- 
speare is  at  fault,  but  by  showing  that  the  difficulty 
is  merely  imaginary.  They  will  not  admit  that 
Desdemona  or  Cordelia,  for  instance,  are  faultless. 
They  try  to  show  that  real  faults  were  committed, 
and  for  these  they  were  punished.  Desdemona 
married  a  man  not  of  her  race.  Cordelia  did  not 
answer  her  father  in  a  fitting  manner,  Lear  com- 
mitted an  act  of  imprudence  in  the  division  of  his 
Kingdom, — such  are  the  faults  that  are  to  be  punished 
by  death.  Gervinus  finds  that  Duncan,  Banquo 
and  Macduff  are  all  guilty  in  a  degree  that  justifies 

[214] 


RECENT  OPINIONS 

the  calamities  which  befell  them.*  Ulrici  adopts 
the  same  system  of  defence  for  Shakespeare  that  is 
found  in  Gervinus.  f  Duncan,  he  tells  us  is  weak, 
a  coward,  unfit  for  the  duties  of  his  office,  and  there- 
fore he  is  justly  slain.  Macduff  committed  a  fault, 
inasmuch  as  he  fled  from  home  and  country  too 
hastily, — at  least,  he  showed  neglect  for  his  family, 
and  was  therefore  responsible  for  the  calamity  which 
befell  his  children.  At  the  same  time,  he  was  punished 
not  by  the  loss  of  his  own  life  but  by  the  loss  of  those 
whom  he  had  neglected.  Banquo  is  also  an  example 
of  poetic  justice,  because  he  was  arrogantly  compla- 
cent when  he  contemplated  the  honors  that  might 
come  to  him,  or  at  least  to  his  descendants.  He 
should  have  checked  Macbeth's  ambition  and  re- 
strained his  own;  but  he  failed  to  do  so,  and  there- 
fore his  crime.  It  is  in  such  a  manner  as  this  that 
Ulrici  illustrates  the  unswerving  obedience  of  .Shake- 
speare to  the  law  of  poetic  justice.  Similarly  Snider 
shows  his  loyalty  to  the  doctrine  of  rewards  and 
punishments    by    discovering    human    frailties    and 

*  Gervinus,  Shakespeare  Commentaries,  pp.  605  ff. 
"As  regards  poetic  justice  in  the  fates  of  Duncan,  Banquo, 
and  Macduff,"  says  Gervinus,  "there  lies  in  the  nature 
of  all  a  contrast  to  that  of  Macbeth.  King  Duncan  is 
characterized  in  history  as  a  man  of  greater  weakness  than 
became  a  King.  Want  of  foresight  ruins  Banquo.  He  had 
been  initiated  into  the  secret  of  the  weird  sisters;  pledged 
to  openness  towards  Macbeth,  he  had  opportunity  of  convinc- 
ing himself  of  his  obduracy  and  secrecy;  he  guesses  at,  and 
strongly  suspects  Macbeth's  deed;  yet  he  docs  nothing 
against  him  or  in  self-defence.  Macduff  is  not  quite  so 
culpable — he  is  not,  therefore,  punished  in  his  own  person 
but  in   the  fate  of  his  family." 

f  Ulrici,   Shakespeare's  Dramatic  Art,   I.,   pp.   473  ff. 

[215] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

punishable  sins  in  such  faultless  creatures  as  Des- 
demona  and  Cordelia.  Like  Moulton,  he  evolves 
out  of  Shakespeare  a  voluminous  system  of  morality, 
but  is  gifted  with  less  literary  skill  as  a  writer,  and 
with  less  scientific  method  as  a  literary  critic. 

CONCLUSION. 

The  difference  between  the  two  schools  of  literary 
interpretation  is  striking  in  more  respects  than  one. 
If  there  is  any  highly  unpoetical  dogma  of  dramatic 
criticism,  it  is  the  dogma  which  is  called  poetic 
justice.  Those  who  were  the  most  famous  exponents 
of  this  dogma  were  at  the  same  time  the  most  un- 
worthy of  praise  from  the  point  of  view  of  literary 
art.  No  critic  is  to  be  lauded  for  maintaining  that 
a  good  play  can  not  be  written  without  observing 
the  rule  in  every  detail.  Genius  in  any  form  of  art 
has  been  first  of  all  a  contributor  to  the  world's 
civilization  and  after  that  a  contributor  of  raw 
materials  to  some  maker  of  the  rules  of  art.  But 
genius  is  not  to  be  bound  down  by  any  rules  as  such. 
Before  Homer  sang,  there  was  no  one  to  teach  him 
the  laws  of  the  epic;  before  Phidias  and  Praxiteles 
and  the  other  great  sculptors  made  images  of  gods 
and  men  in  ivory  and  in  marble,  there  was  no  one 
to  say  what  they  should  not  do;  before  the  architects 
of  Greece  built  their  wondrous  temples,  there  was 
no  one  to  describe  the  possibilities  of  their  art.  And 
so  it  was  with  all  the  achievements  of  the  great 
minds  of  men  in  the  dawn  of  the  world's  civilization. 
The  rules  that  govern  art  are  an  after-thought  in 
the  minds  of  lesser  men.  And  if  all  the  rules  of 
tragedy  were  enunciated  before  Shakespeare  made 
[216] 


CONCLUSION 

his  name  as  a  writer  of  plays,  it  is  either  an  accident 
that  he  complied  with  such  rules,  or  else  he  gave  to 
the  world  a  new  type  of  drama  with  rules  of  its  own. 

But  it  is  not  necessary  to  think  that  Shakespeare 
introduced  a  new  type  of  drama, — it  is  merely 
necessary  to  put  him  in  a  class  with  ^Eschylus  and 
Sophocles  and  Euripides  when  the  time  comes  to 
reduce  the  practice  of  the  world's  masters  of  the 
dramatic  art  to  a  body  of  rules.  Dryden  was  sorry 
that  Aristotle  had  not  postponed  the  publication 
of  his  Poetics  until  he  had  a  chance  to  read  the  plays 
which  had  been  written  as  late  as  the  end  of  the 
seventeenth  century.  There  may  have  been  a  note 
of  egotism  in  what  Dryden  said,  but  there  was  at 
the  same  time  a  suggestion  of  good  sense.  And 
Moulton  is  right  in  his  idea  about  inductive  criticism, 
provided,  of  course,  he  approves  of  no  resulting 
principles  that  are  opposed  to  the  fundamental  laws 
of  morality.  He  believes  that  rules,  in  order  to  be 
truly  expressive  of  the  character  of  any  art,  must 
be  based  on  data  gathered  from  the  entire  field 
embraced  by  that  art.  This  is  particularly  true  as 
regards  Shakespeare's  relation  to  the  laws  of  the 
drama;  and  he  is  not  to  be  condemned  by  any 
rule  of  Aristotle  merely  because  it  was  formulated 
by  an  eminent  critic. 

We  have  characterized  the  doctrine  of  poetic 
justice,  in  its  strict  sense,  as  the  most  unpoetical  of 
literary  dogmas.  To  illustrate  the  truth  of  this 
assertion,  let  us  call  attention  again  to  some  of  the 
applications  of  the  doctrine.  On  the  one  hand, 
poetic  justice  says  Desdemona  committed  a  crime 
for  which  she  was  justly  punished  by  death,  and  we 

[  217  ] 


POETIC  JUSTICE  IN  THE  DRAMA 

are  asked  to  believe  that  because  of  this  fact  the 
portrayal  of  her  character  is  poetical.  On  the  other 
hand,  poetic  justice  says  that  Shakespeare  violated 
a  principle  of  poetical  art  in  bringing  Desdemona  to 
so  unhappy  an  end,  and  for  this  reason  we  are  asked 
to  believe  that  the  portrayal  of  her  character  is  not 
poetry.  In  either  case,  it  is  difficult  to  accept  the 
judgment  of  the  literary  critic. 

The  poetical  test  is  too  mechanical,  too  arbitrary, 
too  cold  and  unartistic.  Against  the  critics  who 
would  apply  such  a  test,  let  us  quote  the  words  of 
Courtney  on  the  same  subject.  "If  history,"  he 
says,  "does  not  teach  that  the  world  is  governed 
by  moral  laws,  it  is  difficult  to  know  what  it  does 
teach,  for  it  assuredly  does  not  suggest  a  reign  of 
chaos.  And  if  this  be  so — and  most  certainly 
Shakespeare  thought  it  was  so — you  can  extract  from 
Shakespeare's  plays  a  great  justification  of  the  ways 
of  Providence  to  men.  Ask,  for  instance,  whether 
our  moral  conscience  is  satisfied  in  his  treatment 
of  the  human  drama,  and  there  can  only  be  an 
affirmative  reply.  To  talk  of  Shakespeare  as  a  pessi- 
mist is  absurd.  The  real  pessimism  is  the  discovery 
that  human  happiness  is  unattainable.  Plenty  of 
men  and  students  who  are  not  pessimists  have  dis- 
covered that.  The  real  pessimism  is  dispair  of  human 
virtue,  and  that  Shakespeare  never  so  much  as 
suggests.  On  the  contrary  he  believes  in  human 
virtue,  and  paints  it  with  a  loving  hand.  Human 
virtue  may  often  go  down  before  the  assaults  of 
evil — Desdemona  is  ensnared  in  the  webs  spun  by 
Iago — but,  nevertheless,  it  is  its  own  exceeding 
great  reward, — and  the  dead  Cordelia  in  King  Lear's 
[218] 


CONCLUSION 

arms  triumphantly  proclaims  that  self-devotion, 
whether  it  succumbs  or  fails,  is  the  highest  of  moral 
excellences." 

The  critic  who  looks  at  the  deaths  of  Cordelia 
and  Desdemona  in  such  a  light  as  that  which  illumines 
the  plays  of  Shakespeare  for  a  man  like  Courtney, 
finds  in  them  poetry  of  the  finest  kind,  and  can  help 
others  to  see  the  beauties  he  sees  and  to  feel  the 
emotions  that  thrill  his  soul;  but  such  a  vision  is 
not  granted  the  cold,  unemotional  analyst  who 
justifies  the  relations  of  the  play  by  the  scientific 
methods  of  Gervinus,  Ulrici  and  Snider,  nor  will 
any  one  be  helped  by  such  methods  to  a  realization 
of  the  wondrous  beauty  that  is  star-lit  with  sorrow 
and  the  charming  tenderness  of  a  life  that  is  rendered 
eternally  impressive  by  death. 


[  219] 


WORKS  OF  REFERENCE 


WORKS  OF  REFERENCE. 


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London,     1891. 
Aseham,    R. :     English    Works.      Edited    by    W.    A.   Wright. 

Cambridge,     1904. 
Bacon,    F. :      The    Advancement    of    Learning.      Edited    by 

W.    A.    Wright.       4th    Ed.      Oxford,     1891. 
Bray,  J.  W. :      A  History  0}  English  Critical  Terms.      Boston, 

1898. 
Butcher,  S.   H.:      Aristotle's  Theory  0}  Poetry  and  Fine  Art. 

With  a  Critical  Text  and  a  Translation  of  the  Poetics. 

London,     1895. 
By  water,    Ingram:      Aristotle  on  the   Art  0}  Poetry.    Oxford, 

1909. 
Collier,   J.    P.:      Hie   History   of   English   Dramatic   Poetry   to 

the  time  of  Shakespeare:    and  Annals  of  the  Stage  to  the 

Restoration.      London,    1831. 
Cook,    W. :      The   Elements   of   Dramatic   Criticism.      London, 

1775. 

Courtney,   W     L. :      The  Idea  of   Tragedy  in   the  Ancient  and 

Modern  Drama.      Westminister,   1900. 
Dennis,    J.:      The   Advancement   and   Reformation   of    Modern 

Poetry.      London,    1701. 
Dennis,  J.:      An  Essay  on  the  Genius  and  Writings  of  Shake- 
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London,    171 2. 
Dennis,   J.:      The  Grounds  of   Criticism   in   Poetry.      London, 

1704. 
Dennis,  J.:      Coriolanus,   The  Invader  of  His  Country,   or  the 

Fatal  Resentment.      London,    1721. 
Dryden,  John:      Works.      Scott-Saintsbury  edition.      18  vols. 

Edinburg,    1882. 
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Oxford,     1900. 

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1900. 
Gayley    and     Scott:      Methods    and     Materials    of    Literary 

Criticism.      Boston,    1899. 
Gervinus,     G.     G. :     Shakespeare    Commentaries.      Brunnet's 

Translation.      6th  edition.      London,    1903. 
Gildon,  C. :      The  Patriot,  or  iheltalian  Conspiracy,  a  Tragedy. 

London,    1703. 
Gildon,    C. :     Phaeton,    or    The    Fatal    Divorce,    a    Tragedy. 

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Gildon,    C. :     Letters,    in    Miscellaneous    Letters    and    Essays 

on  Several  Subjects.      By  several  Gentlemen  and  Ladies. 

London,  1694. 
Gildon,  C. :     The  Complete  Art  0}  Poetry.      2  vols.      London, 

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Johnson,  S. :     Preface  to  Edi'ion  0}  Shakespeare,  in  Eighteenth 

Century  Essays  on  Shakespeare.     Edited  by  D.  Nichol 

Smith.     Glasgow,     1903. 
Johnson,    S. :     Works.      In    11    vols.      London,    1825. 
Jowett,   B. :     The  Dialogues  of  Plato  translated  into  English 

with    analyses    and    Introduction.      In    5    vols.      Oxford, 

1892.      3rd.  edition. 
Lounsbury,     T.     R. :     Shakespeare    as    a     Dramatic     Artist. 

New    York,    1901. 
Milton,  J.:     Poetical    Works.      Edited    by    the    Rev.    Henry 

Todd.      7   vols.      London.    1S09.      2nd   edition. 
Moulton,  R.  G. :     Shakespeare  as  a  Dramatic  Artist.      Oxford, 

1885. 
Price,  W.  T. :      The  Technique  of  the  Drama.    New  York,  1892. 
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2    vols.      London,     1706. 
Rymer,    T. :     A    Short     View    of    Tragedy.      London,     1693. 

Bound   with  second  edition  of   The  Last  Age. 
Rymer,   T. :      The   Tragedies  of  the   Last   Age.      2nd   edition. 

London,    1692. 
Saintsbury,    G. :      A    History   of   Literary   Criticism.      3    vols. 

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Sidney,  Sir  P.:     An  Apologie  for  Poetrie.    Edited  by  E.  Arber. 

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Smith,    D.    N. :    Eighteenth    Century   Essays   on   Shakespeare. 

Glasgow,  1903. 
Smith,  G.  G. :     Elizabethan  Critical  Essays.      2  vols.      Oxford, 

1904. 
Snider,    D. :     The   Shakespearean    Drama.     St.    Louis,    1887. 
Spingarn,    J.    E. :      .4    History    0}    Literary    Criticism    in    the 

Renaissance.      New  York,   1889. 
Spingarn,  J.  E. :     Critical  Essays  0}  the  Seventeenth  Century. 

2   vols.      Oxford.    1908. 
Taine,  A.  A.:     History  0}  English  Literature.     Translated  by 

H.   Van   Laun.        2   vols.      New   York,    1886. 
The  Retrospective  Review.      Vol.   I.      London,   1820. 
Ulrici,     H.:      Shakespeare's    Dramatic    Art.      Translation    by 

L.   Sehmitz.      London,    1908. 
Ward,    T.    H. :     The    English    Poets.      New    York.      1900. 
Worsfold,    W.    B. :      The    Principles    0}    Criticism.      London, 

1897. 
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[  225  ] 


INDEX 


INDEX. 


Absalon,    14,    17. 
Achilles,   38,    143,    188. 
Acts   of   parliament,   66,    76, 

79,   "3,   "4-  a 

Addison,  1,  3,  4,  14,  43,  49, 
64,  103,  106,  107,  125, 
144,  168,  169,  177,  179, 
i82ff. 

Addison  denounces  poetic 
justice,  1 ;  ignores  Dennis, 
6;  initiates  revolt  against 
poetic  justice,  2;  insin- 
uates that  Aristotle  did 
not  approve  of  poetic 
justice,  4. 

Addison's  conception  of  po- 
etic justice,  2;  idea  of 
tragedy,   3. 

Advancement  and  Reforma- 
tion of  Modern  Poetry,  170. 

Advancement  of  Learning,  109. 

Adventure  of  the  Spaniards, 
discussed   by  Rymer,    164. 

^Egisthus,   51,   143. 

ALneid,    27. 

^Eschylus,  22,  29,  34,  213, 
217. 

iEsthetical  and  ethical  in 
poetry  compared,  184,  193. 

.Esthetical  function  of  the 
drama,    71. 

Agamemnon,    162. 

Agiippa,  Cornelius,   104. 

Aim  of  poetry,   176,  185. 

All  for  Love,    118,    126,    160. 

Allegorical  interpretation  of 
poetry,    112. 

Amintor,    163. 

Dramatic  Poesy,    118,    122. 

An  Essay  on  Shakespeare, 
5,   64,    174.    179- 


Anatomie    of    Absurditie,    95. 

Ancients,  a  school  of  literary 
criticism,    18. 

Antigone,   57. 

Apollonius  Rhodius,   138. 

Apology  for  Poetry,  Sidney's, 
10,   15,  88ff.,  96. 

Apology  of  Poetry,  Haring- 
ton's,    io3ff. 

Areopagus,    157. 

Ariosto,    16. 

Aristophanes,  48,  49,  164 

Aristotle,  4,  6,  14,  15,  17,  18, 
20,  23,  24,  26,  28ft.,  49ff., 
57fT.,  64,  75,  90,  98,  115, 
1 1  yfF.,  122,  127,  129,  132, 
133,  136,  138,  140,  144, 
151,  160,  161,  167,  180, 
181,  184,  185,  188,  193, 
194,     197,    203,    204,    217. 

Aristotle  and  early  English 
critics,  12;  and  the  laws 
of  tragedy,  2;  compared 
with  Plato,  6 iff.;  during 
middle  ages,  12;  misunder- 
stood by  Dennis,  56;  not 
concerned  with  poetic  jus- 
tice, 54;  neglected  by 
poets  of  England,  164;  rec- 
ognized the  poetic  justice 
type  of  tragedy,  7;  var- 
iously interpreted,  7fT.,  11. 
20,  128,  141,  172,  173, 
186,  203. 

Aristotle's  definition  of  trag- 
edy, 3;  idea  of  poetry, 
62;  idea  of  tragedy,  48ff . ; 
influence  of  literary  crit- 
icism, 7ff . ;  laws  of  trag- 
edy, 2;  second  preference 
in   tragedy,    5;     true   posi- 


[  229  ] 


INDEX 


Uon  in  regard  to  poetic 
justice,  50;  views  concern- 
ing the  ethical  function 
of  poetry,  4. 

Aristotle's  Theory  0}  Poetry 
and  Fine  Art,  8,  10,  19, 
20,    51,   57,    58,   61. 

Art  0}  English  Poetry,  16,  95, 
96,  99,   101,   102. 

Arthurian    Legend,    73. 

Ascham,  1 3fT.,  17,  77,  73,  81. 

Athens,    30. 

Athenian  Constitution,  30. 

Attica,  30. 

Aufidius,    178. 


Bacon,  Francis,  66,  103,  109, 
in. 

Bacon,   Roger,   20. 

Banquo,    179,   214,   215. 

Beaumont  and  Fletcher,  1, 
126,  137,  154,  155,  158, 
161,    164,    181. 

Beginnings  of  theatrical  per- 
formances,  97. 

Blackfriars  theatre,  108,  109. 

Blind  fate,  212. 

Boccaccio,    27. 

Boileau,  6,   182. 

Brutus,  in  Coriolanus,  178; 
in    Julius  Ca:sar,  171,   172, 

179- 
Burbage's   theatre,   80. 
Butcher,    19,   20,   23,   25,  48, 

50,   51,   57- 
Butcher   on   Arstotle's    idea 

of     tragedy,     7;      on     the 

Poetics  of   Arstotle,    12. 


Cassius,    172. 

Castlevetro,   27. 

Catiline,  Jonson's,    151,    154. 

Catiline's  Conspiracies,   Gos- 

son's,    86. 
Cato,   182,   201. 
Catholic     Church     and      the 

drama,  75. 


Censorship  of  the  English 
stage,   25,  66,   72,   76,   79, 

113,    "4- 

Certain  Notes  0}  Instruction, 
81. 

Change  in  Dr.  Johnson's 
views,  201. 

Characters  concerned  in  po- 
etic justice,  55. 

Charles  I.,    King,    116. 

Cicero,    12,    86. 

Cicero's  Prince,    134. 

Cintio,   19,  26. 

Cintio's  idea  of  tragedy,  21. 

Cinyras,  41. 

Civil  punishment  compared 
with  divine  retribution, 
181. 

Classicism,  French,  116,  136, 
148. 

Classicism,  Renaissance,  115. 

Coignet,  94. 

Collier,  67,  68,  71,  75,  76, 
79,  82,   113,   114. 

Comedy,  56;  and  poetic 
justice,  50;  compared  with 
tragedy,   98,    124,    173. 

Complete  Art  of  Poetry,  10, 
191,   196,   197. 

Conquest  0}  Mexico,    138. 

Cook,  Sir  William,  203,  204. 

Corneille,   20,   153. 

Contest  in  poetry,  Rymer's, 
138. 

Cordelia,  146,  179,  202,  207, 
214,   216,   218,   219. 

Coriolanus,   177,    178,    183. 

Courtney,  212,  213,  218,  219. 

Cowley,   137,   138. 

Criticism,  Aristotle's  influ- 
ence in  literary,  7ft". 

Criticism,  Rymer's  first  con- 
tribution to  literary,  i34ff. 

Cronus,  32. 

Dacier,   20. 
Daniello,    19,    28. 
Dante,    27. 
D'Aubignac,    20. 


[230] 


INDEX 


Davenant,  112,  113,  136,  137. 
Defence    of    an    Essay,     122, 

134,  154- 

Defence  of  Poetry,  87. 

Defenders,   88. 

Dennis,  6,  14,  22,  26,  33, 
40,  49,  55,  56,  64,  65,  103, 
106,  107,  125,  140,  144, 
145,  146,  i68ff.,  i96ff.,  201, 
204,  207. 

Dennis  names  Aristotle  as 
the  first  to  establish  the 
doctrine  of  poetic  justice 
5;     replies   to   Addison,   4. 

Dennis-Addison  controversy, 
21,   52. 

Desdemona,  100,  146,  165, 
166,  179,  181,  189,  207, 
208,    214,    2l6ff. 

Determinants  of  fate,  207, 
208. 

Discourse  of  English  Poetry, 
16,   95- 

Don  Sebastian,    129,    130. 

Drama,   restraint  of,   67ff. 

Dryden,  17,  103,  113,  114, 
116,  i2off.,  136,  i38ff., 
148,  152,  154,  160,  161, 
194,    198,    207,    217. 

Dryden  accepts  the  doctrine 
of  poetic  justice,  i23ff. ; 
censures  Shakespeare,  153; 
on   tragic  emotions,    10. 

Dryden's  attack  on  Rymer, 
153;  early  critical  opin- 
ions, i2off. ;  idea  of  trag- 
edy, 115;  religion,  [116; 
views  summarized,   13111. 

Duncan,    179,    214,    215. 

Edgar,    149,    183,    207. 

Edward    VI.,    76. 

Egger,    12. 

Eighteenth  Century  Essays, 
200. 

Electra,   143. 

Elements  of  Dramatic  Crit- 
icism,  203. 

Elizabeth,  Queen,  78. 


Elizabethan  Critical  Essays, 
15,  16,  73ff.,  83,  88ff.,  101. 

Emotions,  effect  of  repeated 
exercise  of,  49;  proper  to 
tragedy,    10,   53. 

English  basis  of  poetic  jus- 
tice,  64fT. 

Eratosthenes,   26,  27. 

Essay  on  Shakespeare,   5,  64, 

174,    179- 

Ethical  and  a^sthetical  in 
poetry  compared,  184,  193. 

Ethical  effect  of  the  Aris- 
totelian   katharsis,    59. 

Ethical  function  of  the 
drama,    68. 

Ethical  purpose  of  punish- 
ment,   46. 

Ethical  requirement  in  po- 
etry, Sidney's,  88ff. 

Ethical  sense  of  the  pity 
and  fear  clause,   3. 

Euripides,  14,  17,  26,  29,  40, 
48,  117,  144,  147,  150, 
151,    167,    168,    217. 

Fable  compared  with  history, 

91,    102,    175,    179. 
Fear,      Plato's     attitude     in 

regard  to,   35. 
Field,    Richard,    95. 
Finsler,    59,    60. 
Fisher,  Bishop,  107,  108. 
Fitzstephen,   68,    71. 
Fletcher,    Beaumont  and,    1, 

126,     137,     144,     154,    155, 

15%,   159,   161,   164,   181. 
Fleckno,    66,    114,    136,    159. 
Fourth  Satire,   182. 
French    Classicism,    17,    116, 

138,    14S. 
Frogs,   48. 
Fulgentius,  27. 
Furies,   213. 

Gascoigne,    66,    81,    82,    85, 

86,    88. 
Gentleman's   Journal,    164. 
Gervinus,  189,  214,  215,  219. 


[  231  ] 


INDEX 


Gildon,  140,  168,  i89ff.,  207. 

Gildon  on  tragic  emotions,  10. 

Glass    off    Government,    82. 

Gorgias,   47. 

Gosson,    15,    79,   85,   87,   88. 

Greek  origin  of  poetic  justice, 
iff. 

Grounds  of  Criticism,   127. 

Grounds  of  Criticism  in  Po- 
etry,   174. 

Guarino,   28. 

Hamlet,    179. 

Harington,  Sir  John,  1 5ff ., 
88,    I03ff.,    112. 

Harington's   discussion   of 
poetry,   io3ff. 

Heads  of  an  Answer  to  Rymer, 
10,    118,    132,    148,    194. 

Herculas,    162. 

Hecuba,    146,   167. 

Hell  behind  the  scenes,  ac- 
cording    to     Rymer,     47, 

149,   157,   159- 
Henry  VIII.,   76. 
Hero,  character  of  the,   162, 

185,  188. 
Hesiod,  32. 
History  of  English  Literature, 

140. 
History  of   Dramatic   Poetry, 

67,  68,  71,  72,  82,  113,  114. 
History  of  Literary  Criticism, 

8ff.,    27. 
History  of  Literary  Criticism 

in  the  Renaissance,  12,   14, 

22,   113. 
History    of    Greek  Literature, 

30. 
History  of   Promos  and   Cas- 
sandra, 83. 
History,     use    of     the     word 

itself,  90. 
History  compared  with  fable, 

102,    175,    179. 
Hobbes,   103,   113,    136. 
Hoby,   Sir   E.,   94. 
Holy      Scripture      compared 

with  Aristotle's  Poetics,  20. 


Homer,    32,   36,    37,    38,    40, 

112,  143,  188,  216. 
Horace,    12,    14,    18,    26,    28. 

142,    184. 

Iago,    166,    218. 

Idea   of    Tragedy,    212. 

Idea    of    tragedy,    Dryden's, 

119,    148. 
Idea  of  tragedy,  Minturno's, 

22. 

Immorality  of  the  drama,  1, 

72. 
Impartial    Critic,    169. 
Indian  Emperor,  121,   138. 
Intemperance       in       poetry, 

treatment   of,    38. 

James  II.,   King,   117. 

Jephthe,   14,   16. 

Johnson,    Dr.    Samuel,     151, 

lS7»    I99ff-.   203,   204,   205, 

213- 
Jonson,  Ben,  1,17,  107,  135, 

137.   M4.   »5i»   J54- 
Jowett,    3off. 
Julius  Ccesar,   154,    165,   170, 

171. 

Katharsis,  8,   13,   59,  63,  69, 

122,  179,  196. 
Kent,    179. 
King    and    No     King,     154, 

161,    163. 

Laughter  in  poetry,  treat- 
ment of,   38. 

Laws,    3 iff. 

Lear,  179,  186,  202,  214,  218. 

Legal  punishment  of  crime, 
42,  209,  210. 

Letters  and  Essays,    190. 

Life   of    Addison,    213. 

Literary  criticism  in  France, 
18. 

Lives  0}  the  Poets,    201. 

Lodge,   15,   17,  87. 

London,  Proclamation  of  the 
city  council  of,  78. 


[  232  ] 


INDEX 


I.onginus,    26,    27. 
I.ounsbury,   6,   65,    145,    202 

Macbeth,   179,   203,  208,   215. 

Macduff,   214,   215. 

Macduff,    Lady,    179. 

Magge,   27. 

Maid's  Tragedy,    154,    163. 

Marino,    138. 

Mary,    Queen,    76,    78. 

Measure   for   Measure,    84. 

Medea,    124,    157. 

Mediaeval  theories  of  poetry, 

2  iff. 
Meres,   16,   17. 
Midas,   41. 

Milton,    17,   26,    123,    139. 
Minturno,   22,   26,   28. 
Miracle   plays,   67,    70. 
Mirror  of  nature,  the  drama 

styled,    1 5  j  ,   2oiff.,    214. 
Miscellany,    153. 
Miscellaneous  Letters,    190. 
Mock    Astrologer,     123,     124, 

130. 
Moderns,  a  school  of  literary 

criticism,    18. 
Moral  nob'lity  in  tragedy,  19. 
Moral  System  in  Shakespeare, 

211. 
Moralities,   70. 
Motteux,    164. 
Moulton,    2o8ff.,    216,    217. 

Nash,  95. 

National  Dictionary  of   Biog- 
raphy,   190. 
Nemesis,   208,   216. 
New  comedy,  96,  98,  106. 
Niobe,    34. 

Odyssey,   37,    50. 

(Edipus,  54,   123,   129IT.,   153, 

i57ff.,    170,    181,    195. 
Olmucensis,    27. 
Opposition  to  the  drama,  70. 
Orestes,  51,   157,   158,   162. 
Original     and      Progress      of 

Satire,    131. 


Orlando   Furioso,    16,    103. 
Othello,    100,    146,    154,    165, 

179,    186. 
Otto,   160. 

Parr,   Catherine,    76. 

Patriot,    195. 

Penalties  inflicted  on  actors, 

77,  78. 

Pericles,    29. 

Phaeton,    194,    195. 

Phidre,    by   Racine,    25. 

Phidias,   216. 

Philips,   103. 

Pity,   how   aroused,    161. 

Plato,  15,  16,  28ff.,  50,  54, 
61 ,  70,  75,  83,  90,  93,  94, 
102,  121,  123,  128,  164, 
196. 

Plato  and  Aristotle  com- 
pared,   6iff.,    128. 

Plato's  doctrine  of  poetic 
justice,  29ff. ;  rules  for 
poets,  44;  ethical  ideal 
in  poetry,   44. 

Platon  und  die  Aristotelische 
Poetik,    59,    60. 

Plavs  in  England,  earliest, 
67. 

Pleasure,    true    tragic,    51. 

Plutarch,   26,  27. 

Poetic  justice  a  leading  ques- 
tion in  Plato,  54;  accord- 
ing to  Francis  Bacon, 
io9ff. ;  according  to  John 
Dennis,  169ft. ;  according 
to  Charles  Gildon,  iSgff. ; 
according  to  Dr.  Johnson, 
i99ff.;  Aristotle  not  co- 
cerned  with,  54;  char- 
acters concerned  in,  55; 
Dryden  accepts  doctrine 
of,  i23ff. ;  during  Shake- 
speare's time,  ii2ff. ; 
English  basis  of,  64ff . ; 
Greek  origin  of,  iff.;  in 
recent  times,  207ff. ;  lim- 
ited meaning  of,  52;  mis- 
take concerning  origin  of, 


[  233  ] 


INDEX 


64ff. ;  not  found  in  pure 
tragedy,  53;  phrase  first 
used  by  Rymer,  65;  Plato's 
doctrine  of,  29ft . ;  required 
by  Plato,   39,  42,  45. 

Poetics,  4,  6,  12,  13,  50,  52, 
53,  55,  144,  186,  217; 
early   editions   of,    12,    13. 

Poetry,  mediaeval  theories 
of,  2 iff.;  Racine's  idea  of, 
25;    Scaliger's  idea  of,  22. 

Pope,   187. 

Portia  in  Julius  Caesar,   179. 

Praxiteles,   216. 

Price,  W.  T.,  212. 

Principles  of   Criticism,    109. 

Promos  and  Cassandra,  83, 
84. 

Prospero,    208. 

Protestantism  and  the  drama, 

74- 
Punishment,   excessive,    181, 

182;       Rymer's     idea     of 

tragic,    58;      Plato's    idea 

of,    45;     not    a    source    of 

misery,  46. 
Purgation     applied     to     the 

emotions,  8. 
Purgatory,  34. 
Purification    applied    to    the 

emotions,  8. 
Puritan       attitude       toward 

plays,   8 iff.:    influence  on 

the   drama,    73,    74. 
Puritanism,  77ff.,  85,  87,  88, 

92,    108,    135,   206. 
Puttenham,  16,  17,  66,  95ff., 

in. 
Puttenham's     treatment     of 

the  ethics  of  poetry,  95ff 

Quintilian,    12. 

Racine's  idea  of  poetry,  25. 
Rapin,     17,     137,     139,     142, 

*43,    147,    167,    172,     >94- 
Rapin's  influence  on  Rymer, 

139"". 
Realism,    202. 


Reflections  on  Aristotle's  Po- 
etics, 17,  123,  134ft".,  159, 
167,    194. 

Remarks  upon  Cato,  182,  183, 
201. 

Remarks  on  Pope's  Transla- 
tion of  Homer,   183. 

Renaissance  Classicism,   115. 

Renaissance  Aristotelianism, 

17- 
Republic,    29ft". 
Restraint  of  the  drama,  67ft. 
Retrospective    Review,    204. 
Revival  of  the  drama,  70. 
Revolt,  Addison's  ,iff.,  183ft. 
Rewards     and     punishments 

balanced,    100. 
Richard    II.,    72. 
Richard    III.,    58,    203,    207. 
Rival-Ladies,    121,    1 54. 
Robortelli,    13,    27. 
Roderigo,    166. 
Rollo,    133,    154ft".,    '8 1. 
Romeo  and  Juliet,    208. 
Rules  for  tragedy,  Rymer's, 

163. 
Rymer,    17,    22,    33,    43,   44, 

47,  49,   52,   55,   57,   5»,  64, 

65,    82ft".,     103,     106,     109, 

II3ff.,      I20ff.,      I32ff.,      I57, 

165,    168,    170,    172,     173, 

l8off.,      189ft".,      202ff..     2IO. 

Rymer  censured  by  Warbur- 
ton,  152;  compared  with 
Plato,  43;  Rapin's  influ- 
ence on,    139ft". 

Rymer's  criticism  of  Shake- 
speare, 164ft.;  first  con- 
tribution to  literary  crit- 
icism, 134ft"  J  idea  of  tragic 
punishment,  58;  opinions 
summarized,   167ft". 

Saintsbury,  on  Longinus,  26; 
on  Aristotle's  idea  of  trag- 
edy, 8. 

Samson   Agonistes,    123. 

Scaliger's  idea  of  poetry,  22. 

School  of  Abuse,  15,79,85,87. 


[234] 


INDEX 


Schoolmaster,  14,  73,  77. 

Segni's  translation  of  the 
Poetics,    1 3. 

Seneca,    14. 

Shad  well,    114,    i36- 

Shakespeare,  1,  2,  55,  58, 
84,  ii2,  113,  '.36.  '37, 
144,  146,  147,  i.SifT.,  165, 
170,  171,  174,  175.  T  77, 
186,  187,  189,  190,  193, 
198ft". 

Shakespeare  attacked  by 
critics,  i ;  defended  by 
Addison,  2;  ridiculed  by 
Rymer,  152;  Rymer's  crit- 
icism   of,    i64ff. 

Shakespeare  as  a  Dramatic 
Artist,  65,  202,  206,  209. 

Shakespeare       Commentaries, 

215.  A 

Shakespeare's    Dramatic    Art, 

2I5- 
Short    View  0}   Tragedy,    120, 

134,     1.35.     !52,     153.     l64, 

165,   169. 
Shylock,    209. 
Sicinius,    178. 
Sidney,    Sir    Philip,     10,     15, 

17/66,    88ft".,    96,    ioiff. 
Sidney  on  tragic  emotions,  10. 
Sidney's  ethical  requirement 

in    poetry,    88ff. 
Simonides,    94. 
Six  Oid  Plays,   84. 
Smith    on    Ascham,    73;     on 

Puritanism,    75. 
Snider,   Denton  J.,    146,    147, 

165,     189,     214,     215,     219. 
Socrates,    26,    32. 
Sophocles,    14,    20,    117,    129, 

131,     143,     147.     150,     151, 

167,     168,     170,     195,    217. 
Spectator,  1,  6,  183,  184,  187, 

188,    202. 
Spencer  criticised  by  Rymer, 

137- 
Spingarn,  12,  17,  22,  23,  113, 

116,   159. 
Stage  Defended,    183. 


Stowe,   68. 
St.    Paul's,   85. 

Taine,    139. 

Tasso,    138. 

Tate,    Nahum,    187. 

Technique  0}  the  Drama,  212 

Tempest,   208. 

Tertullian,   26. 

Third   Miscellany,    118. 

Thyestes,   54. 

To  The  Spectator,  64,  180, 
182. 

Tragedies  0}  the  Last  Age 
and  Short  View,  58,  118, 
132,  134,  144,  148ft*-,  167, 
172,   209. 

Tragedy,  Addison's  idea  of, 
2;  Cintio's  idea  of,  21; 
Dryden's  idea  of,  115ft.; 
Gildon's  idea  of,  n.;' 
Minturno's  idea  of,  22; 
aim  of,  185;  compared 
with  comedy,  19,  98,  124, 
171;  defined  by  Cook, 
203;  defined  by  Dryden, 
118;  four  types  of,  56; 
instructive,  49;  Plato's  a- 
titude  in  regard  to,  34; 
primary  purpose  of,  49; 
styled  the  mirror  of  nature, 
107. 

Tragi-comedy,  55- 

Tragic  guilt,   source  of,   181. 

Triumph    of    evil,    213,    214. 
Troilus    and    Cressida,     118, 

127. 
Trojan   War,    34. 

Truths,    universal,    150. 
Tyrannic    Love,    125. 
Types  of  plays,    53. 

Ulrici,   214,   215,   219. 
Unities,   the,    147. 
Unrewarded    virtue,    4. 
Utopia,    Plato's,    40. 

Varchi,    27. 

Vergil,   27,    138,    143. 


[  235  ] 


INDEX 

Vettori,    27.  Whetstone,    66,    83ff. 

Villain,  character  of,  133.  Wild  Gallant,   121. 

Virtue  unrewarded,  4.  Women  on  the  English  stage, 
Virtuous,  misfortunes  of  the,  IX3- 

107,  179,   188,  206.  Worsfold,   66,    109. 

Wright,  29,  31. 

Warburton,    152.  Wyliey,    75. 
Ward,  88. 

Webbe,  16,   17,  94,  95.  Zeus,  213. 


[236] 


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